§169ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὔ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον.
SOCRATES: But not better than you, Theodorus.
μὴ οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί.
Do not, then, think that I must defend your deceased companion in every way while you defend him in no way.
ἀλλʼ ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἴς τε ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τἆλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις διαφέρειν.
But come, my excellent friend, follow a little way, until this very point, until we know whether you indeed must be the measure regarding geometrical diagrams, or whether all are equally as capable as you for themselves in astronomy and the other things in which you indeed have the reputation of being outstanding.
ΘΕΟ. οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν.
THEODORUS: It is not easy, Socrates, sitting beside you, not to give an account; but I was just now talking nonsense when I said you would permit me not to strip, and not force me like the Lacedaemonians; but you seem to me to lean rather toward Sciron.
Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατʼ Ἀνταῖόν τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἂν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.
For the Lacedaemonians bid one either depart or strip, but you seem to me to act the drama rather like Antaeus; for you do not let go of whoever comes near until you force him to strip and wrestle with you in arguments.
ΣΩ. ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπῄκασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων.
SOCRATES: Excellently indeed, Theodorus, have you likened my disease; however, I am more robust than they.
μυρίοι γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλʼ εὖ συγκεκόφασιν, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας.
For countless Heracleses and Theseuses, strong in speaking, have met me and soundly thrashed me, but I do not withdraw any the more; so terrible a passion for gymnastics about these things has entered into me.
μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.
Do not, therefore, grudge rubbing yourself against me and thereby helping both yourself and me.
ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλʼ ἄγε ὅπῃ ʼθέλεις· πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώσῃς δεῖ ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον.
THEODORUS: I no longer object, but lead wherever you wish; in any case, whatever fate you spin about these things must be endured by being refuted.
οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τʼ ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι.
However, I shall not be able to offer myself to you any further than what you propose.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων.
SOCRATES: But it is enough even up to these things.
καί μοι πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ὀνειδίσῃ.
And watch this very carefully for me, lest we somehow make a childish form of arguments without noticing, and someone reproach us for it again.
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθʼ ὅσον ἂν δύνωμαι.
THEODORUS: Well, I shall try, as far as I am able.
ΣΩ. τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα οὗπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι αὐτάρκη ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν συνεχώρησεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος διαφέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς.
SOCRATES: Let us then first take hold again of this very point as before, and see whether we were right or wrong in being displeased when we censured his argument because it made each person self-sufficient in wisdom, and yet Protagoras conceded to us that some people differ in respect to the better and the worse, who indeed are the wise.
οὐχί;
Is it not so?
ΘΕΟ. ναί.
THEODORUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὡμολόγει ἀλλὰ μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν δὲ τάχʼ ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ὁμολογίας.
SOCRATES: If, then, he himself were present and agreed, instead of us conceding on his behalf to help him, there would be no need to take it up again and confirm it; but now perhaps someone might render us unauthorized in our agreement on his behalf.
διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.
Therefore, it is better to agree more clearly about this very thing; for it makes no small difference whether it is thus or otherwise.
ΘΕΟ. λέγεις ἀληθῆ.
THEODORUS: You speak the truth.
§170ΣΩ. μὴ τοίνυν διʼ ἄλλων ἀλλʼ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, let us obtain the agreement not through others, but from his own argument in the briefest possible way.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς;
THEODORUS: How?
ΣΩ. οὑτωσί· τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ;
SOCRATES: In this way: does he not say that what seems to each person, this also is for the one to whom it seems?
ΘΕΟ. φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.
THEODORUS: To be sure he does.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ φαμὲν οὐδένα ὅντινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν τοὺς ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδοκῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι·
SOCRATES: Do we not then, Protagoras, speak of the opinions of a man, or rather of all men, and say that there is no one who does not believe himself wiser than others in some things, and others wiser than himself in other things?
καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τῶν τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν, ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι.
And indeed in the greatest dangers, when they are storm-tossed in military campaigns or illnesses or at sea, they look to those who rule in each situation as to gods, expecting them to be their saviors, differing in nothing else than in knowing; and all human affairs are surely full of those seeking teachers and rulers of themselves and of other animals and of works, and on the other hand, of those believing they are capable of teaching and capable of ruling.
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;
And in all these cases, what else shall we say but that men themselves believe that wisdom and ignorance exist among them?
ΘΕΟ. οὐδὲν ἄλλο.
THEODORUS: Nothing else.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν;
SOCRATES: Do they not then believe wisdom to be true thought, and ignorance to be false opinion?
ΘΕΟ. τί μήν;
THEODORUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;
SOCRATES: What then, Protagoras, shall we do with the argument?
πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ τοτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ;
Shall we say that men always hold true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false?
ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που συμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλʼ ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς δοξάζειν.
For from both positions, surely, it follows that they do not always hold true opinions, but both.
σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
For consider, Theodorus, if any of those around Protagoras, or you yourself, would be willing to contend that no one believes another to be ignorant and to hold false opinions.
ΘΕΟ. ἀλλʼ ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEODORUS: But that is incredible, Socrates.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων.
SOCRATES: And yet, the argument that says 'man is the measure of all things' arrives at this very necessity.
ΘΕΟ. πῶς δή;
THEODORUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρός με ἀποφαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστιν κριταῖς γενέσθαι, ἢ ἀεὶ σὲ κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν;
SOCRATES: Whenever you, having judged something by yourself, declare to me an opinion about something, let this indeed be true for you according to his argument; but for us, the others, is it not possible to become judges about your judgment, or do we always judge that you hold true opinions?
ἢ μυρίοι ἑκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι;
Or do countless people on each occasion fight you, holding opposite opinions, believing that you judge and think falsely?
ΘΕΟ. νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα παρέχουσιν.
THEODORUS: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, very many indeed, as Homer says, who provide me with human troubles.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ;
Do you wish us to say that you then hold true opinions for yourself, but false for the countless ones?
ΘΕΟ. ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
THEODORUS: It seems to be necessary from the argument, at least.