§192ΣΩ. δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους ὅτι ὃ μέν τις οἶδεν, σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθανόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον.
SOCRATES: It must be stated in this way about them, distinguishing from the beginning, that for one to think that what he knows—having the memory of it in his soul, but not perceiving it—is some other thing of the things he knows—having also the imprint of that, but not perceiving it—is impossible.
καὶ ὅ γε οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδʼ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγῖδα· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεταί γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται.
And again, to think that what he knows is what he does not know and of which he has no seal; and what he does not know, to be what he does not know; and what he does not know, to be what he knows; and what he perceives, to think it is some other thing of the things he perceives; and what he perceives, to be some of the things he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive, to be some of the things he does not perceive; and what he does not perceive, to be some of the things he perceives.
καὶ ἔτι γε αὖ καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὖ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὖ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε.
And still further, again, to think that what he knows and perceives, and of which he holds the sign corresponding to the perception, is some other thing of the things he knows and perceives, and of which he holds in turn the sign of that other corresponding to the perception, is even more impossible than those, if that were possible.
καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὃ οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταὐτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται·
And to think that what he knows and perceives, having the memory correctly, is what he knows is impossible; and what he knows and perceives, having it in the same way, to be what he perceives; and again, what he does not know nor perceive, to be what he does not know nor perceive; and what he does not know nor perceive, to be what he does not know; and what he does not know nor perceive, to be what he does not perceive.
πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινα δοξάσαι.
All these cases exceed in the impossibility of anyone opining falsely in them.
λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.
It remains, then, in the following cases, if indeed anywhere else, for such a thing to occur.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐν τίσι δή;
THEAETETUS: In which, indeed?
ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἕπομαι.
If perhaps I might learn something more from them; for now I am not following.
ΣΩ. ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερʼ ἄττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.
SOCRATES: In those things which he knows, to think that they are some other things of those he knows and perceives; or of those which he does not know, but perceives; or of those which he knows and perceives, to be some of those he knows in turn and perceives.
ΘΕΑΙ. νῦν πολὺ πλέον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.
THEAETETUS: Now I am left behind much more than before.
ΣΩ. ὧδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε.
SOCRATES: Listen, then, back again in this way.
ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταὐτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ, καὶ ἅπτομαί ποτʼ αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἀκούω ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δʼ αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ;
Do I, knowing Theodorus and remembering in myself what sort of person he is, and Theaetetus in the same way, sometimes indeed see them, and sometimes not, and sometimes touch them, and sometimes not, and hear them or perceive some other perception, and at other times have indeed no perception about you, but remember you none the less and know you in myself?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Certainly indeed.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μάθε ὧν βούλομαι δηλῶσαι, ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: Learn this first, then, of what I wish to show: that it is possible for one not to perceive what he knows, and it is possible to perceive it.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθῆ.
THEAETETUS: True.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον;
SOCRATES: Is it not also the case that what he does not know, it is often possible not even to perceive, but often possible only to perceive?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.
THEAETETUS: This is also so.