§439ΣΩ. ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός·
SOCRATES: Hold on, by Zeus!
τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ πολλάκις μέντοι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὰ καλῶς κείμενα ἐοικότα εἶναι ἐκείνοις ὧν ὀνόματα κεῖται, καὶ εἶναι εἰκόνας τῶν πραγμάτων;
Did we not often agree that names well established are like those things of which they are names, and are images of the things?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν ἔστι μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα διʼ ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα μανθάνειν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ διʼ αὐτῶν, ποτέρα ἂν εἴη καλλίων καὶ σαφεστέρα ἡ μάθησις;
SOCRATES: If then it is possible to learn things as much as possible through names, and is also possible through themselves, which would be the finer and clearer learning?
ἐκ τῆς εἰκόνος μανθάνειν αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν εἰ καλῶς εἴκασται, καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἧς ἦν εἰκών, ἢ ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτήν τε αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα αὐτῆς εἰ πρεπόντως εἴργασται;
To learn from the image both itself (to see) if it is well imaged, and the truth of which it was an image, or to learn from the truth both itself and its image (to see) if it has been properly wrought?
ΚΡ. ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας μοι δοκεῖ ἀνάγκη εἶναι.
CRATYLUS: From the truth, it seems to me, is necessary.
ΣΩ. ὅντινα μὲν τοίνυν τρόπον δεῖ μανθάνειν ἢ εὑρίσκειν τὰ ὄντα, μεῖζον ἴσως ἐστὶν ἐγνωκέναι ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ σέ· ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογήσασθαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ὀνομάτων ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν καὶ μαθητέον καὶ ζητητέον ἢ ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
SOCRATES: In what way, then, one must learn or discover existing things, is perhaps a greater thing to have known than according to me and you; but we must be content to agree on this, that not from names, but much rather from themselves must they be both learned and sought after than from names.
ΚΡ. φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες.
CRATYLUS: So it appears, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταὐτὸν τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, εἰ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες γε ἔθεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἁπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ῥεόντων—φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δʼ, εἰ ἔτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλʼ οὗτοι αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμβάλλουσιν.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, let us consider this, lest these many names, all tending to the same point, deceive us, if in reality those who established them established them thinking that all things are always going and flowing—for to me also they appear to have thought so—but, if it so happens, the matter is not so, but they themselves, as if having fallen into some whirlpool, are whirled about, and dragging us along, throw us in too.
σκέψαι γάρ, ὦ θαυμάσιε Κρατύλε, ὃ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω.
For consider, my wonderful Cratylus, what I often dream of.
πότερον φῶμέν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὕτω, ἢ μή;
Shall we say there is something "itself beautiful" and "good" and each of the existing things in this way, or not?
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες,.
CRATYLUS: It seems so to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐκεῖνο σκεψώμεθα, μὴ εἰ πρόσωπόν τί ἐστιν καλὸν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα ῥεῖν· ἀλλʼ αὐτό, φῶμεν, τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιοῦτον ἀεί ἐστιν οἷόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Let us then consider that very thing, not if there is some beautiful face or something of that sort, and all these things seem to flow; but "itself the beautiful", we say, is it not always such as it is?
ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη.
CRATYLUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἷόν τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;
SOCRATES: Is it then possible to address it correctly, if it is always slipping away, first that "it is that thing", then that "it is of such a kind", or is it necessary that even while we are speaking, it immediately becomes something else and slips away and no longer remains as it was?
ΚΡ. ἀνάγκη.
CRATYLUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν εἴη τὶ ἐκεῖνο ὃ μηδέποτε ὡσαύτως ἔχει;
SOCRATES: How then could that be anything which is never in the same state?
εἰ γάρ ποτε ὡσαύτως ἴσχει, ἔν γʼ ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν μεταβαίνει· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει καὶ τὸ αὐτό ἐστι, πῶς ἂν τοῦτό γε μεταβάλλοι ἢ κινοῖτο, μηδὲν ἐξιστάμενον τῆς αὑτοῦ ἰδέας;
For if it is ever in the same state, in that time at least it is clear that it does not change at all; but if it is always in the same state and is the same, how could this change or move, in no way departing from its own form?
ΚΡ. οὐδαμῶς.
CRATYLUS: By no means.
§440ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἂν γνωσθείη γε ὑπʼ οὐδενός.
SOCRATES: Moreover, it would not be known by anyone either.
ἅμα γὰρ ἂν ἐπιόντος τοῦ γνωσομένου ἄλλο καὶ ἀλλοῖον γίγνοιτο, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν γνωσθείη ἔτι ὁποῖόν γέ τί ἐστιν ἢ πῶς ἔχον· γνῶσις δὲ δήπου οὐδεμία γιγνώσκει ὃ γιγνώσκει μηδαμῶς ἔχον.
