§3#2τῷ γὰρ τὸν λόγον ἐπιδέχεσθαι διὰ τούτων τὸ διττὸν, λαβόντες θάτερον κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς οἱ σοφισταὶ, θάτερον συνάγουσι, μεταβάλλοντες μὲν διὰ τούτων τὸν λόγον, πάντως γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως τὸ σόφισμα συμβαίη, συλλογιζόμενοι δὲ ὡς ταὐτὸ λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ ἕν τι λογικὸν ὄνομα καὶ ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου, τὸ λογικὸν ἄρα ἓν ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου· καὶ εἰ ὅρος ἐνταῦθα εἱστήκει ὁ τὸ χωρίον, ὅρος δ᾿ ἐνταῦθα οὐχ ἕστηκε καὶ λάθοι μὲν οὐδένα τὸ κίβδηλον·
For, by the proposition's admitting multiplicity through these means, the sophists, having taken one meaning at the beginning, conclude the other, changing indeed the proposition through these—for surely the fallacy would not happen otherwise—and reasoning as if they were taking the same thing, just as if "rational" is some single name and a property of man, therefore "rational" is one property of man; and if "oros" stood here as meaning boundary, while "oros" did not stand here, and this counterfeit would escape no one.
αὐτὰρ οὐκ ὀκνοῦσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ πανταχῆ σμικρὸν φροντίζειν τοῦ εὐλόγου· ἐπεὶ κᾀν τοῖς ἐνεργείᾳ διττοῖς οὗτοί γε ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιοῦσι.
Yet the sophists do not hesitate to care little for what is reasonable in every way; since even in things that are multiple in actuality, they do this very same thing.
λαβόντες γὰρ ἕτερον συλλογίζονται· ἀλλ᾿ ἐκεῖ μὲν ἀφανέστερον ὅτι καὶ ὁτιοῦν σημαίνῃ ἂν |ὁ λόγος, ὁμολογηθείη· ἐνταῦθα δὲ προδήλως, διὸ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κᾀκεῖ εἰσιν οἱ τὸ εἶδος σοφισταὶ βιαζόμενοι·
For having taken the other meaning, they reason; but while there it is less obvious that whatever the proposition might mean would be agreed upon, here it is completely manifest, which is why Aristotle also said, "by these very names and propositions"; for those who force the form even there are the sophists.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔχομεν τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ τε καὶ δυνάμει, λείπεται φαντασίᾳ· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, καθάπερ ἐλέγετο ἔμπροσθεν·
But since we have what is in actuality and in potentiality, what remains is that in appearance; and this is that due to the figure of speech, as was said before.
φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα διττὸν οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁμοίως καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον καθ᾿ ἕκαστον τῶν προειρημένων·
For even a name appears multiple when it is not so, and a proposition likewise, though not so much as in each of the aforementioned cases.
τὰ παραδείγματα λάβοι τὶς ἂν ἔκ τε τῶν καὶ Εὐδήμου κᾀξ ἄλλων·
One might take examples from the works of Eudemus and from others.
ἐπεὶ δ᾿ οὖν ἔχομεν πάντας κατειλεγμένους τοὺς τρόπους, ἂν γένοιτό τι διττὸν, ἔχομεν πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα.
Since, therefore, we have all the ways listed, if any multiplicity should arise, we have all the fallacies due to diction.
ταῦτα γὰρ οὖν ἐστι, ἢ παρὰ τὸ διττόν· ἐχόμενον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοσαυταχῶς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις οὐ ταὐτὸν δηλώσαιμεν, ὅτι ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ δυνάμει, ἢ φαντασίᾳ.
For these are indeed either due to multiplicity, or following upon this, we would show by these very names and propositions in as many ways that they do not signify the same thing, namely, either in actuality, in potentiality, or in appearance.
δῆλον δ᾿ ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμοῦ τρόπον, ὁποῖόν τις ἂν προέλοιτο, δυνατὸν ποιεῖν, ἅπαξ γε τὴν διαίρεσιν ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ εὐθείας καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπάγοντα.
And it is clear that whichever mode of reasoning one might choose, it is possible to perform it, once one has the division, both by direct proof and by leading to the impossible.
εἰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατὸν, ἀλλ᾿ ἔσται οὔτ᾿ ἐν ὀνόματι οὔτ᾿ ἐν λόγῳ, οὔτ᾿ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὔτε δυνάμει, οὔτε φαντασίᾳ· παρὰ ταῦτα δ᾿ οὐδὲν ὁ λόγος ἐδείκνυ·
For if it were possible, yet it will exist neither in a name nor in a proposition, nor in actuality, nor in potentiality, nor in appearance; but the argument showed nothing besides these.
κατ᾿ αὐτὸ μὲν ἀφωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον·
Let it be defined in this way according to that very method.
ὅτι δ᾿ οὐ κατ᾿ αὐτὸν τὴν διαίρεσιν εὑρήκαμεν, οὐ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλει χαριζόμεθα νῦν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἅπαντα κατὰ τὴν μέθοδον γέγραπται, δῆλον·
But not that we have found the division for his sake—for we are not doing a favor to Aristotle now—but it is clear that all these have been written according to method.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἢ ἐν ὀνόματι δεῖν, ἢ ἐν λόγῳ τὸ διττὸν εἶναι σαφῶς αὐτὸς εἴρηκεν ἐν οἷς φησιν ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ δυνάμει, ἢ φαντασίᾳ γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς τάξεως·
For that the multiplicity must be either in a name or in a proposition, he himself has clearly said in those passages where he says that the multiplicity in actuality, in potentiality, or in appearance by the same names and propositions is known from the order.
γέγραπται γοῦν ἀφωρισμένα καθ᾿ ἕκαστον εἶδος ἢ γένος τὰ ὁμογενῆ, καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ δυνάμει, τρίτον δὲ τὰ φαντασίᾳ, καθάπερ δίκαιον, ἢ διὰ τί ποτ᾿ οὐ συγκέχυται ταῦτα·
At least, the related things have been written separated according to each species or genus, and first those in actuality, second those in potentiality, third those in appearance, as is just, or else why indeed were these never confused?
ἀλλ᾿ ὡς γελοῖον ἴσως καὶ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων ἑτέραν πίστιν πειρᾶσθαι φέρειν, μὴ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ πράγματος· εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει καθάπερ ἡ τέχνη φησὶ δηλονότι καὶ γέγονε κατ᾿ αὐτὴν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ, τομήν τινα οὐκ ἂν τύχῃ οὐδὲ ταὐτόματα ἐργάσαιτο·
But it is perhaps ridiculous to try to bring another proof for such things, and not the one from the fact itself; for if things are indeed as the art says, and occur according to it, just like medicine, it would not perform any division by chance, nor spontaneously.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τούτων ἱκανὰ πρὸς τὸ παρόν ἐστιν.
These things, then, are sufficient concerning these matters for the present.