§199ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώσεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν γράμματα πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;
SOCRATES: Or shall we say that he will read and count what he does not know, having granted to him that he knows all letters and all number?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτʼ ἄλογον.
THEAETETUS: But that too is unreasonable.
ΣΩ. βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἕλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μέν τι τὸ κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν τις ἔκτηται μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδεν μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν;
SOCRATES: Do you want us, then, to say that we do not care at all about names, in whatever way anyone delights in twisting the words 'knowing' and 'learning'; but since we have defined possessing knowledge as one thing, and having it as another, we say that it is impossible for someone not to possess what he has acquired, so that it never happens that what one knows, one does not know, but nevertheless it is possible to get a false opinion about it?
ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν ἀντʼ ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινά πού ποτʼ ἐπιστήμην διαπετομένων ἀνθʼ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, τότε ἄρα τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα ᾠήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβὼν τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.
SOCRATES: For it is possible not to have the knowledge of this thing, but another instead of it, when hunting some piece of knowledge among those flying about, he mistakenly takes one instead of another; at that time, then, he thought eleven was twelve, taking the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve, which is in him like taking a ringdove instead of a dove.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.
THEAETETUS: Yes, that makes sense.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευδεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι;
SOCRATES: But when he takes the very one he attempts to take, he is free from error and then opines things that are; and in this way indeed both true and false opinion exist, and none of the things we were having difficulty with before becomes an obstacle?
ἴσως οὖν μοι συμφήσεις· ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;
Perhaps, then, you will agree with me; or what will you do?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAETETUS: Just so.
ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή.
SOCRATES: Yes, for we have been rid of the difficulty of not knowing what we know; for it no longer happens anywhere that we do not possess what we have acquired, whether we are mistaken about something or not.
δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.
However, another more terrible difficulty seems to me to appear.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον;
THEAETETUS: What kind of difficulty?
ΣΩ. εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς γενήσεταί ποτε δόξα.
SOCRATES: If the exchange of pieces of knowledge will ever become false opinion.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;
THEAETETUS: How so?
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνῃ ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενομένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα;
SOCRATES: First, that one having the knowledge of something should be ignorant of this very thing, not through ignorance, but by his own knowledge; next, to opine this to be another thing, and that other to be this, how is this not a great absurdity—that when knowledge is present, the soul should recognize nothing, but be ignorant of everything?
ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει.
For by this argument, nothing prevents ignorance, when present, from making someone recognize something, and blindness from making one see, if indeed knowledge too is ever to make someone be ignorant.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δʼ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ πέρι ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.
THEAETETUS: For perhaps, Socrates, we were not right in setting up the birds as pieces of knowledge only; we ought to have set up also pieces of ignorance flying about together with them in the soul, and the hunter, taking sometimes a piece of knowledge and sometimes a piece of ignorance concerning the same thing, opines falsely with the piece of ignorance, but truly with the piece of knowledge.
§200ΣΩ. οὐ ῥᾴδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε· ὃ μέντοι εἶπες πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι.
SOCRATES: It is not easy, Theaetetus, not to praise you; however, examine again what you have said.
ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ μέν, φῄς, δοξάσει.
For let it be as you say; but the one who takes the piece of ignorance will opine falsely, you say.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐ δήπου καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
SOCRATES: Surely he will not also think that he opines falsely.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γάρ;
THEAETETUS: How indeed could he?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται.
SOCRATES: But rather truly, and he will be disposed as one who knows about the things in which he has been mistaken.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.
SOCRATES: Therefore, he will think that he has hunted and holds a piece of knowledge, but not a piece of ignorance.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον.
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, after coming round a long way, we are back again at our first difficulty.
ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελάσας φήσει· πότερον,
ὦ βέλτιστοι,
ἀμφοτέρας τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν;
For that refutative man will laugh and say: "Is it the case, my excellent friends, that someone who knows both, both knowledge and ignorance, thinks that one of them which he knows is another which he knows?
ἢ οὐδετέραν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν;
Or knowing neither, does he opine that one which he does not know is another of those which he does not know?
ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δʼ οὔ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται;
Or knowing one but not the other, does he think the one he knows is the one he does not know, or the one he does not know is the one he knows?
ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕωσπερ ἂν κεκτῆται ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προχείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ;
Or will you tell me again that of these pieces of knowledge and ignorance there are in turn other pieces of knowledge, which the possessor, having shut them up in some other ridiculous aviaries or waxen molds, knows as long as he possesses them, even if he does not have them ready in his soul?
καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινούμεθα;
And will you thus be forced to run round to the same place ten thousand times, achieving nothing more?" What shall we reply to this, Theaetetus?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.
THEAETETUS: But by Zeus, Socrates, I at least do not know what one must say.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες;
SOCRATES: Does not, then, my boy, the argument rightly rebuke us and show that we are not correct in seeking false opinion before knowledge, letting the latter go?
τὸ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι πρὶν ἄν τις ἐπιστήμην ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτʼ ἐστίν.
For it is impossible to understand that before one has sufficiently grasped what knowledge actually is.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἴεσθαι.
THEAETETUS: It is necessary, Socrates, in the present situation to think as you say.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην;
SOCRATES: What, then, will one say again from the beginning that knowledge is?
οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω;
For surely we shall not yet give up, shall we?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἥκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύῃς.
THEAETETUS: Not at all, unless you at least give up.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;
SOCRATES: Tell then, by saying what about it would we least contradict ourselves?
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.
THEAETETUS: That true opinion is knowledge.
ΣΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΘΕΑΙ. τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστιν τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίγνεται.
For surely opining truly is free from error, and all the things that come about under it become fine and good.