For at the same time that the one who is going to know approaches, it would become other and different, so that it would no longer be known what sort of thing it is or how it is; and surely no knowledge knows that which it knows when it is in no state at all.
ΚΡ. ἔστιν ὡς λέγεις.
CRATYLUS: It is as you say.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ γνῶσιν εἶναι φάναι εἰκός, ὦ Κρατύλε, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει.
SOCRATES: But it is not even reasonable to say that there is knowledge, Cratylus, if all things are changing and nothing remains.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἡ γνῶσις, τοῦ γνῶσις εἶναι μὴ μεταπίπτει, μένοι τε ἂν ἀεὶ ἡ γνῶσις καὶ εἴη γνῶσις.
For if this very thing, knowledge, does not change from being knowledge, knowledge would always remain and be knowledge.
εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος μεταπίπτει τῆς γνώσεως, ἅμα τʼ ἂν μεταπίπτοι εἰς ἄλλο εἶδος γνώσεως καὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις· εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ μεταπίπτει, ἀεὶ οὐκ ἂν εἴη γνῶσις, καὶ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὔτε τὸ γνωσόμενον οὔτε τὸ γνωσθησόμενον ἂν εἴη.
But if even the form itself of knowledge changes, it would at the same time change into another form of knowledge and would not be knowledge; and if it is always changing, it would always not be knowledge, and according to this argument there would be neither that which will know nor that which will be known.
εἰ δὲ ἔστι μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ γιγνῶσκον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ γιγνωσκόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τὸ καλόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔστι δὲ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, οὔ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἃ νῦν ἡμεῖς λέγομεν, ῥοῇ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ φορᾷ.
But if that which knows always exists, and that which is known exists, and the beautiful exists, and the good exists, and each of the existing things exists, these things of which we are now speaking do not seem to me to be at all like a flow or motion.
ταῦτʼ οὖν πότερόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει ἢ ἐκείνως ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτόν τε λέγουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ᾖ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὑτὸν καὶ τὴν αὑτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνοις καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διισχυρίζεσθαι ὥς τι εἰδότα, καὶ αὑτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγιγνώσκειν ὡς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ῥεῖ, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ οἱ κατάρρῳ νοσοῦντες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως οἴεσθαι καὶ τὰ πράγματα διακεῖσθαι, ὑπὸ ῥεύματός τε καὶ κατάρρου πάντα χρήματα ἔχεσθαι.
Whether, then, these things are so, or in the other way as the followers of Heraclitus say and many others, is perhaps not easy to examine, nor is it the part of a very sensible man to commit himself and his own soul's care to names, trusting them and those who established them, and to maintain firmly as if he knew something, and to condemn both himself and existing things as if nothing of anything is healthy, but all things flow like pots, and to think that things are situated just like people sick with catarrh, and that all things are possessed by flow and catarrh.
ἴσως μὲν οὖν δή, ὦ Κρατύλε, οὕτως ἔχει, ἴσως δὲ καὶ οὔ.
Perhaps indeed, Cratylus, it is so, and perhaps not.
σκοπεῖσθαι οὖν χρὴ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ εὖ, καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίως ἀποδέχεσθαι—ἔτι γὰρ νέος εἶ καὶ ἡλικίαν ἔχεις—σκεψάμενον δέ, ἐὰν εὕρῃς, μεταδιδόναι καὶ ἐμοί.
Therefore you must consider bravely and well, and not accept things easily—for you are still young and have the age for it—and when you have considered, if you find out, impart it also to me.
ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα.
CRATYLUS: Indeed I will do so.
εὖ μέντοι ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ νυνὶ ἀσκέπτως ἔχω, ἀλλά μοι σκοπουμένῳ καὶ πράγματα ἔχοντι πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκείνως φαίνεται ἔχειν ὡς Ἡράκλειτος λέγει.
Know well, however, Socrates, that even now I am not unthoughtful, but to me as I consider and take trouble, it seems much rather to be in that way as Heraclitus says.
ΣΩ. εἰς αὖθις τοίνυν με, ὦ ἑταῖρε, διδάξεις, ἐπειδὰν ἥκῃς· νῦν δέ, ὥσπερ παρεσκεύασαι, πορεύου εἰς ἀγρόν· προπέμψει δέ σε καὶ Ἑρμογένης ὅδε.
SOCRATES: Another time then, my companion, you shall teach me, when you have returned; but now, as you have prepared, go to the country; and Hermogenes here will escort you.
ΚΡ. ταῦτʼ ἔσται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ πειρῶ ἔτι ἐννοεῖν ταῦτα ἤδη.
CRATYLUS: So shall it be, Socrates, but do you also try to go on thinking about these things now.