§423ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HERMOGENES: How indeed could it be otherwise, Socrates?
ΣΩ. εἰ μέν γʼ οἶμαι τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κοῦφον ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ᾔρομεν ἂν πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν τὴν χεῖρα, μιμούμενοι αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ δὲ τὰ κάτω καὶ τὰ βαρέα, πρὸς τὴν γῆν.
SOCRATES: If, for instance, we wished to point out what is above and light, I think we would raise our hand toward heaven, imitating the very nature of the thing; but if what is below and heavy, toward the earth.
καὶ εἰ ἵππον θέοντα ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων ἐβουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, οἶσθα ὅτι ὡς ὁμοιότατʼ ἂν τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν σώματα καὶ σχήματα ἐποιοῦμεν ἐκείνοις.
And if we wished to point out a horse running or any other of the animals, you know that we would make our own bodies and gestures as similar as possible to them.
ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις ἔχειν.
HERMOGENES: It seems to me that it must be as you say.
ΣΩ. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι δήλωμά του ἐγίγνετο, μιμησαμένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σώματος ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐβούλετο δηλῶσαι.
SOCRATES: For in this way, I think, a representation of something would come about, since the body, as it seems, imitated that which it wished to point out.
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῇ τε καὶ γλώττῃ καὶ στόματι βουλόμεθα δηλοῦν, ἆρʼ οὐ τότε ἑκάστου δήλωμα ἡμῖν ἔσται τὸ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόμενον, ὅταν μίμημα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ ὁτιοῦν;
SOCRATES: But since we wish to point out things with our voice, tongue, and mouth, will not the representation of each thing be that which comes from these, when a representation is made through them of whatever it may be?
ΕΡΜ. ἀνάγκη μοι δοκεῖ.
HERMOGENES: It seems to me to be necessary.
ΣΩ. ὄνομʼ ἄρʼ ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικε, μίμημα φωνῇ ἐκείνου ὃ μιμεῖται, καὶ ὀνομάζει ὁ μιμούμενος τῇ φωνῇ ὃ ἂν μιμῆται
ΕΡΜ. δοκεῖ μοι.
SOCRATES: A name, then, as it seems, is a vocal imitation of that which is imitated, and the one who imitates names with the voice that which he imitates. HERMOGENES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. μὰ Δίʼ ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐμοί πω δοκεῖ καλῶς λέγεσθαι, ὦ ἑταῖρε.
SOCRATES: By Zeus, but it does not yet seem to me to be well said, my friend.
ΕΡΜ. τί δή;
HERMOGENES: Why so?
ΣΩ. τοὺς τὰ πρόβατα μιμουμένους τούτους καὶ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ἀναγκαζοίμεθʼ ἂν ὁμολογεῖν ὀνομάζειν ταῦτα ἅπερ μιμοῦνται.
SOCRATES: Because we should be forced to admit that those who imitate sheep and cocks and other animals are naming those very things which they imitate.
ΕΡΜ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
HERMOGENES: What you say is true.
ΣΩ. καλῶς οὖν ἔχειν δοκεῖ σοι;
SOCRATES: Do you think, then, that this is well?
ΕΡΜ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
HERMOGENES: Not to me, indeed.
ἀλλὰ τίς ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μίμησις εἴη τὸ ὄνομα;
But what kind of imitation, Socrates, would the name be?
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ ἐὰν καθάπερ τῇ μουσικῇ μιμούμεθα τὰ πράγματα οὕτω μιμώμεθα, καίτοι φωνῇ γε καὶ τότε μιμούμεθα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἐὰν ἅπερ ἡ μουσικὴ μιμεῖται καὶ ἡμεῖς μιμώμεθα, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν ὀνομάσειν.
SOCRATES: First, as it seems to me, not if we imitate things in the way we do in music, although even then we imitate with the voice; and secondly, if we should imitate the very things that music imitates, I do not think we shall be naming them.
λέγω δέ τοι τοῦτο· ἔστι τοῖς πράγμασι φωνὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἑκάστῳ, καὶ χρῶμά γε πολλοῖς;
I mean this: is there not a sound and a shape for each of the things, and also a color for many?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν οὐκ ἐάν τις ταῦτα μιμῆται, οὐδὲ περὶ ταύτας τὰς μιμήσεις ἡ τέχνη ἡ ὀνομαστικὴ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: It seems, then, if someone imitates these things, the art of naming is not concerned with these imitations.
αὗται μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἡ μὲν μουσική, ἡ δὲ γραφική· ἦ γάρ;
For these are, on the one hand, music, and on the other, painting; is it not so?
ΕΡΜ. ναί.
HERMOGENES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τόδε;
SOCRATES: What then about this?
οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν;
Does there not seem to you to be an essence for each thing, just as there is a color and the things we just now mentioned?
πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἠξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;
First, for color itself and sound, is there not a certain essence for each of them, and for all other things which are deemed worthy of this appellation, of 'being'?
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
HERMOGENES: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
εἴ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἑκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν;
If someone could imitate this very thing of each, the essence, with letters and syllables, would he not make manifest what each thing is?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?