§86ΦΑΙΔ. ταύτῃ ἔμοιγε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ᾗ δὴ καὶ περὶ ἁρμονίας ἄν τις καὶ λύρας τε καὶ χορδῶν τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον εἴποι, ὡς ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ πάγκαλόν τι καὶ θεῖόν ἐστιν ἐν τῇ ἡρμοσμένῃ λύρᾳ, αὐτὴ δ’ ἡ λύρα καὶ αἱ χορδαὶ σώματά τε καὶ σωματοειδῆ καὶ σύνθετα καὶ γεώδη ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ θνητοῦ συγγενῆ.
Phaedo: “In this way, in my opinion at least,” he said, “in that indeed someone might say this very same argument also about harmony and a lyre and strings, that the harmony indeed is something invisible and bodily and beautiful and divine in the tuned lyre, while the lyre itself and the strings are bodies and bodily in form and composite and earthy and akin to the mortal.
ἐπειδὰν οὖν ἢ κατάξῃ τις τὴν λύραν ἢ διατέμῃ καὶ διαρρήξῃ τὰς χορδάς, εἴ τις διισχυρίζοιτο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ σύ, ὡς ἀνάγκη ἔτι εἶναι τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἐκείνην καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι — οὐδεμία γὰρ μηχανὴ ἂν εἴη τὴν μὲν λύραν ἔτι εἶναι διερρωγυιῶν τῶν χορδῶν καὶ τὰς χορδὰς θνητοειδεῖς οὔσας, τὴν δὲ ἁρμονίαν ἀπολωλέναι τὴν τοῦ θείου τε καὶ ἀθανάτου ὁμοφυῆ τε καὶ συγγενῆ, προτέραν τοῦ θνητοῦ ἀπολομένην — ἀλλὰ φαίη ἀνάγκη ἔτι που εἶναι αὐτὴν τὴν ἁρμονίαν, καὶ πρότερον τὰ ξύλα καὶ τὰς χορδὰς κατασαπήσεσθαι πρίν τι ἐκείνην παθεῖν — καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ αὐτόν σε τοῦτο ἐντεθυμῆσθαι, ὅτι τοιοῦτόν τι μάλιστα ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἐντεταμένου τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν καὶ συνεχομένου ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν, κρᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ ἁρμονίαν αὐτῶν τούτων τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν, ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα καλῶς καὶ μετρίως κραθῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα — εἰ οὖν τυγχάνει ἡ ψυχὴ οὖσα ἁρμονία τις, δῆλον ὅτι, ὅταν χαλασθῇ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἀμέτρως ἢ ἐπιταθῇ ὑπὸ νόσων καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει ἀπολωλέναι, καίπερ οὖσαν θειοτάτην, ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἁρμονίαι αἵ τ’ ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργοις πᾶσι, τὰ δὲ λείψανα τοῦ σώματος ἑκάστου πολὺν χρόνον παραμένειν, ἕως ἂν ἢ κατακαυθῇ ἢ κατασαπῇ — ὅρα οὖν πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον τί φήσομεν, ἐάν τις ἀξιοῖ κρᾶσιν οὖσαν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ θανάτῳ πρώτην ἀπόλλυσθαι. διαβλέψας οὖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ὥσπερ τὰ πολλὰ εἰώθει, καὶ μειδιάσας, δίκαια μέντοι, ἔφη, λέγει ὁ Σιμμίας.
When, therefore, someone breaks the lyre or cuts and tears the strings, if he should persist in the same argument as you, that it is necessary that that harmony still exist and not have perished—for there would be no way that the lyre indeed still exists when the strings are broken, and the strings being of mortal nature, but the harmony has perished which is of the same nature and akin to the divine and immortal, having perished before the mortal—but should say that it is necessary that the harmony itself still exist somewhere, and that the wood and the strings must rot before she suffers anything—and indeed, Socrates, I think myself that you also have considered this, that we assume the soul to be most of all something of this sort, that since our body is stretched and held together by the hot and cold and dry and wet and such things, our soul is a mixture and harmony of these very things, when these are mixed with one another beautifully and in due measure—if then the soul happens to be a certain harmony, it is clear that, whenever our body is relaxed immeasurably or stretched by diseases and other evils, it is necessary that the soul immediately perish, although being most divine, just as also the other harmonies, both those in sounds and those in all the works of craftsmen, while the remains of each body remain for a long time, until it is either burned or rotted—look then what we shall say to this argument, if someone claims that the soul, being a mixture of the things in the body, is the first to perish in what is called death.” Socrates then, looking intently as he was accustomed to do for the most part, and smiling, said, “Indeed, Simmias speaks justly.
εἰ οὖν τις ὑμῶν εὐπορώτερος ἐμοῦ, τί οὐκ ἀπεκρίνατο;
If then anyone of you is more capable than I, why did he not answer?
καὶ γὰρ οὐ φαύλως ἔοικεν ἁπτομένῳ τοῦ λόγου.
For he seems to have laid hold of the argument in no mean way.
δοκεῖ μέντοι μοι χρῆναι πρὸ τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἔτι πρότερον κέβητος ἀκοῦσαι τί αὖ ὅδε ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵνα χρόνου ἐγγενομένου βουλευσώμεθα τί ἐροῦμεν, ἔπειτα ἀκούσαντας ἢ συγχωρεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐάν τι δοκῶσι προσᾴδειν, ἐὰν δὲ μή, οὕτως ἤδη ὑπερδικεῖν τοῦ λόγου.
It seems to me, however, that before the answer we must first hear from Kebes what he in turn objects to the argument, so that, time having intervened, we may deliberate what we shall say, and then, having heard, either to yield to them if they seem to sing in tune, or if not, then at this point to advocate for the argument.
ἀλλ’ ἄγε, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ὦ Κέβης, λέγε, τί ἦν τὸ σὲ αὖ θρᾶττον. λέγω δή, ἦ δ’ ὃς ὁ Κέβης.
But come,” he said, “Kebes, tell us, what was it that was troubling you in turn?” “I will tell indeed,” said Kebes.