§419ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐὰν τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ὀνόματι χρῇ, ὃ πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν ὀρθῶς κεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ νῦν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολογήσει τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀγαθοῖς, ἐὰν ἀντὶ τοῦ εἶ τὸ ἰῶτα ἀποδιδῷς, ὥσπερ τὸ παλαιόν· διϊὸν γὰρ αὖ σημαίνει, ἀλλʼ οὐ δέον, τἀγαθόν, ὅπερ δὴ ἐπαινεῖ.
SOCRATES: But if you use the ancient name, which is much more likely to have been correctly established than the current one, it will agree with the previously mentioned words concerning the good, if you restore the iota in place of the ei, as in the ancient way; for it signifies that which "goes through," but not "binding," namely the good, which is indeed what he praises.
καὶ οὕτω οὐκ ἐναντιοῦται αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὁ τὰ ὀνόματα τιθέμενος, ἀλλὰ
δέον
καὶ
ὠφέλιμον
καὶ
λυσιτελοῦν
καὶ
κερδαλέον
καὶ
ἀγαθὸν
καὶ
συμφέρον
καὶ
εὔπορον
τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται, ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι σημαῖνον τὸ διακοσμοῦν καὶ ἰὸν πανταχοῦ ἐγκεκωμιασμένον, τὸ δὲ ἴσχον καὶ δοῦν ψεγόμενον.
And in this way, the one who establishes the names does not contradict himself, but 'binding', 'useful', 'profitable', 'gainful', 'good', 'advantageous', and 'expedient' appear to be the same, indicating by different names that which orders and goes through everything, which is praised, while that which holds back and binds is blamed.
καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ
ζημιῶδες,
ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φωνὴν ἀποδῷς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φανεῖταί σοι κεῖσθαι τὸ ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῷ δοῦντι τὸ ἰόν, ἐπονομασθὲν
δημιῶδες.
And indeed, also 'damaging', if you restore delta in place of zeta according to the ancient speech, will appear to you to have been established for that which "binds that which goes," being named 'demiodes'.
ΕΡΜ. τί δὲ δὴ
ἡδονὴ
καὶ
λύπη
καὶ
ἐπιθυμία
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
HERMOGENES: But what about 'pleasure', 'pain', 'desire', and such things, Socrates?
ΣΩ. οὐ πάνυ χαλεπά μοι φαίνεται, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες.
SOCRATES: They do not seem very difficult to me, Hermogenes.
ἥ τε γὰρ
ἡδονή,
ἡ πρὸς τὴν ὄνησιν ἔοικε τείνουσα πρᾶξις τοῦτο ἔχειν τὸ ὄνομα—τὸ δέλτα δὲ ἔγκειται, ὥστε
ἡδονὴ
ἀντὶ
ἡονῆς
καλεῖται—ἥ τε
λύπη
ἀπὸ τῆς διαλύσεως τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν ἐπωνομάσθαι ἣν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πάθει ἴσχει τὸ σῶμα.
For 'pleasure', being the action that seems to stretch toward benefit, has this name—and the delta is inserted, so that it is called 'hēdone' instead of 'hēone'—and 'pain' seems to have been named from the dissolution of the body which the body experiences in this passive state.
καὶ ἥ γε
ἀνία
τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἰέναι.
And 'annoyance' is that which hinders going.
ἡ δὲ
ἀλγηδὼν
ξενικόν τι φαίνεταί μοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀλγεινοῦ ὠνομασμένον.
And 'pain' seems to me to be something foreign, named from that which is painful.
ὀδύνη
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένῃ ἔοικεν.
And 'grief' seems to have been called so from the entering of pain.
ἀχθηδὼν
δὲ καὶ παντὶ δῆλον ἀπεικασμένον τὸ ὄνομα τῷ τῆς φορᾶς βάρει.
And 'burden' is a name clearly likened by everyone to the weight of movement.
χαρὰ
δὲ τῇ διαχύσει καὶ εὐπορίᾳ τῆς ῥοῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικε κεκλημένῃ.
And 'joy' seems to have been named from the spreading and ease of the flow of the soul.
τέρψις
δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τερπνοῦ· τὸ δὲ
τερπνὸν
ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕρψεως πνοῇ ἀπεικασθὲν κέκληται, ἐν δίκῃ μὲν ἂν
ἕρπνουν
καλούμενον, ὑπὸ χρόνου δὲ
τερπνὸν
παρηγμένον.
And 'delight' is from that which is delightful; and 'delightful' has been called so because it is likened to the breath creeping through the soul, which would justly be called 'herpnoun', but has been deflected by time into 'terpnon'.
εὐφροσύνη
δὲ οὐδὲν προσδεῖται τοῦ διότι ῥηθῆναι· παντὶ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν συμφέρεσθαι τοῦτο ἔλαβε τὸ ὄνομα,
εὐφεροσύνην
τό γε δίκαιον· ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ καλοῦμεν
εὐφροσύνην.
And 'good cheer' needs no explanation of its reason; for it is clear to everyone that it took this name from the soul moving along well with things, 'eupherosyne' at least in justice; yet we call it 'euphrosyne'.
οὐδʼ
ἐπιθυμία
χαλεπόν·
Nor is 'desire' difficult; for it is clear that this name was given to the power that goes toward the spirit.
τῇ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσῃ δυνάμει δῆλον ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκλήθη τὸ ὄνομα. θυμὸς
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα.
And 'spirit' would have this name from the raging and boiling of the soul.
