§433ΚΡ. ἀλλὰ μέμνημαι.
CRATYLUS: Yes, I remember.
ΣΩ. καλῶς τοίνυν.
SOCRATES: Very well then.
ὅταν γὰρ τοῦτο ἐνῇ, κἂν μὴ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ἔχῃ, λέξεταί γε τὸ πρᾶγμα, καλῶς ὅταν πάντα, κακῶς δὲ ὅταν ὀλίγα·
For when this (character) is in it, even if it does not have all the appropriate parts, the thing will still be spoken of—well when it has all, and badly when it has few.
λέγεσθαι δʼ οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἐῶμεν, ἵνα μὴ ὄφλωμεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ νύκτωρ περιιόντες ὀψὲ ὁδοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα δόξωμεν αὖ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὕτω πως ἐληλυθέναι ὀψιαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἢ ζήτει τινὰ ἄλλην ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα, καὶ μὴ ὁμολόγει δήλωμα συλλαβαῖς καὶ γράμμασι πράγματος ὄνομα εἶναι.
In any case, my blessed friend, let us allow that it is spoken of, so that we do not incur the charge of being like those who wander around Aegina at night late on the road, and we ourselves seem to have arrived at the things in truth in this way, rather later than we ought. Otherwise, seek some other correctness of a name, and do not agree that a name is a representation of a thing by syllables and letters.
εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἐρεῖς, οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ συμφωνεῖν σαυτῷ.
For if you say both of these, you will not be able to agree with yourself.
ΚΡ. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, μετρίως λέγειν, καὶ οὕτω τίθεμαι.
CRATYLUS: Well, Socrates, you seem to me to speak moderately, and I agree with that.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἡμῖν συνδοκεῖ, μετὰ ταῦτα τάδε σκοπῶμεν· εἰ μέλλει φαμὲν καλῶς κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα, τὰ προσήκοντα δεῖ αὐτὸ γράμματα ἔχειν;
SOCRATES: Since then we agree on these things, let us examine the following next: if we say a name is to be well placed, must it have the appropriate letters?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. προσήκει δὲ τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν;
SOCRATES: And are the appropriate ones those that are like the things?
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
CRATYLUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν ἄρα καλῶς κείμενα οὕτω κεῖται·
SOCRATES: Then those that are well placed are placed in this way.
εἰ δὲ μή τι καλῶς ἐτέθη, τὸ μὲν ἂν πολὺ ἴσως ἐκ προσηκόντων εἴη γραμμάτων καὶ ὁμοίων, εἴπερ ἔσται εἰκών, ἔχοι δʼ ἄν τι καὶ οὐ προσῆκον, διʼ ὃ οὐκ ἂν καλὸν εἴη οὐδὲ καλῶς εἰργασμένον τὸ ὄνομα.
But if some name was not well placed, if indeed it is to be an image, it would perhaps consist largely of appropriate and similar letters, but it might also have some inappropriate one, because of which the name would not be beautiful or well made.
οὕτω φαμὲν ἢ ἄλλως;
Do we say so, or otherwise?
ΚΡ. οὐδὲν δεῖ οἶμαι διαμάχεσθαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀρέσκει γέ με τὸ φάναι ὄνομα μὲν εἶναι, μὴ μέντοι καλῶς γε κεῖσθαι.
CRATYLUS: I think there is no need to fight at all, Socrates, since it does not please me to say that it is a name, but not indeed well placed.
ΣΩ. πότερον τοῦτο οὐκ ἀρέσκει σε, τὸ εἶναι τὸ ὄνομα δήλωμα τοῦ πράγματος;
SOCRATES: Does this displease you, that the name is a representation of the thing?
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε.
CRATYLUS: No, that pleases me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκ προτέρων συγκείμενα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτα, οὐ καλῶς σοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι;
SOCRATES: But that some names are composed of earlier elements, and others are primary, does that not seem to you to be well said?
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε.
