Humanitext Reader

Plato · Cratylus §429

Correctness of Names and Impossibility of Falsehood

Passage 26 of 34 · Greek

Summary

Socrates questions Cratylus on whether the art of naming admits of better and worse products like other crafts, but Cratylus insists that incorrect names are not names at all. Cratylus then puts forward the classic thesis that it is impossible to speak falsely, which Socrates begins to interrogate.

§429ΚΡ. οὕσπερ σὺ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἔλεγες, τοὺς νομοθέτας.
CRATYLUS: Just those whom you were speaking of at the beginning, the lawgivers.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν καὶ ταύτην φῶμεν τὴν τέχνην ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγίγνεσθαι ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἢ μή;
SOCRATES: Shall we then say that this art too arises among human beings just as the others do, or not?
βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε.
What I want to say is something like this.
ζωγράφοι εἰσίν που οἱ μὲν χείρους, οἱ δὲ ἀμείνους;
Are there not, I suppose, some painters who are worse, and others who are better?
ΚΡ. πάνυ γε.
CRATYLUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ μὲν ἀμείνους τὰ αὑτῶν ἔργα καλλίω παρέχονται, τὰ ζῷα, οἱ δὲ φαυλότερα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, the better ones present their own works—the pictures—more beautifully, while the worse ones present them more poorly?
καὶ οἰκοδόμοι ὡσαύτως οἱ μὲν καλλίους τὰς οἰκίας ἐργάζονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίους;
And likewise builders, some make more beautiful houses, and others uglier ones?
ΚΡ. ναί.
CRATYLUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νομοθέται οἱ μὲν καλλίω τὰ αὑτῶν παρέχονται, οἱ δὲ αἰσχίω;
SOCRATES: Are there then also some lawgivers who present their own works more beautifully, and others more uglier?
ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο ἔτι.
CRATYLUS: This does not seem to me so any longer.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι νόμοι οἱ μὲν βελτίους, οἱ δὲ φαυλότεροι εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Do laws then not seem to you to be some better, and others poorer?
ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα.
CRATYLUS: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ δὴ ὄνομα, ὡς ἔοικε, δοκεῖ σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ μὲν χεῖρον, τὸ δὲ ἄμεινον;
SOCRATES: Nor indeed does a name, as it seems, seem to you to be laid down some worse, and others better?
ΚΡ. οὐ δῆτα.
CRATYLUS: Certainly not.
ΣΩ. πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς κεῖται;
SOCRATES: Are all names then correctly laid down?
ΚΡ. ὅσα γε ὀνόματά ἐστιν.
CRATYLUS: At least as many as are indeed names.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ὃ καὶ ἄρτι ἐλέγετο, Ἑρμογένει τῷδε πότερον μηδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φῶμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἑρμοῦ γενέσεως προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μέν, οὐ μέντοι ὀρθῶς γε;
Regarding this Hermogenes here, which was also being said just now, shall we say that this is not even laid down as his name, unless he has some connection to the descent from Hermes, or that it is laid down, but not correctly?
ΚΡ. οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοὔνομα, οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις.
CRATYLUS: It does not even seem to me to be laid down, Socrates, but only to seem to be laid down; and this name belongs to someone else, to whom its nature also belongs.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὐδὲ ψεύδεται ὅταν τις φῇ Ἑρμογένη αὐτὸν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Does a person then not even speak falsely when he says that he is Hermogenes?
μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;
Or is it possible that this on the other hand cannot be, to say that this man is Hermogenes, if he is not?
ΚΡ. πῶς λέγεις;
CRATYLUS: How do you mean?
ΣΩ. ἆρα ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἆρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος;
SOCRATES: Is it that to speak falsely is absolutely impossible?
συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.
Is this what your argument means?
ΚΡ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει, μὴ τὸ ὂν λέγοι;
For there are quite a number of people who say so, my dear Cratylus, both now and in the past.
ἢ οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ ψευδῆ λέγειν, τὸ μὴ τὰ ὄντα λέγειν;
CRATYLUS: For how, Socrates, could anyone, in speaking that which he speaks, not speak that which is?
ΣΩ. κομψότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἢ κατʼ ἐμὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἡλικίαν, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
Or is not this what speaking falsely is, namely, to speak things that are not?
ὅμως μέντοι εἰπέ μοι τοσόνδε·
SOCRATES: The argument is too subtle for me and for my age, my friend.
πότερον λέγειν μὲν οὐ δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ψευδῆ, φάναι δέ;
Nevertheless, tell me this much: does it seem to you that to speak falsely is not possible, but to assert is?
ΚΡ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ οὐδὲ φάναι.
CRATYLUS: It does not seem to me possible even to assert.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν οὐδὲ προσειπεῖν;
SOCRATES: Nor to say nor to address?
οἷον εἴ τις ἀπαντήσας σοι ἐπὶ ξενίας, λαβόμενος τῆς χειρὸς εἴποι· χαῖρε, ὦ ξένε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑὲ Σμικρίωνος Ἑρμόγενες, οὗτος λέξειεν ἂν ταῦτα ἢ φαίη ἂν ταῦτα ἢ εἴποι ἂν ταῦτα ἢ προσείποι ἂν οὕτω σὲ μὲν οὔ, Ἑρμογένη δὲ τόνδε;
For instance, if someone meeting you abroad, taking you by the hand, should say: "Hail, Athenian stranger, son of Smicrion, Hermogenes," would he say these things, or assert them, or speak them, or address you in this way, addressing not you but this Hermogenes?
ἢ οὐδένα;
Or no one at all?
ΚΡ. ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι.
CRATYLUS: To me indeed, Socrates, it seems that this man would have uttered these things in vain.

Notes

  1. 429aτοὺς νομοθέτας — This accusative noun phrase serves as a direct answer to Socrates' question "Who?" and agrees in gender, number, and case with the relative pronoun `οὕσπερ`, which is the object of `ἐλέγες` in the preceding relative clause.
  2. 429cμὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ — An independent subjunctive construction with `μὴ ... ᾖ` expressing a cautious apprehension or suspicion ("I fear lest this on the other hand may not even be..."). The negative `οὐδέ` emphasizes "not even."
  3. 429cἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι — The infinitive `δοκεῖν` depends on the main verb `δοκεῖ` from the first half of the sentence ("it seems to me not even..."). Combined with the dependent infinitive `κεῖσθαι`, it creates a layered construction meaning "but only to seem to be laid down."
  4. 429dλέγων γέ τις τοῦτο ὃ λέγει — The participle `λέγων` functions circumstantially or conditionally. Cratylus presents an Eleatic puzzle about the impossibility of falsehood: "since a speaker speaks precisely that which he speaks, how could he not speak that which is?"
  5. 429eἄλλως ἂν οὗτος ταῦτα φθέγξασθαι — An accusative-with-infinitive construction depending on `ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ` in the leading clause. The potential particle `ἂν` with the aorist infinitive `φθέγξασθαι` expresses a past potential or counterfactual result. The adverb `ἄλλως` here means "in vain" or "fruitlessly," signifying that the speech is reduced to mere physical sound.

Cite this passage

Plato, Cratylus §429. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg005.humanitext-grc2:429

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