Humanitext Reader

Plato · Phaedo §84-85

The Song of the Swans and Testing the Arguments

Passage 27 of 55 · Greek

Summary

Socrates argues that a soul purified by philosophy has no danger of dispersing after death, comparing his calm state to swans that sing joyfully before death. Simmias acknowledges the difficulty of knowing the absolute truth in this life but insists on testing every argument to its limit.

§84ΦΑΙΔ. οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε. οὐ γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὕτω λογίσαιτ’ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου, καὶ οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείη τὴν μὲν φιλοσοφίαν χρῆναι αὐτὴν λύειν, λυούσης δὲ ἐκείνης, αὐτὴν παραδιδόναι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις ἑαυτὴν πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν καὶ ἀνήνυτον ἔργον πράττειν Πηνελόπης τινὰ ἐναντίως ἱστὸν μεταχειριζομένης, ἀλλὰ γαλήνην τούτων παρασκευάζουσα, ἑπομένη τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ ἀεὶ ἐν τούτῳ οὖσα, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη καὶ ὑπ’ ἐκείνου τρεφομένη, ζῆν τε οἴεται οὕτω δεῖν ἕως ἂν ζῇ, καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ συγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν.
Phaedo: “Certainly not, I at least do not,” [said Kebes]. “Indeed,” [said Socrates], “for a soul of a philosopher would reason in this way, and would not think that philosophy must free it, and while philosophy is freeing it, it should surrender itself to pleasures and pains to bind itself down again and perform an endless task, handling a sort of loom of Penelope in reverse; but rather, providing a calm from these, following reasoning and always being in it, contemplating what is true and divine and not matter of opinion, and being nurtured by it, it thinks it must live in this way as long as it lives, and when it dies, having arrived at what is akin and of like nature, it will be released from human evils.
ἐκ δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὅπως μὴ διασπασθεῖσα ἐν τῇ ἀπαλλαγῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων διαφυσηθεῖσα καὶ διαπτομένη οἴχηται καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι οὐδαμοῦ ᾖ. σιγὴ οὖν ἐγένετο ταῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον, καὶ αὐτός τε πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ἰδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι·
From such nurture, Simmias and Kebes, there is no fear that the soul should dread lest, in its release from the body, it be torn apart, blown away by the winds, dispersed, and vanish, and exist no longer anywhere.” When Socrates had said this, there was silence for a long time, and Socrates himself was absorbed in the argument just spoken, as he appeared to the sight, and most of us were so too.
Κέβης δὲ καὶ Σιμμίας σμικρὸν πρὸς ἀλλήλω διελεγέσθην.
But Kebes and Simmias whispered a little to each other.
καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν αὐτὼ ἤρετο, τί; ἔφη, ὑμῖν τὰ λεχθέντα μῶν μὴ δοκεῖ ἐνδεῶς λέγεσθαι;
And Socrates, seeing them, asked, “What?” he said, “Do you think what has been said was spoken insufficiently?
πολλὰς γὰρ δὴ ἔτι ἔχει ὑποψίας καὶ ἀντιλαβάς, εἴ γε δή τις αὐτὰ μέλλει ἱκανῶς διεξιέναι.
For indeed it still has many doubts and objections, if indeed one is going to examine them adequately.
εἰ μὲν οὖν τι ἄλλο σκοπεῖσθον, οὐδὲν λέγω· εἰ δέ τι περὶ τούτων ἀπορεῖτον, μηδὲν ἀποκνήσητε καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ διελθεῖν, εἴ πῃ ὑμῖν φαίνεται βέλτιον ἂν λεχθῆναι, καὶ αὖ καὶ ἐμὲ συμπαραλαβεῖν, εἴ τι μᾶλλον οἴεσθε μετ’ ἐμοῦ εὐπορήσειν. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας ἔφη·
If, then, you are considering something else, I say nothing; but if you are in doubt about these matters, do not hesitate to speak yourselves and go through them, if it seems to you in any way that it could have been spoken better, and also to take me along with you, if you think you will fare better with me.” And Simmias said, “Indeed, Socrates, I will tell you the truth.
καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τἀληθῆ σοι ἐρῶ. πάλαι γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἀπορῶν τὸν ἕτερον προωθεῖ καὶ κελεύει ἐρέσθαι διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μὲν ἀκοῦσαι, ὀκνεῖν δὲ ὄχλον παρέχειν, μή σοι ἀηδὲς ᾖ διὰ τὴν παροῦσαν συμφοράν. καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας ἐγέλασέν τε ἠρέμα καί φησιν·
For a long time each of us, being in doubt, has been pushing and urging the other to ask, because of our desire to hear, but hesitating to cause you trouble, lest it be unpleasant to you because of the present misfortune.” And he, hearing this, laughed gently and said, “Dear me, Simmias!
Βαβαί, ὦ Σιμμία· ἦ που χαλεπῶς ἂν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους πείσαιμι ὡς οὐ συμφορὰν ἡγοῦμαι τὴν παροῦσαν τύχην, ὅτε γε μηδ’ ὑμᾶς δύναμαι πείθειν, ἀλλὰ φοβεῖσθε μὴ δυσκολώτερόν τι νῦν διάκειμαι ἢ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν βίῳ·
I would certainly have difficulty in persuading other men that I do not consider my present fortune a misfortune, since I cannot even persuade you, but you fear that I am now in a more difficult disposition than in my former life.
