§430ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀγαπητὸν καὶ τοῦτο.
SOCRATES: Well, even this is acceptable.
πότερον γὰρ ἀληθῆ ἂν φθέγξαιτο ταῦτα ὁ φθεγξάμενος ἢ ψευδῆ;
For would the one who uttered these things have uttered what is true or what is false?
ἢ τὸ μέν τι αὐτῶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος;
Or is some part of them true, and some part false?
καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ἐξαρκοῖ.
For even this would be sufficient.
ΚΡ. ψοφεῖν ἔγωγʼ ἂν φαίην τὸν τοιοῦτον, μάτην αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν κινοῦντα, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις χαλκίον κινήσειε κρούσας.
CRATYLUS: I for my part would say that such a person is making a noise, moving himself in vain, just as if someone should make a sound by striking a bronze vessel.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὦ Κρατύλε·
SOCRATES: Come then, Cratylus, let us see if we can agree somehow.
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἂν φαίης τὸ ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄλλο δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τὸ ὄνομά ἐστιν;
Would you not say that the name is one thing, and that of which it is the name is another?
ΚΡ. ἔγωγε.
CRATYLUS: I would indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὁμολογεῖς μίμημά τι εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος;
SOCRATES: Do you then also agree that the name is a kind of imitation of the thing?
ΚΡ. πάντων μάλιστα.
CRATYLUS: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ζωγραφήματα τρόπον τινὰ ἄλλον λέγεις μιμήματα εἶναι πραγμάτων τινῶν;
SOCRATES: And do you also say that paintings are, in another way, imitations of certain things?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. φέρε δή—ἴσως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὐ μανθάνω ἅττα ποτʼ ἔστιν ἃ λέγεις, σὺ δὲ τάχʼ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοις—ἔστι διανεῖμαι καὶ προσενεγκεῖν ταῦτα ἀμφότερα τὰ μιμήματα, τά τε ζωγραφήματα κἀκεῖνα τὰ ὀνόματα, τοῖς πράγμασιν ὧν μιμήματά ἐστιν, ἢ οὔ;
SOCRATES: Come then—for perhaps I do not understand what you mean, but you might well be speaking correctly—is it possible to distribute and apply both of these imitations, both the paintings and those names, to the things of which they are imitations, or not?
ΚΡ. ἔστιν.
CRATYLUS: It is.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκόπει τόδε.
SOCRATES: First of all, then, consider this.
ἆρʼ ἄν τις τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἰκόνα τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἀποδοίη, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῇ γυναικί, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως;
Might one assign the picture of the man to the man, and that of the woman to the woman, and so on with other things?
ΚΡ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν μὲν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τῇ γυναικί, τὴν δὲ τῆς γυναικὸς τῷ ἀνδρί;
SOCRATES: And also, on the contrary, the picture of the man to the woman, and that of the woman to the man?
ΚΡ. ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα.
CRATYLUS: This also is possible.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αὗται αἱ διανομαὶ ἀμφότεραι ὀρθαί, ἢ ἡ ἑτέρα;
SOCRATES: Are both of these distributions then correct, or only one of them?
ΚΡ. ἡ ἑτέρα.
CRATYLUS: Only one of them.
ΣΩ. ἣ ἂν ἑκάστῳ οἶμαι τὸ προσῆκόν τε καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον ἀποδιδῷ.
SOCRATES: That which, I suppose, assigns to each what is appropriate and like it.
ΚΡ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
CRATYLUS: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. ἵνα τοίνυν μὴ μαχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ φίλοι ὄντες, ἀπόδεξαί μου ὃ λέγω.
SOCRATES: So, in order that we may not quarrel in our arguments, since you and I are friends, accept what I say.
τὴν τοιαύτην γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καλῶ ἔγωγε διανομὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφοτέροις μὲν τοῖς μιμήμασιν, τοῖς τε ζῴοις καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ὀρθήν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασι πρὸς τῷ ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθῆ·
For such a distribution, my friend, I call correct in the case of both imitations, both the pictures and the names; and in the case of names, in addition to being correct, I call it true.
τὴν δʼ ἑτέραν, τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου δόσιν τε καὶ ἐπιφοράν, οὐκ ὀρθήν, καὶ ψευδῆ ὅταν ἐπʼ ὀνόμασιν ᾖ.
But the other distribution, namely the giving and applying of what is unlike, I call incorrect, and false when it is applied to names.
ΚΡ. ἀλλʼ ὅπως μή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν μὲν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ᾖ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς διανέμειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οὔ, ἀλλʼ ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ ἀεὶ ὀρθῶς.
CRATYLUS: But see to it, Socrates, lest this—namely, incorrect distribution—may indeed occur in the case of paintings, but not in the case of names, but it is necessary that they are always correct.
ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις;
SOCRATES: How do you mean?
τί τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρει;
How does this differ from that?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι προσελθόντα ἀνδρί τῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι
τουτί ἐστι σὸν γράμμα,
καὶ δεῖξαι αὐτῷ, ἂν μὲν τύχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα, ἂν δὲ τύχῃ, γυναικός;
Is it not possible to go up to some man and say, 'this is your picture,' and show him, as it may happen, either his own likeness or that of a woman?
τὸ δὲ δεῖξαι λέγω εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αἴσθησιν καταστῆσαι.
And by 'showing' I mean bringing it before the perception of the eyes.
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
CRATYLUS: Certainly.