§178ΘΕΟ. οὐδαμῶς.
THEODORUS: Not at all.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἑκάστη;
SOCRATES: Does each city, then, always hit the mark, or does it also often make mistakes?
ΘΕΟ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν.
THEODORUS: I, for my part, think they also make mistakes.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειεν ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἴδους ἐρωτῴη ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν· ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον.
SOCRATES: Moreover, from this point, everyone would agree even more to these same things, if one were to ask about the entire class to which the beneficial also happens to belong; and this is, I suppose, also about the future time.
ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον· τοῦτο δὲ
μέλλον
ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.
For when we make laws, we establish the laws as being beneficial for the time to come; and this we would correctly call the future.
ΘΕΟ. πάνυ γε.
THEODORUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, οὑτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων· πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν,
ὡς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, λευκῶν βαρέων κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων·
SOCRATES: Come then, let us ask Protagoras or someone else among those who say the same things as he does: "Man is the measure of all things," as you people say, Protagoras, of white things, heavy things, light things, and of absolutely everything of that kind.
ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὑτῷ καὶ ὄντα.
For having the criterion of them in himself, thinking them to be such as he experiences them, he thinks they are true for him and exist.
οὐχ οὕτω;
Is it not so?
ΘΕΟ. οὕτω.
THEODORUS: It is so.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, καὶ οἷα ἂν οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι;
SOCRATES: And does he, we shall say, Protagoras, also have the criterion of things that are going to be in himself, and whatever he thinks will be, do these also happen to that person who thought so?
οἷον θερμή· ἆρʼ ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης αὑτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα;
For instance, as to heat: when some layman thinks that he is going to catch a fever and that this heat will be, and another person, who is a doctor, thinks the contrary, according to whose opinion shall we say the future will turn out, or according to the opinion of both, so that for the doctor he will become neither hot nor feverish, but for himself he will become both?
ΘΕΟ. γελοῖον μεντἂν εἴη.
THEODORUS: That would indeed be ridiculous.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οἶμαι περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ κυρία.
SOCRATES: But, I suppose, concerning the future sweetness or sourness of wine, the opinion of the farmer, and not that of the kithara-player, is authoritative.
ΘΕΟ. τί μήν;
THEODORUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειεν μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Nor again, concerning what will be out of tune or in tune, would a physical trainer judge better than a musician, which even later will seem in tune to the physical trainer himself.
ΘΕΟ. οὐδαμῶς.
THEODORUS: By no means.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς.
SOCRATES: Therefore, also of one who is going to feast, not being a cook, while a banquet is being prepared, the judgment concerning the future pleasure is less authoritative than that of the cook.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονότος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἄριστος κριτής, ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν;
For concerning what is already pleasant to each, or has been in the past, let us not yet contend in our discussion, but concerning what is going to seem and be for each in the future, is he himself the best judge for himself, or would you, Protagoras, predict better than any layman whatever about the argument that is going to be persuasive for each of us in a court of law?
ΘΕΟ. καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.
THEODORUS: Indeed, Socrates, in this at least he used to claim strongly that he excelled everyone.
§179ΣΩ. νὴ Δία, ὦ μέλε·
SOCRATES: By Zeus, my friend!
ἢ οὐδείς γʼ ἂν αὐτῷ διελέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ μὴ τοὺς συνόντας ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτός.
Otherwise no one would have conversed with him, giving him a large sum of money, if he had not persuaded his associates that neither a prophet nor anyone else could judge what is going to be and seem in the future better than he himself.
ΘΕΟ. ἀληθέστατα.
THEODORUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετουμένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, both legislations and the beneficial are concerned with the future, and everyone would agree that a city making laws must often of necessity miss the most beneficial?
ΘΕΟ. μάλα γε.
THEODORUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὁπωστιοῦν ἀνάγκην εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτʼ ἐβουλόμην εἴτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Moderately, then, shall it be said by us to your teacher that he must of necessity admit that one person is wiser than another, and that such a person is a measure, but for me, the ignorant one, there is no necessity at all to become a measure, as the argument on his behalf just now forced me to be, whether I wished it or not.
ΘΕΟ. ἐκείνῃ μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἁλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ᾗ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.
THEODORUS: In that way, Socrates, it seems to me the argument is most caught, though it is also caught in this way: that it makes the opinions of others authoritative, and these have appeared to regard his arguments as in no way true.
ΣΩ. πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἁλοίη μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι·
SOCRATES: In many other ways too, Theodorus, such a claim could be caught, to the effect that not every opinion of every person is true.
περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται, χαλεπώτερον ἑλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς.
But concerning the immediate experience present to each, from which sensations and the corresponding opinions arise, it is more difficult to capture them as not being true.
ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσίν, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταὐτὸν θέμενος.
But perhaps I am saying nothing; for they are, if they happen to be, invincible, and those who assert that they are clear and are knowledge may perhaps be speaking the truth, and Theatetus here has not spoken beside the mark in putting sensation and knowledge as the same thing.
προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται·
We must therefore approach closer, as the argument on behalf of Protagoras commanded, and examine this flowing reality, testing it by striking it, to see whether it sounds healthy or cracked.
μάχη δʼ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φαύλη οὐδʼ ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.
In any case, the battle about it is not trivial, nor has it occurred among a few.
ΘΕΟ. πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρωμένως.
THEODORUS: Far from being trivial, indeed, it is spreading very widely in Ionia; for the disciples of Heraclitus promote this doctrine very vigorously.
ΣΩ. τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.
SOCRATES: For that very reason, my dear Theodorus, we must examine it all the more and from the beginning, just as they themselves propose.