§431ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What about this?
πάλιν αὐτῷ τούτῳ προσελθόντα εἰπεῖν ὅτι
τουτί ἐστιν σὸν ὄνομα
;
Is it not possible to go up again to this same man and say, 'this is your name'?
ἔστι δέ που καὶ τὸ ὄνομα μίμημα ὥσπερ τὸ ζωγράφημα.
And a name, I suppose, is also an imitation, just like a picture.
τοῦτο δὴ λέγω· ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν εἴη αὐτῷ εἰπεῖν ὅτι
τουτί ἐστι σὸν ὄνομα,
καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀκοῆς αὖ αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, τὸ ἐκείνου μίμημα, εἰπόντα ὅτι ἀνήρ, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, τὸ τοῦ θήλεος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους, εἰπόντα ὅτι γυνή;
This is what I mean: would it not be possible to say to him, 'this is your name,' and after this to bring before his perception of hearing, as it may happen, either his own imitation, by saying 'man,' or, as it may happen, that of the female of the human race, by saying 'woman'?
οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τοῦτο οἷόν τʼ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐνίοτε;
Does it not seem to you that this is possible and sometimes happens?
ΚΡ. ἐθέλω σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, συγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἔστω οὕτως.
CRATYLUS: I am willing to agree with you, Socrates, and let it be so.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ φίλε, εἰ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως· οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖ νῦν πάνυ διαμάχεσθαι περὶ αὐτοῦ.
SOCRATES: You do well, my friend, if this is so; for there is no need to fight very hard about it now.
εἰ δʼ οὖν ἔστι τοιαύτη τις διανομὴ καὶ ἐνταῦθα, τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τούτων ἀληθεύειν βουλόμεθα καλεῖν, τὸ δʼ ἕτερον ψεύδεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἔστι μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν τὰ ὀνόματα μηδὲ ἀποδιδόναι τὰ προσήκοντα ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλʼ ἐνίοτε τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα, εἴη ἂν καὶ ῥήματα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν.
If, then, there is such a distribution in this case also, we want to call one of these 'speaking truth' and the other 'speaking falsehood.' And if this is so, and it is possible to distribute names incorrectly and not to assign the appropriate ones to each, but sometimes inappropriate ones, it would also be possible for verbs to do this very same thing.
εἰ δὲ ῥήματα καὶ ὀνόματα ἔστιν οὕτω τιθέναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ λόγους· λόγοι γάρ που, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἡ τούτων σύνθεσίς ἐστιν·
And if it is possible to place verbs and names in this way, it is necessary that sentences are also so; for sentences, I suppose, as I think, are the composition of these.
ἢ πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Κρατύλε;
Or how do you say, Cratylus?
ΚΡ. οὕτω· καλῶς γάρ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν.
CRATYLUS: So it is; for you seem to me to speak well.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ γράμμασιν αὖ τὰ πρῶτα ὀνόματα ἀπεικάζομεν, ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν καὶ πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα χρώματά τε καὶ σχήματα ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μὴ πάντα αὖ, ἀλλʼ ἔνια ἐλλείπειν, ἔνια δὲ καὶ προστιθέναι, καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω·
SOCRATES: Then if we again liken the primary names to letters, is it possible, just as in paintings, to assign all the appropriate colors and shapes, and again, not all of them, but to leave out some and add others, and more and larger ones?
ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν;
Or is it not possible?
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
CRATYLUS: It is.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν ἀποδιδοὺς πάντα καλὰ τὰ γράμματά τε καὶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ ἢ προστιθεὶς ἢ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα μὲν καὶ εἰκόνας ἐργάζεται καὶ οὗτος, ἀλλὰ πονηράς;
SOCRATES: Then the one who assigns everything produces beautiful drawings and pictures, whereas the one who adds or subtracts also produces drawings and pictures, but bad ones?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ ὁ διὰ τῶν συλλαβῶν τε καὶ γραμμάτων τὴν οὐσίαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀπομιμούμενος;
SOCRATES: And what about the one who imitates the essence of things through syllables and letters?
ἆρα οὐ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ἂν μὲν πάντα ἀποδῷ τὰ προσήκοντα, καλὴ ἡ εἰκὼν ἔσται—τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὄνομα—ἐὰν δὲ σμικρὰ ἐλλείπῃ ἢ προστιθῇ ἐνίοτε, εἰκὼν μὲν γενήσεται, καλὴ δὲ οὔ;
According to the same principle, if he assigns all the appropriate things, will the picture—which is the name—be beautiful, but if he sometimes leaves out or adds small things, it will indeed become a picture, but not a beautiful one?
ὥστε τὰ μὲν καλῶς εἰργασμένα ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων, τὰ δὲ κακῶς;
So that some names will be well made, and others badly made?
ΚΡ. ἴσως.
CRATYLUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα ἔσται ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς δημιουργὸς ὀνομάτων, ὁ δὲ κακός;
SOCRATES: Perhaps, then, there will be a good craftsman of names, and a bad one?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τούτῳ ὁ
νομοθέτης
ἦν ὄνομα.
SOCRATES: And the name for this craftsman was the 'lawgiver'?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἴσως ἄρα νὴ Δίʼ ἔσται, ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ νομοθέτης ὁ μὲν ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ κακός, ἐάνπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐκεῖνα ὁμολογηθῇ ἡμῖν.
SOCRATES: Perhaps then, by Zeus, just as in the other arts, there will also be a good lawgiver and a bad one, provided that those previous points are agreed upon by us.