Humanitext Reader

Plato · Phaedo §64

Philosophy as Practice for Death and Neglect of the Body

Passage 7 of 55 · Greek

Summary

Socrates begins his defense to Simmias and Cebes by arguing that true philosophers spend their lives practicing for death and being dead, making it absurd for them to be angry when death finally arrives. Through a dialogue with Simmias, he defines the philosopher as someone who turns away from physical pleasures and bodily concerns, focusing instead on the soul.

§64ΦΑΙΔ. ἀλλ’ ὑμῖν δὴ τοῖς δικασταῖς βούλομαι ἤδη τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι, ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὔελπις εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ.
Phaedo: "But," he said, "to you as my judges I wish now to render my account, of how it seems to me reasonable for a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy to be of good courage when he is about to die, and to be of good hope that he will win the greatest goods there when he has deceased.
πῶς ἂν οὖν δὴ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχοι, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἐγὼ πειράσομαι φράσαι.
How then this should be so, Simmias and Cebes, I will try to explain.
κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὀρθῶς ἁπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοὶ ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀποθνῄσκειν τε καὶ τεθνάναι.
For those who happen to apply themselves to philosophy in the right way seem to have escaped the notice of others that they occupy themselves with nothing else than dying and being dead.
εἰ οὖν τοῦτο ἀληθές, ἄτοπον δήπου ἂν εἴη προθυμεῖσθαι μὲν ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τοῦτο, ἥκοντος δὲ δὴ αὐτοῦ ἀγανακτεῖν ὃ πάλαι προυθυμοῦντό τε καὶ ἐπετήδευον. καὶ ὁ Σιμμίας γελάσας, νὴ τὸν Δία, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ πάνυ γέ με νυνδὴ γελασείοντα ἐποίησας γελάσαι.
If this is true, it would surely be absurd to be eager for nothing else than this through all their life, and then, when it has come, to be vexed at what they had long been eager for and occupying themselves with." And Simmias laughed and said, "By Zeus, Socrates, you made me laugh just now, though I was not at all in a laughing mood.
οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀκούσαντας δοκεῖν εὖ πάνυ εἰρῆσθαι εἰς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας — καὶ συμφάναι ἂν τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πάνυ — ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι, καὶ σφᾶς γε οὐ λελήθασιν ὅτι ἄξιοί εἰσιν τοῦτο πάσχειν.
For I think that most people, on hearing this, would think it was very well said against those who philosophize—and our people would agree entirely—that those who philosophize are truly death-seeking, and it has not escaped their own notice that they are worthy to suffer this.
καὶ ἀληθῆ γ’ ἂν λέγοιεν, ὦ Σιμμία, πλήν γε τοῦ σφᾶς μὴ λεληθέναι.
And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except for the part about it not having escaped their notice.
λέληθεν γὰρ αὐτοὺς ᾗ τε θανατῶσι καὶ ᾗ ἄξιοί εἰσιν θανάτου καὶ οἵου θανάτου οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι.
For it has escaped them in what way the true philosophers are death-seeking, and in what way they are worthy of death, and of what kind of death.
εἴπωμεν γάρ, ἔφη, πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, χαίρειν εἰπόντες ἐκείνοις·
Let us then," he said, "speak among ourselves, bidding farewell to them.
ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; πάνυ γε, ἔφη ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Σιμμίας.
Do we think that death is something?" "Certainly," Simmias said, taking up the word.
ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν;
"Is it anything else than the separation of the soul from the body?
καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτὴν εἶναι;
And that being dead is this: the body having been separated from the soul exists by itself apart, and the soul having been separated from the body exists by itself apart?
ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἔφη.
Is death anything else than this?" "No, but this," he said.
σκέψαι δή, ὠγαθέ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοὶ συνδοκῇ ἅπερ ἐμοί· ἐκ γὰρ τούτων μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἡμᾶς εἴσεσθαι περὶ ὧν σκοποῦμεν.
"Consider then, my good friend, if you also agree with me; for from these things I think we shall know better about what we are examining.
φαίνεταί σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνδρὸς εἶναι ἐσπουδακέναι περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλουμένας τὰς τοιάσδε, οἷον σιτίων καὶ ποτῶν; ἥκιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Σιμμίας.
Does it seem to you to belong to a philosopher to have been eager about the so-called pleasures of this kind, such as those of food and drink?" "Least of all, Socrates," Simmias said.
τί δὲ τὰς τῶν ἀφροδισίων; οὐδαμῶς. τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας;
"What about the pleasures of love?" "Not at all." "What about the other cares of the body?
δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἡγεῖσθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος;
Do you think such a man regards them as honorable?
οἷον ἱματίων διαφερόντων κτήσεις καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμάζειν, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη μετέχειν αὐτῶν; ἀτιμάζειν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος. οὐκοῦν ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματεία οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράφθαι; ἔμοιγε.
For instance, the possession of distinguished clothes and shoes, and the other adornments of the body, do you think he honors them or dishonors them, except insofar as there is a great necessity to share in them?" "To me at least," he said, "the true philosopher seems to dishonor them." "Does it not seem to you then, on the whole," he said, "that the concern of such a man is not about the body, but, as far as he can, to stand aloof from it, and to have turned toward the soul?" "To me it does."

Notes

  1. 64aὥς μοι φαίνεται — The conjunction `ὡς` introduces a clause modifying the preceding phrase `τὸν λόγον ἀποδοῦναι` (to render an account/explanation). The noun phrase `ἀνὴρ ... διατρίψας` (a man who has spent his life) serves as the subject of the following infinitives `θαρρεῖν` and `εὔελπις εἶναι`. The participle `μέλλων` takes the future infinitive `ἀποθανεῖσθαι` meaning 'being about to die.'
  2. 64aλεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι — The verb `λανθάνω` (to escape notice), which usually takes a supplementary participle, here introduces an `ὅτι` clause. `τοὺς ἄλλους` is the accusative object of `λεληθέναι`, functioning as 'it has escaped the notice of others that...'.
  3. 64bκαὶ συμφάναι ἂν — An infinitive continuing from the preceding `δοκεῖν` (would think), representing the thought or statement of `τοὺς πολλούς` (most people) or the parenthetical `τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους` (our people, i.e., the Thebans). The particle `ἄν` goes with `συμφάναι` to form a potential infinitive ('would agree').
  4. 64cἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι — The interrogative particle `ἆρα μή` usually expects a negative answer ('surely it is not...?'), but here functions as a rhetorical question prompting a strong affirmation. The following accusative `τὴν ... ἀπαλλαγήν` functions as the complement of `εἶναι` (or in apposition to the accusative `τὸν θάνατον`) from the preceding sentence.

Cite this passage

Plato, Phaedo §64. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg004.humanitext-grc2:64

Please note the AI-draft status of the translation and the date accessed.

Translation, notes and summary are AI-generated drafts, revised through reader feedback.