§76ΦΑΙΔ. δυνατὸν γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε ἐφάνη, αἰσθόμενόν τι ἢ ἰδόντα ἢ ἀκούσαντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν λαβόντα ἕτερόν τι ἀπὸ τούτου ἐννοῆσαι ὃ ἐπελέληστο, ᾧ τοῦτο ἐπλησίαζεν ἀνόμοιον ὂν ἢ ᾧ ὅμοιον· ὥστε, ὅπερ λέγω, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἤτοι ἐπιστάμενοί γε αὐτὰ γεγόναμεν καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα διὰ βίου πάντες, ἢ ὕστερον, οὕς φαμεν μανθάνειν, οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκονται οὗτοι, καὶ ἡ μάθησις ἀνάμνησις ἂν εἴη. καὶ μάλα δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Phaedo: "For this indeed was shown to be possible: that someone, on perceiving something, either by seeing or hearing or receiving some other sense, should from this think of something else which he had forgotten, to which this approached, whether being unlike or like it; so that, as I say, one of two things must be: either we were born knowing them and we all know them throughout life, or afterwards, those whom we say learn do nothing other than recollect, and learning would be recollection." "And this is very much the case, Socrates." ""Which then do you choose, Simmias?
πότερον οὖν αἱρῇ, ὦ Σιμμία; ἐπισταμένους ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, ἢ ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ὕστερον ὧν πρότερον ἐπιστήμην εἰληφότες ἦμεν; οὐκ ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἑλέσθαι.
That we were born knowing, or that we later recollect those things of which we had previously acquired knowledge?"" ""I am not able, Socrates, to choose at the present moment."" ""What about this?
τί δέ; τόδε ἔχεις ἑλέσθαι, καὶ πῇ σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ;
Can you choose on this, and how does it seem to you about it?
ἀνὴρ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται ἔχοι ἂν δοῦναι λόγον ἢ οὔ; πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἦ καὶ δοκοῦσί σοι πάντες ἔχειν διδόναι λόγον περὶ τούτων ὧν νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; βουλοίμην μεντἄν, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας· ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι μὴ αὔριον τηνικάδε οὐκέτι ᾖ ἀνθρώπων οὐδεὶς ἀξίως οἷός τε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι. οὐκ ἄρα δοκοῦσί σοι ἐπίστασθαί γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία, πάντες αὐτά; οὐδαμῶς. ἀναμιμνῄσκονται ἄρα ἅ ποτε ἔμαθον; ἀνάγκη.
Would a man who knows be able to give an account of what he knows, or not?"" ""It is very necessary, Socrates," he said." ""And do you think that everyone is able to give an account of those things we were just now speaking of?"" ""I wish they could," said Simmias; "but I am much more afraid that tomorrow at this time there may no longer be any man capable of doing this worthily." ""Then, Simmias," he said, "do you not think that everyone knows them?"" ""By no means."" ""Do they then recollect what they once learned?"" ""Necessarily."" ""When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them?
πότε λαβοῦσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἀφ’ οὗ γε ἄνθρωποι γεγόναμεν. οὐ δῆτα. πρότερον ἄρα. ναί. ἦσαν ἄρα, ὦ Σιμμία, αἱ ψυχαὶ καὶ πρότερον, πρὶν εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώπου εἴδει, χωρὶς σωμάτων, καὶ φρόνησιν εἶχον. εἰ μὴ ἄρα ἅμα γιγνόμενοι λαμβάνομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταύτας τὰς ἐπιστήμας· οὗτος γὰρ λείπεται ἔτι ὁ χρόνος.
For surely it was not since we have been human beings."" ""Certainly not."" ""Before then."" ""Yes."" ""Then, Simmias, our souls existed even before, prior to being in human form, apart from bodies, and they possessed intelligence."" ""Unless indeed, Socrates, we acquire these knowledges at the same time as we are born; for this time is still left." ""Very well, my friend.
εἶεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἀπόλλυμεν δὲ αὐτὰς ἐν ποίῳ ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ; — οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔχοντές γε αὐτὰς γιγνόμεθα, ὡς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν — ἢ ἐν τούτῳ ἀπόλλυμεν ἐν ᾧπερ καὶ λαμβάνομεν;
But at what other time do we lose them?—for we do not, indeed, are born possessing them, as we just now agreed—or do we lose them at the very time in which we also receive them?
ἢ ἔχεις ἄλλον τινὰ εἰπεῖν χρόνον; οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ ἔλαθον ἐμαυτὸν οὐδὲν εἰπών. ἆρ’ οὖν οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη, ἡμῖν, ὦ Σιμμία; εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἃ θρυλοῦμεν ἀεί, καλόν τέ τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη οὐσία, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτην τὰ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα ἀναφέρομεν, ὑπάρχουσαν πρότερον ἀνευρίσκοντες ἡμετέραν οὖσαν, καὶ ταῦτα ἐκείνῃ ἀπεικάζομεν, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὥσπερ καὶ ταῦτα ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι καὶ πρὶν γεγονέναι ἡμᾶς·
Or have you some other time to mention?"" ""By no means, Socrates; I did not realize I was talking nonsense."" ""Is it then the case for us, Simmias," he said, "that if those things which we are always babbling about exist—something beautiful and good and all such reality—and we refer all the things from the senses to this, discovering that it pre-existed and is ours, and we liken these things to it, then, just as these things exist, so it is necessary that our soul also exists even before we are born?
εἰ δὲ μὴ ἔστι ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος εἰρημένος εἴη;
But if these do not exist, would this argument have been spoken in vain?
ἆρ’ οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἴση ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τάδε;
Is this how it is, and is there an equal necessity both that these things exist and that our souls existed even before we were born, and if the former do not, neither do the latter?""