§420ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν
ἵμερός
γε τῷ μάλιστα ἕλκοντι τὴν ψυχὴν ῥῷ ἐπωνομάσθη· ὅτι γὰρ ἱέμενος ῥεῖ καὶ ἐφιέμενος τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐπισπᾷ σφόδρα τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὴν ἕσιν τῆς ῥοῆς, ἀπὸ ταύτης οὖν πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως
ἵμερος
ἐκλήθη.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, indeed, 'longing' was named after the flow that most of all draws the soul; for because it flows sending itself and desiring things, and thus indeed strongly draws the soul through the sending of the flow, it was called 'himeros' from this whole power.
καὶ μὴν
πόθος
αὖ καλεῖται σημαίνων οὐ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἄλλοθί που ὄντος καὶ ἀπόντος, ὅθεν
πόθος
ἐπωνόμασται ὃς τότε, ὅταν παρῇ οὗ τις ἐφίετο,
ἵμερος
ἐκαλεῖτο· ἀπογενομένου δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος
πόθος
ἐκλήθη.
And furthermore, 'yearning' in turn is so called, signifying that it is not for that which is present but for that which is elsewhere and absent, whence it is named 'pothos', which at that time, when that which one desired was present, was called 'himeros'; but when it was gone, this very same thing was called 'pothos'.
ἔρως
δέ, ὅτι εἰσρεῖ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐκ οἰκεία ἐστὶν ἡ ῥοὴ αὕτη τῷ ἔχοντι ἀλλʼ ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, διὰ ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐσρεῖν
ἔσρος
τό γε παλαιὸν ἐκαλεῖτο— τῷ γὰρ οὖ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὦ ἐχρώμεθα—νῦν δʼ
ἔρως
κέκληται διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὦ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὖ μεταλλαγήν.
And 'love', because it flows in from without, and this flow is not native to the one who has it but is introduced through the eyes, on this account from "flowing in" it was called 'esros' in ancient times—for we used omicron-upsilon in place of omega—but now it is called 'eros' because of the change of omega in place of omicron-upsilon.
ἀλλὰ τί ἔτι σὺ λέγεις ὅτι σκοπῶμεν;
But what else do you say we should examine?
ΕΡΜ.
δόξα
καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πῇ σοι φαίνεται;
HERMOGENES: How do 'opinion' and such things appear to you?
ΣΩ.
δόξα
δὴ ἤτοι τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόμασται, ἣν ἡ ψυχὴ διώκουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα πορεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ τόξου βολῇ.
SOCRATES: 'Opinion' indeed is named either from the pursuit which the soul, pursuing the knowledge of how things are, travels, or from the shooting of the bow.
ἔοικε δὲ τούτῳ μᾶλλον.
And it seems more like the latter.
ἡ γοῦν
οἴησις
τούτῳ συμφωνεῖ.
At least 'notion' agrees with this.
οἶσιν
γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπὶ πᾶν πρᾶγμα, οἷόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, δηλούσῃ προσέοικεν, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ
βουλή
πως τὴν βολήν, καὶ τὸ
βούλεσθαι
τὸ ἐφίεσθαι σημαίνει καὶ τὸ
βουλεύεσθαι
· πάντα ταῦτα δόξῃ ἑπόμενʼ ἄττα φαίνεται τῆς βολῆς ἀπεικάσματα, ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἡ
ἀβουλία
ἀτυχία δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὡς οὐ βαλόντος οὐδὲ τυχόντος οὗ τʼ ἔβαλλε καὶ ὃ ἐβούλετο καὶ περὶ οὗ ἐβουλεύετο καὶ οὗ ἐφίετο.
For it resembles that which indicates the movement of the soul toward every thing, what each of existing things is, just as 'will' somehow signifies 'shooting', and 'to wish' signifies to aim at, and 'to deliberate' likewise; all these seem to be certain images of 'shooting' following 'opinion', just as, on the contrary, 'thoughtlessness' seems to be misfortune, as of one who does not shoot nor hit that which he was shooting at, and what he wished, and about what he deliberated, and at what he aimed.
ΕΡΜ. ταῦτα ἤδη μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, πυκνότερα ἐπάγειν.
HERMOGENES: These things, Socrates, you seem to me to be bringing in more rapidly now.
ΣΩ. τέλος γὰρ ἤδη θέω.
SOCRATES: For I am already running toward the end.
ἀνάγκην
δʼ οὖν ἔτι βούλομαι διαπερᾶναι, ὅτι τούτοις ἑξῆς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ
ἑκούσιον.
But still I want to carry through 'necessity', which is next to these, and 'the voluntary'.
τὸ μὲν οὖν
ἑκούσιον,
τὸ εἶκον καὶ μὴ ἀντιτυποῦν ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ λέγω, εἶκον τῷ ἰόντι δεδηλωμένον ἂν εἴη τούτῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, τῷ κατὰ τὴν βούλησιν γιγνομένῳ· τὸ δὲ
ἀναγκαῖον
καὶ ἀντίτυπον, παρὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὄν, τὸ περὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀμαθίαν, ἀπείκασται δὲ τῇ κατὰ τὰ ἄγκη πορείᾳ, ὅτι δύσπορα καὶ τραχέα καὶ λάσια ὄντα ἴσχει τοῦ ἰέναι.
'The voluntary' indeed, that which yields and does not resist but, as I say, yields to that which goes, would be indicated by this name, as that which happens according to the will; while 'the necessary' and resisting, being contrary to the will, would be concerned with error and ignorance, and is likened to the journey through the ravines, because being hard to pass, rough, and overgrown, they hinder going.
ἐντεῦθεν οὖν ἴσως ἐκλήθη
ἀναγκαῖον,
τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἄγκους ἀπεικασθὲν πορείᾳ.
From there, then, it was perhaps called 'necessary', being likened to the journey through the ravine.
ἕως δὲ πάρεστιν ἡ ῥώμη, μὴ ἀνιῶμεν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺ μὴ ἀνίει, ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα.
But as long as our strength is present, let us not slacken it; and do you also not slacken, but ask.