§421ΕΡΜ. ἐρωτῶ δὴ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ κάλλιστα, τήν τε
ἀλήθειαν
καὶ τὸ
ψεῦδος
καὶ τὸ
ὂν
καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐστιν,
ὄνομα,
διʼ ὅτι τὸ ὄνομα ἔχει.
HERMOGENES: I ask indeed about the greatest and most beautiful things: 'truth', 'falsehood', and 'being', and this very thing about which we are now speaking, 'name', why it has the name 'name'.
ΣΩ. μαίεσθαι οὖν καλεῖς τι;
SOCRATES: Do you call something 'searching'?
ΕΡΜ. ἔγωγε, τό γε ζητεῖν.
HERMOGENES: I do indeed, at least 'to seek'.
ΣΩ. ἔοικε τοίνυν ἐκ λόγου ὀνόματι συγκεκροτημένῳ, λέγοντος ὅτι τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὄν, οὗ τυγχάνει ζήτημα ὄν,
ὄνομα.
SOCRATES: It seems, then, to be a name compressed from a sentence, which says 'this is an entity of which there happens to be a search', 'name'.
μᾶλλον δὲ ἂν αὐτὸ γνοίης ἐν ᾧ λέγομεν τὸ
ὀνομαστόν
· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ σαφῶς λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι ὂν οὗ μάσμα ἐστίν.
But you would understand it better in what we call 'the nameable'; for there it clearly says that this is an entity of which there is a search.
ἡ δʼ
ἀλήθεια,
καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔοικε· ἡ γὰρ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φορὰ ἔοικε προσειρῆσθαι τούτῳ τῷ ῥήματι, τῇ
ἀληθείᾳ,
ὡς θεία οὖσα ἄλη.
And 'truth' seems to resemble the others; for the divine movement of being seems to be addressed by this word, 'truth', as being a divine movement.
τὸ δὲ
ψεῦδος
τοὐναντίον τῇ φορᾷ· πάλιν γὰρ αὖ λοιδορούμενον ἥκει τὸ ἰσχόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαζόμενον ἡσυχάζειν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τοῖς καθεύδουσι· τὸ ψεῖ δὲ προσγενόμενον ἐπικρύπτει τὴν βούλησιν τοῦ ὀνόματος.
But 'falsehood' is the opposite of movement; for again, that which is held back and forced to be quiet comes under censure, and it is likened to those who sleep; and the addition of the letter psi conceals the intention of the name.
τὸ δὲ
ὂν
καὶ ἡ
οὐσία
ὁμολογεῖ τῷ ἀληθεῖ, τὸ ἰῶτα ἀπολαβόν· ἰὸν γὰρ σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ
οὐκ ὂν
αὖ, ὥς τινες καὶ ὀνομάζουσιν αὐτό,
οὐκ ἰόν.
And 'being' and 'essence' agree with 'truth' when they receive the iota back; for it signifies 'going', and likewise 'not being', as some indeed call it, signifies 'not going'.
ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα μέν μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνδρείως πάνυ διακεκροτηκέναι· εἰ δέ τίς σε ἔροιτο τοῦτο τὸ
ἰὸν
καὶ τὸ
ῥέον
καὶ τὸ
δοῦν,
τίνα ἔχει ὀρθότητα ταῦτα τὰ ὀνόματα—
ΣΩ.
τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα;
HERMOGENES: These things, Socrates, you seem to me to have hammered out very courageously; but if someone should ask you about this 'going', 'flowing', and 'binding', what correctness these names have— SOCRATES: What should we answer him?
λέγεις;
Is that what you mean?
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not?
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
HERMOGENES: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἓν μὲν τοίνυν ἄρτι που ἐπορισάμεθα ὥστε δοκεῖν τὶ λέγειν ἀποκρινόμενοι.
SOCRATES: Well, we just now provided ourselves with one way so that we might seem to be saying something when we answer.
ΕΡΜ. τὸ ποῖον τοῦτο;
HERMOGENES: What kind of way is that?
ΣΩ. φάναι, ὃ ἂν μὴ γιγνώσκωμεν, βαρβαρικόν τι τοῦτʼ εἶναι.
SOCRATES: To say, of whatever we do not know, that it is something foreign.
εἴη μὲν οὖν ἴσως ἄν τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν, εἴη δὲ κἂν ὑπὸ παλαιότητος τὰ πρῶτα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνεύρετα εἶναι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πανταχῇ στρέφεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν εἰ ἡ παλαιὰ φωνὴ πρὸς τὴν νυνὶ βαρβαρικῆς μηδὲν διαφέρει.
Indeed, there might perhaps be some truth in this, and also on account of antiquity the first names might be undiscoverable; for because names are twisted in every direction, it is not at all surprising if the ancient speech, in comparison with the present one, differs in no way from a foreign tongue.
ΕΡΜ. καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγεις.
HERMOGENES: And you say nothing out of place.
ΣΩ. λέγω γὰρ οὖν εἰκότα.
SOCRATES: For I speak what is likely.
οὐ μέντοι μοι δοκεῖ προφάσεις ἀγὼν δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ προθυμητέον ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι.
However, it does not seem to me that the contest accepts excuses, but we must make every effort to examine these things.
ἐνθυμηθῶμεν δέ, εἴ τις ἀεί, διʼ ὧν ἂν λέγηται τὸ ὄνομα, ἐκεῖνα ἀνερήσεται τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ αὖθις αὖ διʼ ὧν ἂν τὰ ῥήματα λεχθῇ, ἐκεῖνα πεύσεται, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ παύσεται ποιῶν, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τελευτῶντα ἀπειπεῖν τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον;
Let us consider: if someone always, concerning the words through which a name is spoken, asks about those terms, and again, through which those terms are spoken, inquires about those, and does not stop doing this, is it not necessary that the answerer should end up giving up?
