§103ΦΑΙΔ. παντάπασιν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτω φαίνεταί μοι. καί τις εἶπε τῶν παρόντων ἀκούσας — ὅστις δ’ ἦν, οὐ σαφῶς μέμνημαι — πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν λόγοις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν νυνὶ λεγομένων ὡμολογεῖτο, ἐκ τοῦ ἐλάττονος τὸ μεῖζον γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος τὸ ἔλαττον, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς αὕτη εἶναι ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἐναντίοις, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων;
Phaedo: "Entirely so," said Cebes, "it appears to me." And someone of those present, having heard this, said—who it was, I do not clearly remember—"By the gods, was not the very opposite of what is now being said agreed upon in our previous discussions, that the greater comes to be from the less and the less from the greater, and that simply this is the generation for opposites, from opposites?
νῦν δέ μοι δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τοῦτο οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παραβαλὼν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἀκούσας, ἀνδρικῶς, ἔφη, ἀπεμνημόνευκας, οὐ μέντοι ἐννοεῖς τὸ διαφέρον τοῦ τε νῦν λεγομένου καὶ τοῦ τότε.
But now it seems to me to be said that this could never happen." And Socrates, having turned his head and listened, said, "Manfully have you remembered, yet you do not perceive the difference between what is now being said and what was said then.
τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐλέγετο ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου πράγματος τὸ ἐναντίον πρᾶγμα γίγνεσθαι, νῦν δέ, ὅτι αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει.
For then it was said that from the opposite thing the opposite thing comes to be, but now, that the opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature.
τότε μὲν γάρ, ὦ φίλε, περὶ τῶν ἐχόντων τὰ ἐναντία ἐλέγομεν, ἐπονομάζοντες αὐτὰ τῇ ἐκείνων ἐπωνυμίᾳ, νῦν δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν ὧν ἐνόντων ἔχει τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὰ ὀνομαζόμενα· αὐτὰ δ’ ἐκεῖνα οὐκ ἄν ποτέ φαμεν ἐθελῆσαι γένεσιν ἀλλήλων δέξασθαι. καὶ ἅμα βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κέβητα εἶπεν, ἆρα μή που, ὦ Κέβης, ἔφη, καὶ σέ τι τούτων ἐτάραξεν ὧν ὅδε εἶπεν; οὐδ’ αὖ, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, οὕτως ἔχω· καίτοι οὔτι λέγω ὡς οὐ πολλά με ταράττει. συνωμολογήκαμεν ἄρα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, ἁπλῶς τοῦτο, μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι. παντάπασιν, ἔφη.
For then, my friend, we were speaking about the things that have the opposites, calling them by the name of those, but now about those things themselves, by the presence of which the named things have their names; and those things themselves, we say, would never be willing to admit generation from one another." And at the same time, looking toward Cebes, he said, "Is it possible, Cebes," he said, "that something of what this man said also troubled you?" "Not so, either," said Cebes, "do I feel; though I by no means say that there are not many things that trouble me." "We have agreed, then," he said, "absolutely on this, that the opposite will never be opposite to itself." "Entirely so," he said.
ἔτι δή μοι καὶ τόδε σκέψαι, ἔφη, εἰ ἄρα συνομολογήσεις.
"Then consider this also further for me," he said, "if indeed you will agree.
θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν; ἔγωγε. ἆρ’ ὅπερ χιόνα καὶ πῦρ; μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε. ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερόν τι πυρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἕτερόν τι χιόνος τὸ ψυχρόν; ναί. ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽ οἶμαι δοκεῖ σοι, οὐδέποτε χιόνα γ’ οὖσαν δεξαμένην τὸ θερμόν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν, ἔτι ἔσεσθαι ὅπερ ἦν, χιόνα καὶ θερμόν, ἀλλὰ προσιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι. πάνυ γε. καὶ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ ἢ ὑπεξιέναι ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ποτὲ τολμήσειν δεξάμενον τὴν ψυχρότητα ἔτι εἶναι ὅπερ ἦν, πῦρ καὶ ψυχρόν. ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Do you call something hot, and something cold?" "I do." "Are they the same as snow and fire?" "By Zeus, not I." "But the hot is something other than fire, and the cold something other than snow?" "Yes." "But this, at least, I think seems so to you: that snow, being snow, having admitted the hot, as we were saying in the previous part, will never still be what it was, snow and hot, but when the hot approaches, it will either withdraw from it or perish." "Certainly." "And fire, again, when the cold approaches it, will either go away or perish, but it will never dare, having admitted the coldness, to still be what it was, fire and cold." "You speak the truth," he said.
ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ᾖ.
"It is therefore the case," he said, "concerning some of such things, that not only the form itself is deemed worthy of its own name for all time, but also something else, which is not indeed that form, but has its shape always, whenever it exists.
ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ; πάνυ γε.
But perhaps it will be clearer in this what I mean: for the odd must surely always obtain this name which we are now speaking of; or not?" "Certainly."