§172ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν ἑκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἑκάστῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως εἶναι·
SOCRATES: Therefore, regarding political matters as well—beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, holy and unholy—whatever each city, believing them to be so, lays down as laws for itself, these are also in truth for each; and in these matters, indeed, neither is any private individual wiser than another private individual, nor city than city.
ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθʼ, εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβουλόν τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν·
But in laying down what is advantageous to itself or not advantageous, here indeed, if anywhere, he will in turn agree that adviser differs from adviser, and the opinion of one city differs in respect of truth from that of another; and he would not at all dare to say that whatever a city lays down, believing it to be advantageous to itself, will most assuredly also be advantageous to it.
ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖ οὗ λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνοσίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε, ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον.
But in that other area of which I speak, in matters of the just and unjust, holy and unholy, they are willing to insist that none of these has by nature any essence of its own, but what seems so to the community becomes true at that time when it seems so, and for as long a time as it seems so.
καὶ ὅσοι γε ἂν μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον λέγωσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.
And those who do not altogether speak the argument of Protagoras lead their wisdom in some such way.
λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος καταλαμβάνει.
But an argument, Theodorus, larger from a smaller one, catches up with us from an argument.
ΘΕΟ. οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες;
THEODORUS: Are we not at leisure, Socrates?
ΣΩ. φαινόμεθα.
SOCRATES: It seems so.
καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δή, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.
And indeed, many times, my wonderful friend, on other occasions too I have noticed, and yet also now, how naturally those who have spent much time in philosophy seem ridiculous when they go into the law courts as speakers.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις;
THEODORUS: How indeed do you mean?
ΣΩ. κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.
SOCRATES: Those who have been rolling around in the law courts and such places from their youth run the risk of having been brought up, compared to those reared in philosophy and such pursuits, as slaves compared to free men.
ΘΕΟ. πῇ δή;
THEODORUS: In what way indeed?
ΣΩ. ἧι τοῖς μὲν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες ἀεὶ πάρεστι, σχολή, καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται·
SOCRATES: In that the latter always have this which you mentioned, leisure, and they hold their discussions in peace at leisure.
ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον καθάπερ ἡμᾶς ἀρέσῃ· καὶ διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος·
Just as we are now taking up a third argument from an argument, so do they, if the one that comes up pleases them more than the one proposed, just as it does us; and it matters nothing to them to speak at length or briefly, if only they attain what is.
οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι—κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκεν καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγιγνωσκομένην ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον·
But the former always speak in a lack of leisure —for the flowing water presses them—and it is not permitted to make their arguments about whatever they might desire, but the opponent stands over them, holding a necessity, and reading out the written charge outside of which they must not speak.
οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δεσπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρί τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος·
And their speeches are always about a fellow-slave addressed to a master who sits there, holding some lawsuit in his hand, and the contests are never in vain but always about himself, and often the race is even for life itself.
ὥστʼ ἐξ ἁπάντων τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ ὑπελθεῖν, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς.
Consequently, from all these things they become intense and sharp, knowing how to flatter the master with words and to win him over with deeds, but small and not upright in their souls.