§166ΣΩ. ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε οἶμαι χωρήσεται καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων· οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν εἰ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησεν διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξεν.
SOCRATES: All these things, then, which we say in defending him, and he will, I think, come to close quarters, despising us and saying: 'This good Socrates here, because a certain child when questioned by him became frightened about whether it is possible for the same person to remember the same thing and at the same time not to know it, and in its fear denied it because of not being able to see ahead, has made a laughing-stock of me in his arguments.
τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδʼ ἔχει· ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν διʼ ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῇς, ἐὰν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἷάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθείς.
But the truth, O most easy-going Socrates, is this: when you examine any of my views by means of questioning, if the one who is questioned, answering as I would have answered, is tripped up, I am refuted; but if he answers differently, the questioned person himself is refuted.
αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρεῖναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε, τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι;
For instance, do you think anyone will grant you that memory of what one has experienced is present to someone, being a sort of experience such as it was when he was experiencing it, when he is no longer experiencing it?
πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.
Far from it!
ἢ αὖ ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τʼ εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό;
Or, again, will he shrink from admitting that it is possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing?
ἢ ἐάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι;
Or, if he should fear this, will he ever grant that the one who is becoming different is the same as the one who was before becoming different?
μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, ἐάνπερ ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θηρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων;
Or rather, that there is one person and not many, and these becoming infinite in number, if indeed variation occurs—if indeed we must be on our guard against hunting one another with words?
ἀλλʼ, ὦ μακάριε,
φήσει,
γενναιοτέρως ἐπʼ αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνασαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ ὀνομάζειν, εἴη ᾧπερ φαίνεται·
But, O blessed one,' he will say, 'coming more generously against what I actually say, if you can, refute the claim that our perceptions do not occur as private to each of us, or that, if they do occur as private, it would not follow that what appears becomes so for him alone to whom it appears (or, if we must call it being, that it is for him alone to whom it appears).
ὗς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκεφάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀναπείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν.
And by speaking of pigs and dog-headed baboons, you not only play the pig yourself, but you also persuade your audience to do this to my writings, which is not honorable.
ἐγὼ γάρ φημι μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή, μυρίον μέντοι διαφέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα.
For I say that the truth is as I have written: for each of us is a measure of the things that are and are not, yet one person differs infinitely from another in this very thing, that to one person some things are and appear, and to another different things.
καὶ σοφίαν καὶ σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὃς ἄν τινι ἡμῶν, ᾧ φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι.
And I am far from saying that wisdom and a wise man do not exist, but I call this very person wise, whoever, for any of us to whom things appear and are bad, by changing them, makes them appear and be good.
τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε, ἀλλʼ ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί λέγω.
And do not chase my argument by my mere word, but learn still more clearly in this way what I mean.
οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνήσθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται. §167ΣΩ.
σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι—οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν—οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμνων ἀμαθὴς ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφὸς ὅτι ἀλλοῖα, μεταβλητέον δʼ ἐπὶ θάτερα·
For remember what was said in the previous parts: that to the sick person what he eats appears and is bitter, but to the healthy person the opposite is and appears.' 'Therefore, we must not make either of these wiser—for it is not even possible—nor should it be accused that the sick man is ignorant because he opines such things, and the healthy man is wise because he opines differently, but we must make a transition to the other state; for the other habit is better.
ἀμείνων γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ἕξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον· ἀλλʼ ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις.
And so in education too, one must make a transition from one state to the better; but the doctor changes it with medicines, and the sophist with arguments.
ἐπεὶ οὔ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν· οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρʼ ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ, ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ.
For no one has ever made someone who opines false things later opine true things; for it is neither possible to opine things that are not, nor things other than what one experiences, and these are always true.
ἀλλʼ οἶμαι πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντα συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δή τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν.
But I think that when someone, due to a bad state of soul, opines things akin to it, a good state makes him opine other things of such a kind, which indeed some people out of inexperience call true appearances, but I call them better than the others, but in no way truer.
καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς.
And the wise, my dear Socrates, I am far from calling frogs; but concerning bodies I call them doctors, and concerning plants, farmers.
φημὶ γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν.
For I say that these also, when any of their plants are sick, implant in them good, healthy, and true perceptions instead of bad ones; and the wise and good orators make good things, instead of bad ones, seem to be just to their cities.
ἐπεὶ οἷά γʼ ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλʼ ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.
For whatever things seem just and honorable to each city, these also are so for it, as long as it holds them to be so; but the wise man makes good things, instead of bad ones that exist for them in each case, both be and seem to be.
κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν.
And according to the same argument, the sophist also, being able to guide those who are being educated in this way, is both wise and worthy of much money to those who have been educated.
καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἑτέρων καὶ οὐδεὶς ψευδῆ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐάντε βούλῃ ἐάντε μή, ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σῴζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος.
And in this way, some are wiser than others, and no one opines false things; and you, whether you want to or not, must tolerate being a measure; for in these ways this argument is saved.
ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών· εἰ δὲ διʼ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, διʼ ἐρωτήσεων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον, ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι.
If you are able to dispute this from the beginning, dispute it by countering with an argument; but if you wish to do so through questions, do so through questions; for this too is not to be avoided, but of all things most to be pursued by one who has sense.
ποίει μέντοι οὑτωσί· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν.
Do so, however, in this way: do not be unjust in questioning.
καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν.
For there is great inconsistency in claiming to care for virtue, yet doing nothing but continuing to be unjust in arguments.'