καί, ὡς ἔοικε, τῶν κύκνων δοκῶ φαυλότερος ὑμῖν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, οἳ ἐπειδὰν αἴσθωνται ὅτι δεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν, ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ, τότε δὴ πλεῖστα καὶ κάλλιστα ᾄδουσι, γεγηθότες ὅτι μέλλουσι παρὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀπιέναι οὗπέρ εἰσι θεράποντες. §85ΦΑΙΔ. οἱ δ’ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τὸ αὑτῶν δέος τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τῶν κύκνων καταψεύδονται, καί φασιν αὐτοὺς θρηνοῦντας τὸν θάνατον ὑπὸ λύπης ἐξᾴδειν, καὶ οὐ λογίζονται ὅτι οὐδὲν ὄρνεον ᾄδει ὅταν πεινῇ ἢ ῥιγῷ ἤ τινα ἄλλην λύπην λυπῆται, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἥ τε ἀηδὼν καὶ χελιδὼν καὶ ὁ ἔποψ, ἃ δή φασι διὰ λύπην θρηνοῦντα ᾄδειν.
And, it seems, I appear to you to be inferior in prophecy to the swans, who, when they perceive that they must die, having sung also in the former time, then indeed sing most and most beautifully, rejoicing because they are about to go away to the god whose servants they are.” “But men, because of their own fear of death, tell lies also about the swans, and say that they, lamenting death, sing out of pain, and they do not reflect that no bird sings when it is hungry or cold or suffers any other pain, not even the nightingale itself, nor the swallow, nor the hoopoe, which they say sing lamenting because of pain.
ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ταῦτά μοι φαίνεται λυπούμενα ᾄδειν οὔτε οἱ κύκνοι, ἀλλ’ ἅτε οἶμαι τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄντες, μαντικοί τέ εἰσι καὶ προειδότες τὰ ἐν Ἅιδου ἀγαθὰ ᾄδουσι καὶ τέρπονται ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν διαφερόντως ἢ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ.
But neither do these appear to me to sing out of pain, nor do the swans, but being, I think, of Apollo, they are prophetic, and foreknowing the good things in Hades, they sing and rejoice on that day exceptionally beyond the former time.
ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλός τε εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐ χεῖρον ἐκείνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν παρὰ τοῦ δεσπότου, οὐδὲ δυσθυμότερον αὐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλάττεσθαι.
And I myself believe that I am a fellow-servant of the swans and sacred to the same god, and that I have the gift of prophecy from our master no worse than they, nor do I depart from life more despondently than they.
ἀλλὰ τούτου γ’ ἕνεκα λέγειν τε χρὴ καὶ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι ἂν βούλησθε, ἕως ἂν Ἀθηναίων ἐῶσιν ἄνδρες ἕνδεκα. καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὁ Σιμμίας· καὶ ἐγώ τέ σοι ἐρῶ ὃ ἀπορῶ, καὶ αὖ ὅδε, ᾗ οὐκ ἀποδέχεται τὰ εἰρημένα.
But for this reason, you ought to speak and ask whatever you wish, as long as the Eleven men of Athens permit.” “Well said,” said Simmias; “and I will tell you my difficulty, and he in turn, where he does not accept what has been said.
ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ μὲν σαφὲς εἰδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγχάλεπόν τι, τὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν καὶ μὴ προαφίστασθαι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ σκοπῶν ἀπείπῃ τις, πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός·
For it seems to me, Socrates, concerning such matters, perhaps as it does to you, that to know the clear truth in the present life is either impossible or extremely difficult, but on the other hand, not to examine what is said about them in every way, and to give up before one gets tired of looking everywhere, is the part of a very soft man.
δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπῃ ἔχει ἢ εὑρεῖν ἤ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον, τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα καὶ δυσεξελεγκτότατον, ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεῦσαι τὸν βίον, εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου ὀχήματος, λόγου θείου τινός, διαπορευθῆναι.
For one must achieve one of these things concerning them: either learn how they are, or find out, or, if this is impossible, taking at least the best of human arguments and the most difficult to refute, and riding upon this as upon a raft, sail through life in danger, unless one could travel more safely and with less danger upon a firmer vessel, some divine word.
καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπαισχυνθήσομαι ἐρέσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ταῦτα λέγεις, οὐδ’ ἐμαυτὸν αἰτιάσομαι ἐν ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ ὅτι νῦν οὐκ εἶπον ἅ μοι δοκεῖ.
And so now I shall not be ashamed to ask, since you also say this, nor shall I blame myself in later time that I did not now say what seems to me.
ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τόνδε σκοπῶ τὰ εἰρημένα, οὐ πάνυ φαίνεται ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀληθῆ σοι φαίνεται· ἀλλὰ λέγε ὅπῃ δὴ οὐχ ἱκανῶς.
For to me, Socrates, when I consider what has been said both by myself and with him, it does not seem to have been spoken quite sufficiently.” And Socrates said, “Perhaps indeed, my friend, it seems true to you; but speak, in what way is it not sufficient?”

