§432ΚΡ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
CRATYLUS: That is so.
ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅταν ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα, τό τε ἄλφα καὶ τὸ βῆτα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν στοιχείων, τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀποδιδῶμεν τῇ γραμματικῇ τέχνῃ, ἐάν τι ἀφέλωμεν ἢ προσθῶμεν ἢ μεταθῶμέν τι, οὐ γέγραπται μὲν ἡμῖν τὸ ὄνομα, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ γέγραπται, ἀλλʼ εὐθὺς ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἐάν τι τούτων πάθῃ.
But you see, Socrates, when we assign these letters, the alpha and the beta and each of the elements, to names by the art of grammar, if we take away anything or add or transpose anything, it is not that the name is written by us but incorrectly; rather, it is not written at all, but immediately becomes something else if it undergoes any of these things.
ΣΩ. μὴ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς σκοπῶμεν οὕτω σκοποῦντες, ὦ Κρατύλε.
SOCRATES: I wonder if we might not be examining it well by examining it in this way, Cratylus.
ΚΡ. πῶς δή;
CRATYLUS: How so?
ΣΩ. ἴσως ὅσα ἔκ τινος ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι πάσχοι ἂν τοῦτο ὃ σὺ λέγεις, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ δέκα ἢ ὅστις βούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός, ἐὰν ἀφέλῃς τι ἢ προσθῇς, ἕτερος εὐθὺς γέγονε·
SOCRATES: Perhaps all things that must necessarily exist or not exist from a certain number would undergo this which you say, just as the number ten itself, or any other number you wish, if you subtract or add anything, has immediately become another number.
τοῦ δὲ ποιοῦ τινος καὶ συμπάσης εἰκόνος μὴ οὐχ αὕτη ᾖ ἡ ὀρθότης, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐναντίον οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν δέῃ πάντα ἀποδοῦναι οἷόν ἐστιν ᾧ εἰκάζει, εἰ μέλλει εἰκὼν εἶναι.
But for something of a certain quality and for an image as a whole, I wonder if this correctness might not apply, but rather the opposite, and that it is not at all necessary to assign everything exactly as it is in that which it likenesses, if it is to be an image.
σκόπει δὲ εἰ τὶ λέγω.
Consider if what I say makes any sense.
ἆρʼ ἂν δύο πράγματα εἴη τοιάδε, οἷον Κρατύλος καὶ Κρατύλου εἰκών, εἴ τις θεῶν μὴ μόνον τὸ σὸν χρῶμα καὶ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσειεν ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐντὸς πάντα τοιαῦτα ποιήσειεν οἷάπερ τὰ σά, καὶ μαλακότητας καὶ θερμότητας τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδοίη, καὶ κίνησιν καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ φρόνησιν οἵαπερ ἡ παρὰ σοὶ ἐνθείη αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ πάντα ἅπερ σὺ ἔχεις, τοιαῦτα ἕτερα καταστήσειεν πλησίον σου;
Would there be two such things as Cratylus and Cratylus's image, if one of the gods should not only copy your color and shape like painters do, but also make all the internal parts just like yours, and assign the same softnesses and warmthes, and put into them motion, soul, and intellect such as yours, and in a word, establish another set of all the things you have next to you?
πότερον Κρατύλος ἂν καὶ εἰκὼν Κρατύλου τότʼ εἴη τὸ τοιοῦτον, ἢ δύο Κρατύλοι;
Would such a thing then be Cratylus and an image of Cratylus, or two Cratyluses?
ΚΡ. δύο ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, Κρατύλοι.
CRATYLUS: Two Cratyluses, it seems to me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἄλλην χρὴ εἰκόνος ὀρθότητα ζητεῖν καὶ ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκάζειν, ἐάν τι ἀπῇ ἢ προσῇ, μηκέτι αὐτὴν εἰκόνα εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Do you see then, my friend, that we must seek another correctness of an image and of what we were just talking about, and not force it, if something is absent or present, to no longer be an image?
ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ ὅσου ἐνδέουσιν αἱ εἰκόνες τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχειν ἐκείνοις ὧν εἰκόνες εἰσίν;
Or do you not perceive how far images fall short of having the same things as those of which they are images?
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
CRATYLUS: Yes, I do.
ΣΩ. γελοῖα γοῦν, ὦ Κρατύλε, ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάθοι ἂν ἐκεῖνα ὧν ὀνόματά ἐστιν τὰ ὀνόματα, εἰ πάντα πανταχῇ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιωθείη.
SOCRATES: At any rate, Cratylus, those things of which names are names would suffer ridiculous things from the names, if they were made entirely like them in every way.
διττὰ γὰρ ἄν που πάντα γένοιτο, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν οὐδεὶς οὐδέτερον ὁπότερόν ἐστι τὸ μὲν αὐτό, τὸ δὲ ὄνομα.
For then all things would surely become double, and no one would be able to say of them which is the thing itself and which is the name.
ΚΡ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
CRATYLUS: What you say is true.
ΣΩ. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ὦ γενναῖε, ἔα καὶ ὄνομα τὸ μὲν εὖ κεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ μή, καὶ μὴ ἀνάγκαζε πάντʼ ἔχειν τὰ γράμματα, ἵνα κομιδῇ ᾖ τοιοῦτον οἷόνπερ οὗ ὄνομά ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἔα καὶ τὸ μὴ προσῆκον γράμμα ἐπιφέρειν.
SOCRATES: Boldly then, noble friend, allow that one name is well placed and another is not, and do not force it to have all the letters so that it is exactly like that of which it is the name, but allow also the inappropriate letter to be brought in.
εἰ δὲ γράμμα, καὶ ὄνομα ἐν λόγῳ· εἰ δὲ ὄνομα, καὶ λόγον ἐν λόγῳ μὴ προσήκοντα τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπιφέρεσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἧττον ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἕως ἂν ὁ τύπος ἐνῇ τοῦ πράγματος περὶ οὗ ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τῶν στοιχείων ὀνόμασιν, εἰ μέμνησαι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ καὶ Ἑρμογένης ἐλέγομεν.
And if a letter, also a name in a sentence; and if a name, also allow an inappropriate sentence to the things to be brought in in a sentence, and that the thing is named and spoken of no less, as long as the character of the thing about which the sentence is remains, just as in the names of the elements, if you remember what Hermogenes and I were just saying.