§171ΣΩ. τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ;
SOCRATES: But what about Protagoras himself?
ἆρʼ οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν;
Is it not necessary, if neither he himself thought man is the measure, nor the multitude—as indeed they do not—that this 'Truth' which he wrote exists for no one?
εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθʼ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.
And if he himself thought so, but the multitude does not agree, do you know that, first of all, by as much as those to whom it does not seem so are more numerous than those to whom it does, by so much more it is not than it is?
ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθʼ ἑκάστην δόξαν ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.
THEODORUS: It must be so, if indeed it will be and will not be according to each opinion.
ΣΩ. ἔπειτά γε τοῦτʼ ἔχει κομψότατον· ἐκεῖνος μὲν περὶ τῆς αὑτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴησιν, ᾗ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.
SOCRATES: Then, indeed, it has this most elegant feature: regarding his own opinion, he concedes that the opinion of those who oppose him—by which they believe him to be false—is true, since he agrees that all believe what is the case.
ΘΕΟ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEODORUS: Yes, absolutely.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Therefore, would he not concede that his own is false, if he agrees that the opinion of those who believe him to be false is true?
ΘΕΟ. ἀνάγκη.
THEODORUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. οἱ δέ γʼ ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοῖς ψεύδεσθαι;
SOCRATES: But do the others not concede that they themselves are false?
ΘΕΟ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEODORUS: No, indeed they do not.
ΣΩ. ὁ δέ γʼ αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν.
SOCRATES: But he, on the other hand, agrees that this opinion too is true, from what he has written.
ΘΕΟ. φαίνεται.
THEODORUS: So it seems.
ΣΩ. ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμένων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι συγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μάθῃ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it will be disputed by all, beginning with Protagoras—or rather, it will be agreed by him, when he concedes to the one saying the opposite that he believes what is true, then Protagoras himself will also concede that neither a dog nor any random man is the measure regarding any single thing which he has not learned.
οὐχ οὕτως;
Is it not so?
ΘΕΟ. οὕτως.
THEODORUS: It is so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου Ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ οὔτʼ αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, since it is disputed by all, the Truth of Protagoras would not be true for anyone, neither for any other nor for himself.
ΘΕΟ. ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἑταῖρόν μου καταθέομεν.
THEODORUS: Socrates, we are running down my friend too much.
ΣΩ. ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν τὸ ὀρθόν.
SOCRATES: But, my friend, it is unclear whether we are also running past what is right.
εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σοφώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα, ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο ἀποτρέχων.
It is likely indeed that he, being older, is wiser than us; and if he should suddenly pop up from here as far as his neck, he would probably accuse me of talking nonsense, as is likely, and you of agreeing, and then sink down and run off.
ἀλλʼ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη οἶμαι χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν.
But it is necessary for us, I think, to use ourselves such as we are, and always to say what seems to be.
καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὁντινοῦν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;
And indeed, even now, shall we say that anyone whatsoever would agree to this, namely, that one person is wiser than another, and also more ignorant?
ΘΕΟ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
THEODORUS: To me at least it seems so.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, ᾗ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ, ὡς τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ᾗ δοκεῖ, ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ που ἔν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν γύναιον καὶ παιδίον, καὶ θηρίον δέ, ἱκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που;
SOCRATES: And would the argument stand firmest in this way, in which we sketched it out when helping Protagoras, namely, that for the most part, in the way it seems to each, in that way it also is for him—hot, dry, sweet, and all things of this type; but if it is to be conceded that in some things one differs from another, he would be willing to say regarding what is healthy and diseased that not every woman and child, and indeed beast, is capable of healing itself by knowing what is healthy for itself, but here indeed one differs from another, if indeed anywhere?
ΘΕΟ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.
THEODORUS: To me at least it seems so.