CRATYLUS: Yes, it does.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ πρῶτα εἰ μέλλει δηλώματά τινων γίγνεσθαι, ἔχεις τινὰ καλλίω τρόπον τοῦ δηλώματα αὐτὰ γενέσθαι ἄλλον ἢ αὐτὰ ποιῆσαι ὅτι μάλιστα τοιαῦτα οἷα ἐκεῖνα ἃ δεῖ δηλοῦν αὐτά;
SOCRATES: But if the primary names are to be representations of certain things, do you have any better way for them to become representations than by making them as much like those things which they must represent as possible?
ἢ ὅδε μᾶλλόν σε ἀρέσκει ὁ τρόπος ὃν Ἑρμογένης λέγει καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, τὸ συνθήματα εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ δηλοῦν τοῖς συνθεμένοις προειδόσι δὲ τὰ πράγματα, καὶ εἶναι ταύτην ὀρθότητα ὀνόματος, συνθήκην, διαφέρειν δὲ οὐδὲν ἐάντε τις συνθῆται ὥσπερ νῦν σύγκειται, ἐάντε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπὶ μὲν ᾧ νῦν σμικρόν, μέγα καλεῖν, ἐπὶ δὲ ᾧ μέγα, σμικρόν;
Or does this way please you more, which Hermogenes and many others mention, that names are agreements and represent to those who agree and already know the things, and that this is the correctness of a name, an agreement, and that it makes no difference whether one agrees to call it as it is now composed, or the opposite, calling 'large' what is now 'small', and 'small' what is now 'large'?
πότερός σε ὁ τρόπος ἀρέσκει;
Which way pleases you?
§434ΚΡ. ὅλῳ καὶ παντὶ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ ὁμοιώματι δηλοῦν ὅτι ἄν τις δηλοῖ ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἐπιτυχόντι.
CRATYLUS: It makes all the difference in the world, Socrates, to represent what one represents by a likeness and not by whatever happens to be.
ΣΩ. καλῶς λέγεις.
SOCRATES: Well said.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ἔσται τὸ ὄνομα ὅμοιον τῷ πράγματι, ἀναγκαῖον πεφυκέναι τὰ στοιχεῖα ὅμοια τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματά τις συνθήσει;
Therefore, if indeed the name is to be like the thing, is it not necessary that the elements from which one will compose the first names be naturally like the things?
ὧδε δὲ λέγω· ἆρά ποτʼ ἄν τις συνέθηκεν ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ζωγράφημα ὅμοιόν τῳ τῶν ὄντων, εἰ μὴ φύσει ὑπῆρχε φαρμακεῖα ὅμοια ὄντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ζωγραφούμενα, ἐκείνοις ἃ μιμεῖται ἡ γραφική·
I mean this: would anyone ever have composed what we were just calling a painting like any of existing things, if there did not exist by nature pigments similar to those which the art of painting imitates, from which the painted things are composed?
ἢ ἀδύνατον;
Or is it impossible?
ΚΡ. ἀδύνατον.
CRATYLUS: Impossible.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡσαύτως καὶ ὀνόματα οὐκ ἄν ποτε ὅμοια γένοιτο οὐδενί, εἰ μὴ ὑπάρξει ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ὁμοιότητά τινα ἔχοντα, ἐξ ὧν συντίθεται τὰ ὀνόματα, ἐκείνοις ὧν ἐστι τὰ ὀνόματα μιμήματα;
SOCRATES: Likewise, then, names would never have become like anything, unless those first elements from which the names are composed possessed some likeness to those things of which the names are imitations.
ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν συνθετέον, στοιχεῖα;
And are those things from which they must be composed elements?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν καὶ σὺ κοινώνῃ τοῦ λόγου οὗπερ ἄρτι Ἑρμογένης.
SOCRATES: Join now also in the argument in which Hermogenes just participated.
