§105ΦΑΙΔ. ὃ τοίνυν ἔλεγον ὁρίσασθαι, ποῖα οὐκ ἐναντία τινὶ ὄντα ὅμως οὐ δέχεται αὐτό, τὸ ἐναντίον — οἷον νῦν ἡ τριὰς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὖσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον ἀεὶ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει, καὶ ἡ δυὰς τῷ περιττῷ καὶ τὸ πῦρ τῷ ψυχρῷ καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα — ἀλλ’ ὅρα δὴ εἰ οὕτως ὁρίζῃ, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ’ ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.
"Then, what I was saying we should define—namely, what kind of things they are which, though not being opposite to something, nevertheless do not admit it, the opposite (just as now the triad, though not being opposite to the even, does not admit it any the more, for it always brings the opposite upon it, and the dyad to the odd, and fire to the cold, and many other things)—but see now if you define it thus: not only that the opposite does not admit the opposite, but also that that which brings something opposite to that, to whatever it goes, itself which brings it never admits the oppositeness of that which is brought.
πάλιν δὲ ἀναμιμνῄσκου· οὐ γὰρ χεῖρον πολλάκις ἀκούειν.
But recall it again; for there is no harm in hearing it many times.
τὰ πέντε τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου οὐ δέξεται, οὐδὲ τὰ δέκα τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ, τὸ διπλάσιον.
Five will not admit the form of the even, nor will ten—the double—admit that of the odd.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτὸ ἄλλῳ ἐναντίον, ὅμως δὲ τὴν τοῦ περιττοῦ οὐ δέξεται· οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ ἡμιόλιον οὐδὲ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ ἥμισυ, τὴν τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τριτημόριον αὖ καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, εἴπερ ἕπῃ τε καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι οὕτως. πάνυ σφόδρα καὶ συνδοκεῖ, ἔφη, καὶ ἕπομαι. πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ἐμέ.
Now this indeed is itself also opposite to something else, but nevertheless it will not admit the form of the odd; nor indeed will the sesquialter, nor the other such things—the half—admit the form of the whole, nor again the third-part and all such things, if indeed you follow and agree with me that it is so." "I agree most strongly," he said, "and I follow you." "Tell me then again from the beginning," he said, "and do not answer me in the very terms in which I question you, but in imitation of me.
λέγω δὴ παρ’ ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν.
I say this because, besides the answer which I first spoke of—that safe one—I see another safety from what is now being said.
εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται, οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ’ ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ’ ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ’ ᾧ ἂν μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως.
For if you should ask me what must be in a body for it to be hot, I will not give you that safe but ignorant answer, namely 'heat', but a more sophisticated one from our present discussion, namely 'fire'; nor if you ask what must be in a body for it to be sick, will I say 'sickness', but 'fever'; nor if you ask what must be in a number for it to be odd, will I say 'oddness', but 'a unit'; and so on in other cases.
ἀλλ’ ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ’ ὅτι βούλομαι. ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.
But see if you now sufficiently understand what I want." "Yes, quite sufficiently," he said.
ἀποκρίνου δή, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ᾧ ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν ἔσται; ὧι ἂν ψυχή, ἔφη.
"Answer then," he said, "what must be in a body for it to be alive?" "Soul," he said.
οὐκοῦν ἀεὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ’ ὅς.
"Then is this always so?" "How could it not be?" he said.
ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἂν αὐτὴ κατάσχῃ, ἀεὶ ἥκει ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωήν; ἥκει μέντοι, ἔφη.
"Therefore, whatever the soul occupies, does it always come to it bringing life?" "It does indeed," he said.
πότερον δ’ ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν; ἔστιν, ἔφη.
"And is there something opposite to life, or nothing?" "There is," he said.
τί; θάνατος. οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾧ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει ἀεὶ οὐ μή ποτε δέξηται, ὡς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται; καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
"What is it?" "Death." "Then the soul will never admit the opposite of that which it always brings, as has been agreed from our previous discussion?" "Most assuredly," said Cebes.
τί οὖν;
"What then?
τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ἰδέαν τί νυνδὴ ὠνομάζομεν; ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.
What did we just now call that which does not admit the form of the even?" "Uneven," he said.
τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχηται; ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον. εἶεν· ὃ δ’ ἂν θάνατον μὴ δέχηται τί καλοῦμεν; ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.
"And that which does not admit justice, and that which does not admit music?" "Unmusical," he said, "and the other unjust." "Very well; and what do we call that which does not admit death?" "Immortal," he said.
οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; οὔ. ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχή. ἀθάνατον. εἶεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν;
"Then the soul does not admit death?" "No." "Is the soul therefore immortal?" "Immortal." "Very well," he said; "shall we say that this has now been proved?
ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ; καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Or how does it seem to you?" "Most sufficiently indeed, Socrates."