§422ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
HERMOGENES: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. πότε οὖν ἀπειπὼν ὁ ἀπαγορεύων δικαίως παύοιτο ἄν;
SOCRATES: When, then, would the one who gives up justly cease?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐπειδὰν ἐπʼ ἐκείνοις γένηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν, ἃ ὡσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ καὶ λόγων καὶ ὀνομάτων;
Is it not when he reaches those names which are, as it were, the elements of the other words and names?
ταῦτα γάρ που οὐκέτι δίκαιον φανῆναι ἐξ ἄλλων ὀνομάτων συγκείμενα, ἃν οὕτως ἔχῃ.
For these, surely, it is no longer just to appear to be composed of other names, if indeed they are of this nature.
οἷον νυνδὴ τὸ
ἀγαθὸν
ἔφαμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαστοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ θοοῦ συγκεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ
θοὸν
ἴσως φαῖμεν ἂν ἐξ ἑτέρων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἐξ ἄλλων· ἀλλʼ ἐάν ποτέ γε λάβωμεν ὃ οὐκέτι ἔκ τινων ἑτέρων σύγκειται ὀνομάτων, δικαίως ἂν φαῖμεν ἐπὶ στοιχείῳ τε ἤδη εἶναι καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ἡμᾶς δεῖν εἰς ἄλλα ὀνόματα ἀναφέρειν.
For example, just now we said that 'good' is composed of 'admirable' and 'swift', and 'swift' we might perhaps say is from others, and those from still others; but if we should ever grasp that which is no longer composed of any other names, we would justly say that we are already at the element, and that we no longer need to refer this to other names.
ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν.
HERMOGENES: You seem to me to speak correctly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ νῦν ἅ γʼ ἐρωτᾷς τὰ ὀνόματα στοιχεῖα ὄντα τυγχάνει, καὶ δεῖ αὐτῶν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ ἤδη τὴν ὀρθότητα ἐπισκέψασθαι ἥτις ἐστίν;
SOCRATES: Is it then the case that the names you are now asking about happen to be elements, and we must now examine their correctness, what it is, in some other way?
ΕΡΜ. εἰκός γε.
HERMOGENES: It is likely.
ΣΩ. εἰκὸς δῆτα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες· πάντα γοῦν φαίνεται τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰς ταῦτα ἀνεληλυθέναι.
SOCRATES: It is likely indeed, Hermogenes; at least all the former things seem to have ascended to these.
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν, δεῦρο αὖ συνεπίσκεψαι μετʼ ἐμοῦ μή τι παραληρήσω λέγων οἵαν δεῖ τὴν τῶν πρώτων ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητα εἶναι.
And if this is so, as it seems to me to be, come and examine with me here, lest I say something nonsensical in explaining what kind of correctness the first names must have.
ΕΡΜ. λέγε μόνον, ὡς ὅσον γε δυνάμεως παρʼ ἐμοί ἐστιν συνεπισκέψομαι.
HERMOGENES: Just speak, and I will examine it with you with all the power I have.
ΣΩ. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν μία γέ τις ἡ ὀρθότης παντὸς ὀνόματος καὶ πρώτου καὶ ὑστάτου, καὶ οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῷ ὄνομα εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οἶμαι καὶ σοὶ συνδοκεῖ.
SOCRATES: I think you also agree that there is one and the same correctness of every name, both the first and the last, and that they differ in no way in being names.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γε νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ ὀρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἐβούλετο εἶναι, οἵα δηλοῦν οἷον ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν ὄντων.
SOCRATES: But indeed, the correctness of the names we have just now run through wished to be of such a kind as to show what each of existing things is like.
ΕΡΜ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
HERMOGENES: How indeed could it not?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα οὐδὲν ἧττον καὶ τὰ πρῶτα δεῖ ἔχειν καὶ τὰ ὕστερα, εἴπερ ὀνόματα ἔσται.
SOCRATES: This, then, both the first and the last names must have no less, if indeed they are to be names.
ΕΡΜ. πάνυ γε.
HERMOGENES: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὕστερα, ὡς ἔοικε, διὰ τῶν προτέρων οἷά τε ἦν τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι.
SOCRATES: But the last ones, as it seems, were able to accomplish this through the prior ones.
ΕΡΜ. φαίνεται.
HERMOGENES: It appears so.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· τὰ δὲ δὴ πρῶτα, οἷς οὔπω ἕτερα ὑπόκειται, τίνι τρόπῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ὅτι μάλιστα φανερὰ ἡμῖν ποιήσει τὰ ὄντα, εἴπερ μέλλει ὀνόματα εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Very well; but the first ones, under which no others are yet assumed, in what way will they, as far as possible, make existing things manifest to us, if indeed they are to be names?
ἀπόκριναι δέ μοι τόδε· εἰ φωνὴν μὴ εἴχομεν μηδὲ γλῶτταν, ἐβουλόμεθα δὲ δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα, ἆρʼ οὐκ ἄν, ὥσπερ νῦν οἱ ἐνεοί, ἐπεχειροῦμεν ἂν σημαίνειν ταῖς χερσὶ καὶ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σώματι;
Answer me this: if we had no voice or tongue, and we wished to manifest things to one another, would we not, like the dumb people now, attempt to signify them with our hands, head, and the rest of our body?