§176ΘΕΟ. εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατʼ ἀνθρώπους εἴη.
THEODORUS: If, Socrates, you could persuade everyone of what you say as you do me, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔτʼ ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε— ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη—οὔτʼ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.
SOCRATES: But it is impossible for evils to be destroyed, Theodorus—for there must always be something contrary to the good—nor can they be established among the gods, but they must of necessity prowl around mortal nature and this region.
διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα.
Therefore, we must also try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible.
φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.
And flight is becoming like god as far as possible; and becoming like god is to become just and holy with wisdom.
ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δʼ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν.
But indeed, my excellent friend, it is not altogether easy to persuade people that, after all, it is not for the reasons the many say we must flee wickedness and pursue virtue—namely, in order that one may not seem bad and may seem good, for these are, as it seems to me, the so-called "old wives' tales"—but let us state the truth as follows.
θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλʼ ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιότατος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὃς ἂν ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅτι δικαιότατος.
God is in no way and by no means unjust, but is as just as possible, and there is nothing more like him than whoever among us in turn becomes as just as possible.
περὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία.
On this depends the true cleverness of a man, as well as his worthlessness and unmanliness.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ δʼ ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάναυσοι.
For the knowledge of this is true wisdom and virtue, while ignorance of it is manifest folly and wickedness; and the other seeming clevernesses and wisdoms, when they occur in political offices, become vulgar, and in the crafts low.
τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστʼ ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι· ἀγάλλονται γὰρ τῷ ὀνείδει καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλʼ ἄνδρες οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους.
To the one, therefore, who commits injustice and says or does unholy things, it is by far the best not to concede that he is clever by reason of his unscrupulousness; for they glory in the reproach and think they hear that they are not nonentities, "mere burdens on the earth," but men such as those who are to survive in a city ought to be.
λεκτέον οὖν τἀληθές, ὅτι τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν.
We must, therefore, tell them the truth: that they are all the more the kind of men they think they are not, precisely because they do not think so; for they are ignorant of the penalty of injustice, which they ought least of all to be ignorant of.
οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσιν, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν.
For it is not what they think it is, stripes and death, which they sometimes suffer though doing no injustice, but a penalty which it is impossible to escape.
ΘΕΟ. τίνα δὴ λέγεις;
THEODORUS: What penalty do you mean?
§177ΣΩ. παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιωτάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἠλιθιότητός τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοιούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι.
SOCRATES: My friend, there are two patterns established in reality, the one divine and most happy, the other godless and most miserable, and because they do not see that this is so, through their foolishness and extreme 177a¦ mindlessness they fail to notice that they are becoming like the one by their unjust actions, and unlike the other.
οὗ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοιοῦνται·
They pay the penalty for this by living the life that conforms to the pattern they resemble.
ἐὰν δʼ εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.
But if we tell them that, unless they rid themselves of their "cleverness," even when they die, that place which is pure of evils will not receive them, and here they will always have a mode of life resembling themselves, evil men associating with evil men, they, as extremely clever and unscrupulous people, will listen to these things as the babblings of some fools.
ΘΕΟ. καὶ μάλα δή, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEODORUS: Quite so, indeed, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
SOCRATES: I know it well, my companion.
ἓν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν· ὅταν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φυγεῖν, τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν αὐτοὶ αὑτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν.
However, one thing happens to them: whenever they must give and receive an account in private about the things they censure, and they are willing to endure manfully for a long time and not flee unmanfully, then, strangely enough, my good friend, they end up being displeased with themselves concerning the things they say, and that rhetoric of theirs somehow fades away, so that they seem to differ in no way from children.
περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν—εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον—ἐπὶ δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.
But let us depart from these matters, since they happen to be spoken of as digressions—otherwise, more flowing in constantly will bury our original argument—and let us go on to what went before, if it also seems good to you.
ΘΕΟ. ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀηδέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾴω γὰρ τηλικῷδε ὄντι ἐπακολουθεῖν.
THEODORUS: For me, Socrates, such things are not unpleasant to hear; for it is easier for one of my age to follow them.
εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.
However, if it seems good, let us return.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διισχυρίζεσθαι καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις δόξαντα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θεμένῃ, ἕωσπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τἀγαθὰ οὐδένα ἀνδρεῖον ἔθʼ οὕτως εἶναι ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι καὶ ἃ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι·
SOCRATES: Were we not, then, somewhere about this point in the argument, where we said that those who assert a changing reality, and that what seems to each person always also is for the one to whom it seems, are willing to maintain this in other matters, and not least about things that are just, namely that above all, whatever a city establishes as seeming right to itself, these things are indeed just for the city that established them, for as long as they remain established; but concerning the good, no one is any longer so manly as to dare to contend that whatever a city establishes thinking it to be advantageous to itself, also is advantageous for as long a time as it remains established, unless one were to speak only of the name?
τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμʼ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν.
But this would surely be a mockery of what we are saying.
ἢ οὐχί;
Or is it not?
ΘΕΟ. πάνυ γε.
THEODORUS: Absolutely.
ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω.
SOCRATES: Let him not, indeed, speak of the name, but let him contemplate the thing named.
ΘΕΟ. μὴ γάρ.
THEODORUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δήπου στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθʼ ὅσον οἴεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους ἑαυτῇ τίθεται· ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;
SOCRATES: But whatever a city calls this, it surely aims at it in making laws, and it establishes all its laws, as far as it opines and is able, as most advantageous to itself; or does it make laws looking to something else?