§3#1[Τὸ παρὰ τὸ διττὸν παρ᾿ ἓξ τρόπους παρὰ τὴν λέξιν γενέσθαι.
[That fallacies due to multiplicity arise according to the six ways of diction.
ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστι λόγος. ] Δεικτέον δὲ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἂν εἴη, διὰ τί τὸ παρὰ τὸ διττὸν τοσαυταχῶς, ὁσαχῶς Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ, συνίσταται·
What a proposition is.] The next thing to show would be why fallacies due to multiplicity are established in as many ways as Aristotle says.
εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο μέλλει καλῶς εὑρεθήσεσθαι, ληπτέον πρότερον, ὃ τί ποτέ ἐστι λόγος τε καὶ ἐκ λόγων·
And if this too is to be beautifully discovered, we must first grasp what a proposition (logos) is, and what is composed of propositions.
λόγοι γὰρ καὶ αἱ προτάσεις· τούτων τινὶ ἤ τισι διττὸν ζητοῦμεν·
For premises (protaseis) are also propositions; we look for multiplicity in one or some of these.
ἔσται δὴ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν ἀποχρώντως εἰπεῖν, σύνθεσις ὀνομάτων·
Now, to speak sufficiently for the present, a proposition will be a combination of names.
καλῶ δὲ ὀνόματα κᾂν καὶ τὰ ῥήματα καὶ ὅλως τι σημαίνει διὰ τὸ γνωριμώτερα·
And I call "names" even verbs and generally anything that signifies, because they are more familiar.
ἀνάγκη τὸ διττὸν, ἢ ἔν τινι τούτων εἶναι τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ· τρίτον γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ὅπως συσταίη· ὁπόταν ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἄν τις ἔχοι παρ᾿ ἕκαστα τῶν λίθων, ἢ τὸ συγκείμενον·
It is necessary that multiplicity is either in some of these names, or in the proposition itself; for we have no third thing through which it could be established, just as one would have nothing besides each of the stones or the thing composed of them.
καὶ τοῦτο, ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἢ δυνάμει, ἢ φαντασίᾳ.
And this exists either in actuality, in potentiality, or in appearance.
παρὰ ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲν ἕτερόν τις εὕροι ὑπάρχον, ἢ λεγόμενον, καθάπερ ἐν ἄλλοις ἀποδέδεικται·
For besides these, one could find nothing else existing or spoken of, as has been demonstrated in other places.
πάντα δὲ ταῦτα συλλαβόντες ἔχουσιν οἱ εἰρημένοι τρόποι·
And the aforementioned ways grasp all of these together.
ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ διττὸν ἔχουσι παρά τε τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν καὶ ἐν ὀνόματι μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ ὁ παρὰ τὴν ἀμφιβολίαν·
For they have multiplicity in actuality through homonymy and amphiboly; and the fallacy due to homonymy is in a name, while that due to amphiboly is in a proposition.
ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι δύο σημαίνουσι·
And they have it in actuality because they truly signify two things.
δυνάμει δ᾿ ὁπότε τῇ προσῳδίᾳ γίγνονται διττοὶ καὶ παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ σημαίνουσι πλείω, ἀλλὰ πάντως ἕν.
But they are multiple in potentiality when they become multiple by accent, and by composition and division; for these do not signify more things, but absolutely one.
διά τε τὸ ἑκάτερον ἐνδέχεσθαι διττοὶ λέγονται· διὸ καὶ δυνάμει φαμὲν αὐτοὺς, τοιοῦτο γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει οἶον τοῦτο αὗ πάλιν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρόσθεν διῄρητο, ἢ ἐν ὀνόμασιν, ἢ ἐν λόγῳ·
Yet they are called multiple because of the possibility of either interpretation; which is why we say they are multiple in potentiality, for such is potentiality. And this again, just as was distinguished before, is either in names or in a proposition.
ἐν μὲν οὖν ὀνόμασιν ἡ προσῳδία ποιεῖ τὸ διττόν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐφ᾿ ἑκάτερον ἕλκει τοὔνομα, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ορος ἕστηκεν, ἡ δασεῖα κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς τεθεῖσα, ἢ μή·
In names, then, accent produces multiplicity; for this draws the name to either of the two meanings, as in "Oros (mountain/boundary) stands," depending on whether a rough breathing is placed at the beginning or not.
ἐν δὲ λόγῳ, διότι σύνθεσις καὶ διαίρεσις διττὸν ποιεῖ, δύναται δὲ κἀν τοῖς συνθέτοις τῶν ὀνομάτων αὕτη, διὰ τὸ προσεοικέναι λόγῳ, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Νεάπολις καὶ καλὸς κᾀγαθός· μεταβάλλοι δ᾿ ἀντὶ τῶν ἁπλῶν· ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ εἰς ἕτερον ὄνομα. τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ προσῳδία μόνη ποιεῖ· ἀλλ᾿ εἰς λόγον, ὥσπερ τὸ αὐλητρὶς δηλονότι, καὶ τὸν λόγον συνθείη πότ᾿ ἂν εἰς ὄνομα, ὥσπερ τὸ προκείμενον·
But in a proposition, composition and division produce multiplicity; and this is possible also in compound names because of their resemblance to a proposition, as in "Neapolis" and "kalos kagathos." And they would change in place of simple terms, but not into another single name (for accent alone produces this), but into a proposition, as is obvious in the case of "auletris," and one might sometimes combine a proposition into a name, as in the example proposed.
δόξει δ᾿ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἄτοπον ἴσως τὸ φάσκειν, διὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν τε καὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν συμβαίνειν τὰ σοφίσματα· εἴπερ ταῦτα μὲν διὰ τὸ διττὸν, καθάπερ ἐλέγετο πρόσθεν·
But it will seem perhaps no less strange to assert that fallacies occur because of accent and composition, if indeed these occur because of multiplicity, as was said before.
εἰ |δὲ προσῳδία τε καὶ τὰ ὁμογενῆ καὶ τῶν δυνάμει διττῶν ἐξαιρεῖ τὸ διττὸν, ποιεῖ γὰρ ἤδη ταῦτα, θάτερον σημαίνειν καὶ λέγεται ἀληθῶς συμβαίνειν οὐδὲν ἧττον τὰ σοφίσματα διὰ ταῦτα·
Yet, if accent and similar things remove multiplicity from those that are multiple in potentiality (for these already make them signify one or the other), it is nevertheless truly said that fallacies occur because of these.