Notes

  1. 84aοὐ γάρ· ἀλλ’ οὕτω λογίσαιτ’ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου — The phrase 'οὐ γάρ' marks agreement with the preceding negative response ('οὐ δῆτα ἔγωγε'), meaning 'Indeed, for it is not so.' This is followed by 'ἀλλά' to introduce the positive alternative. The potential optative 'λογίσαιτ' ἄν' with the soul as its subject describes the consistent and rational attitude a philosopher's soul would adopt.
  2. 84bοὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ ... ὅπως μὴ ... οἴχηται — The idiomatic construction 'οὐδὲν δεινὸν μή' followed by the subjunctive expresses a strong denial or reassurance that 'there is no danger/fear that...' Here, with the third-person singular aorist subjunctive passive 'φοβηθῇ' (be frightened/fearful), it means 'there is no danger that the soul will be terrified.' The content of this potential terror is further elaborated by the dependent clause 'ὅπως μὴ... οἴχηται' (lest it be dispersed and perish upon release from the body).
  3. 85cτὸ μέντοι αὖ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτῶν μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν — This is a construction of 'μὴ οὐχὶ' with the infinitive ('ἐλέγχειν'). Since the governing clause 'πάνυ μαλθακοῦ εἶναι ἀνδρός' (it is the part of a very soft/weak man) implies a negative or blameworthy omission, the double negative 'μὴ οὐχὶ' is introduced before the infinitive to emphasize the failure to perform a duty (i.e., not examining). This creates a strong rhetorical effect: 'to NOT examine is indeed the mark of a coward.'
  4. 85dεἰ μή τις δύναιτο ... διαπορευθῆναι — The optative 'δύναιto' is used in the conditional clause 'εἰ μή', presenting the ideal but highly uncertain alternative of traveling by a divine logos as a remote or hypothetical possibility. Since this is contrastive to the urgent reality of human life, it highlights the necessity of clinging to the next best thing: the 'raft' of human reasoning.

Cite this passage

Plato, Phaedo §84-85. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.humanitext-grc2:84-85

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.