§159ΘΕΑΙ. ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν, ὅταν ᾖ κομιδῇ ἕτερον.
THEAETETUS: Therefore, it is impossible for it to have anything the same either in power or in any other respect whatsoever, when it is altogether different.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὁμολογεῖν;
SOCRATES: Must we not, then, also agree that such a thing is unlike?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
THEAETETUS: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῳ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταὐτὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον;
SOCRATES: If, then, it happens that something becomes like or unlike something, whether to itself or to another, shall we say that when it is made like it becomes the same, and when it is made unlike it becomes different?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δέ γε τὰ πάσχοντα;
SOCRATES: Did we not say before that the active factors are many and infinite, and likewise also the passive factors?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμειγνύμενον καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλʼ ἕτερα γεννήσει;
SOCRATES: And further, that one thing mingling with one thing, and with another, will generate not the same but different things?
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἆλλα ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα.
SOCRATES: Let us now speak of me and you and other things according to the same argument, of Socrates in health and Socrates, on the other hand, in illness.
πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτʼ ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν;
Shall we say this one is like or unlike that one?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἆρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει;
THEAETETUS: Do you mean the ill Socrates, this whole, compared to that whole, the Socrates in health?
ΣΩ. κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.
SOCRATES: You understood perfectly; that is exactly what I mean.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνόμοιον δήπου.
THEAETETUS: Unlike, surely.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον;
SOCRATES: And therefore different, just as it is unlike?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη.
THEAETETUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις;
SOCRATES: And will you say the same of him when sleeping, and of all the states we just now went through?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε.
THEAETETUS: I certainly will.
ΣΩ. ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἑτέρῳ μοι χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἑτέρῳ;
SOCRATES: Then each of the things whose nature it is to act on something, when it finds Socrates in health, will treat me as one distinct thing, and when it finds him in illness, as another?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δʼ οὐ μέλλει;
THEAETETUS: How could it not?
ΣΩ. καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφʼ ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν;
SOCRATES: And so I, the passive factor, and that active factor will generate different things in each of the two cases?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαίνεται καὶ γλυκύς;
SOCRATES: When, then, I drink wine being in health, does it appear pleasant and sweet to me?
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶτταν ἀπηργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ ἐποίησεν καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: For indeed, according to our previous agreements, the active and the passive factors generated sweetness and perception, both moving together; and while the perception, being on the side of the passive factor, made the tongue perceiving, the sweetness, being on the side of the wine and moving around it, made the wine both be and appear sweet to the healthy tongue.
ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so; our previous agreements were to that effect.
ΣΩ. ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν;
SOCRATES: But when it finds me in illness, does it not, in the first place, in truth find a different person?
ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.
For it has approached one who is unlike.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἕτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὅ τε τοιοῦτος Σωκράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλʼ αἰσθανόμενον;
SOCRATES: And so, in turn, this sort of Socrates and the drinking of the wine generated different things: on the side of the tongue a perception of bitterness, and on the side of the wine a bitterness arising and moving around it, making the wine not bitterness itself but bitter, and me not perception itself but perceiving?
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Most assuredly.
§160ΣΩ. οὔκουν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀλλοῖον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὔτʼ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτʼ ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται.
SOCRATES: Therefore, neither shall I ever become thus perceiving of any other thing; for a perception of another thing is another perception, and it makes the perceiver different and another; nor will that active factor, by coming together with another, ever generate the same and become such as it is now; for by generating another thing from another subject, it will become different.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
THEAETETUS: That is so.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed shall I, by myself, become such as I am to myself, nor will that, by itself, become such as it is to itself.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
THEAETETUS: No, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ αἰσθανόμενον, ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται· γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.
SOCRATES: But it is necessary that I should become perceiving of something when I become perceiving; for it is impossible to become perceiving but perceiving of nothing; and that it should become sweet or bitter or something of the sort to someone; for it is impossible to become sweet, but sweet to no one.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so.
ΣΩ. λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτʼ ἐσμέν, εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδʼ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς.
SOCRATES: It remains then, I think, for us to be bound to one another, whether we are or whether we become, since necessity binds our essence together indeed, but binds it to none of the other things, nor again to ourselves.
ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται συνδεδέσθαι.
It remains, therefore, that we are bound to one another.
ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρός τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ ἐφʼ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ ὂν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον οὔτʼ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὃν διεληλύθαμεν σημαίνει.
So that if anyone names something as being, he must say that it is for someone, or of someone, or in relation to something, and likewise if he names it as becoming; but that anything is or becomes itself by itself, he must neither say himself nor accept it when someone else says so, as the argument we have gone through indicates.
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely so, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστιν καὶ οὐκ ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δʼ οὔ;
SOCRATES: Therefore, when that which acts on me is for me and not for another, do I also perceive it, while another does not?
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις—τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστιν—καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ ὡς ἔστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.
SOCRATES: True, therefore, to me is my perception—for it is always of my essence—and I am, according to Protagoras, the judge of the things that are for me, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἔοικεν.
THEAETETUS: So it seems.
ΣΩ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὢν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην ὧνπερ αἰσθητής;
SOCRATES: How then, being unerring and not stumbling in my mind concerning the things that are or become, could I fail to be a knower of those very things of which I am a perceiver?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὔ.
THEAETETUS: In no way is it possible that you should not.
ΣΩ. παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέπτωκεν, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: Most beautifully, then, has it been said by you that knowledge is nothing other than perception; and it has converged into the same result: according to Homer and Heraclitus and all that tribe, that all things move like streams, and according to Protagoras, the wisest of all, that man is the measure of all things, and according to Theaetetus, since these things are so, that perception becomes knowledge.
ἦ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε;
Is it not so, Theaetetus?
φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα;
Shall we say that this is, as it were, your newborn child, and my delivery?
ἢ πῶς λέγεις;
Or how do you say?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
THEAETETUS: It must be so, Socrates.