φέρε, καλῶς σοι δοκοῦμεν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ῥῶ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ κινήσει καὶ σκληρότητι προσέοικεν, ἢ οὐ καλῶς;
Come, do we seem to you to speak well when we say that rho is like rush and motion and hardness, or not well?
ΚΡ. καλῶς ἔμοιγε.
CRATYLUS: Well, to me.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ λάβδα τῷ λείῳ καὶ μαλακῷ καὶ οἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;
SOCRATES: And lambda is like the smooth and soft, and those things we were just speaking of?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἡμεῖς μέν φαμεν
σκληρότης,
Ἐρετριῆς δὲ
σκληροτήρ
;
SOCRATES: Do you know then that for the same thing we say hardness (ending in sigma) and the Eretrians say hardness (ending in rho)?
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
CRATYLUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τό τε ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα ἔοικεν ἀμφότερα τῷ αὐτῷ, καὶ δηλοῖ ἐκείνοις τε τὸ αὐτὸ τελευτῶντος τοῦ ῥῶ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ σῖγμα, ἢ τοῖς ἑτέροις ἡμῶν οὐ δηλοῖ;
SOCRATES: Do both rho and sigma then resemble the same thing, and does it represent the same thing to them when ending in rho and to us when ending in sigma, or does it not represent to one of us?
ΚΡ. δηλοῖ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέροις.
CRATYLUS: Indeed, it represents to both.
ΣΩ. πότερον ᾗ ὅμοια τυγχάνει ὄντα τὸ ῥῶ καὶ τὸ σῖγμα, ἢ ᾗ μή;
SOCRATES: Is it insofar as rho and sigma happen to be like, or insofar as they are not?
ΚΡ. ἧι ὅμοια.
CRATYLUS: Insofar as they are like.
ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ὅμοιά ἐστι πανταχῇ;
SOCRATES: Are they then like in every way?
ΚΡ. πρός γε τὸ ἴσως φορὰν δηλοῦν.
CRATYLUS: Perhaps at least in representing rush.
ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τὸ λάβδα ἐγκείμενον;
SOCRATES: Is the lambda that is inside also like it?
οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ σκληρότητος;
Does it not represent the opposite of hardness?
ΚΡ. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔγκειται, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὥσπερ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ σὺ πρὸς Ἑρμογένη ἔλεγες ἐξαιρῶν τε καὶ ἐντιθεὶς γράμματα οὗ δέοι, καὶ ὀρθῶς ἐδόκεις ἔμοιγε.
CRATYLUS: Perhaps indeed it is not rightly inside, Socrates, just as you were saying to Hermogenes, removing and putting in letters where necessary, and you seemed to me to be right.
καὶ νῦν ἴσως ἀντὶ τοῦ λάβδα ῥῶ δεῖ λέγειν.
And now perhaps instead of lambda we should say rho.
ΣΩ. εὖ λέγεις.
SOCRATES: Well said.
τί οὖν;
What then?
νῦν ὡς λέγομεν, οὐδὲν μανθάνομεν ἀλλήλων, ἐπειδάν τις φῇ
σκληρόν,
οὐδὲ οἶσθα σὺ νῦν ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω;
As we now speak, do we understand nothing of each other when someone says hard, or do you not know now what I am saying?
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε, διά γε τὸ ἔθος, ὦ φίλτατε.
CRATYLUS: Yes, I do, because of custom, my dearest friend.
ΣΩ. ἔθος δὲ λέγων οἴει τι διάφορον λέγειν συνθήκης;
SOCRATES: In speaking of custom, do you think you are speaking of something different from agreement?
ἢ ἄλλο τι λέγεις τὸ ἔθος ἢ ὅτι ἐγώ, ὅταν τοῦτο φθέγγωμαι, διανοοῦμαι ἐκεῖνο, σὺ δὲ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι ἐκεῖνο διανοοῦμαι;
Or do you mean by custom anything other than that when I utter this, I think of that, and you know that I think of that?
οὐ τοῦτο λέγεις;
Is this not what you mean?