§65ΦΑΙΔ. ἆρ᾽ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις δῆλός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολύων ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων; φαίνεται. καὶ δοκεῖ γέ που, ὦ Σιμμία, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ᾧ μηδὲν ἡδὺ τῶν τοιούτων μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν οὐκ ἄξιον εἶναι ζῆν, ἀλλ’ ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι ὁ μηδὲν φροντίζων τῶν ἡδονῶν αἳ διὰ τοῦ σώματός εἰσιν. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
Phaedo: Socrates said, "Is it not then first in these very things that the philosopher is manifest, as freeing his soul as much as possible from association with the body, in a way outstandingly different from other men?" Simmias: "It seems so." Socrates: "And indeed it surely seems, Simmias, to most men that he for whom nothing of such things is pleasant, and who does not share in them, does not deserve to live, but that he who cares nothing for the pleasures that are through the body comes close to being dead." Simmias: "You speak very truly indeed." Socrates: "And what about the acquisition of wisdom itself?
τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτῆσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὔ, ἐάν τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνῃ;
Is the body an obstacle or not, if one takes it along as a companion in the search?
οἷον τὸ τοιόνδε λέγω· ἆρα ἔχει ἀλήθειάν τινα ὄψις τε καὶ ἀκοὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτ’ ἀκούομεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν;
"Socrates: "I mean something like this: do sight and hearing have any truth for men, or are even such things always being chanted to us by the poets, that we neither hear anything accurately nor see anything?
καίτοι εἰ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα αἰσθήσεων μὴ ἀκριβεῖς εἰσιν μηδὲ σαφεῖς, σχολῇ αἵ γε ἄλλαι· πᾶσαι γάρ που τούτων φαυλότεραί εἰσιν.
And yet, if these bodily senses are not accurate nor clear, hardly could the others be, for they are all surely inferior to these.
ἢ σοὶ οὐ δοκοῦσιν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
Or do they not seem so to you?" Simmias: "Certainly," he said.
πότε οὖν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς ἀληθείας ἅπτεται;
Socrates: "When then," he said, "does the soul touch the truth?
ὅταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιχειρῇ τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἆρ’ οὖν οὐκ ἐν τῷ λογίζεσθαι εἴπερ που ἄλλοθι κατάδηλον αὐτῇ γίγνεταί τι τῶν ὄντων; ναί. λογίζεται δέ γέ που τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυπῇ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε ὄψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδέ τις ἡδονή, ἀλλ’ ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γίγνηται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ᾽ ἁπτομένη ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος. ἔστι ταῦτα. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ’ αὑτὴν γίγνεσθαι; φαίνεται.
For when it attempts to examine anything along with the body, it is clear that it is then thoroughly deceived by it." Simmias: "You speak the truth." Socrates: "Is it not then in reasoning, if anywhere else, that some of the things that are become clear to it?" Simmias: "Yes." Socrates: "And indeed it reasons surely best of all then, when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing, nor sight, nor pain, nor any pleasure, but it becomes as much as possible itself by itself, bidding farewell to the body, and, as far as it can, having no association nor contact with it, reaches out for that which is." Simmias: "That is so." Socrates: "Therefore here too the soul of the philosopher most of all dishonors the body and flees from it, and seeks to become itself by itself?" Simmias: "It seems so." Socrates: "And what about things of this kind, Simmias?
τί δὲ δὴ τὰ τοιάδε, ὦ Σιμμία; φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδέν; φαμὲν μέντοι νὴ Δία. καὶ αὖ καλόν γέ τι καὶ ἀγαθόν; πῶς δ’ οὔ; ἤδη οὖν πώποτέ τι τῶν τοιούτων τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶδες; οὐδαμῶς, ἦ δ’ ὅς.
Do we say that justice itself is something, or nothing?" Simmias: "We say indeed it is, by Zeus." Socrates: "And also something beautiful and good?" Simmias: "Of course." Socrates: "Now, did you ever yet see any of such things with your eyes?" Simmias: "By no means," he said.
ἀλλ’ ἄλλῃ τινὶ αἰσθήσει τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐφήψω αὐτῶν;
Socrates: "But did you grasp them with any other sense of those through the body?
λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑνὶ λόγῳ ἁπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν·
And I am speaking of all of them, such as about magnitude, health, strength, and, in a word, of the reality of all other things, what each happens to be.
ἆρα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῶν τὸ ἀληθέστατον θεωρεῖται, ἢ ὧδε ἔχει· ὃς ἂν μάλιστα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀκριβέστατα παρασκευάσηται αὐτὸ ἕκαστον διανοηθῆναι περὶ οὗ σκοπεῖ, οὗτος ἂν ἐγγύτατα ἴοι τοῦ γνῶναι ἕκαστον; πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
Is their truest nature contemplated through the body, or is it rather thus: whoever of us prepares himself most of all and most accurately to think of each thing itself about which he examines, he would come closest to knowing each?" Simmias: "Certainly."