§4[Οἱ τῆς ἀμφιβολίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων σοφισμάτων τρόποι. ] Εἴρηται δέ τινα καὶ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς περὶ τῶν τοῦ μέρους δικαίων ἐπελθοῦσιν ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἔξω πίπτει τρόπος εἶναι εἰρημένων.
[The modes of ambiguity and other fallacies.] But some things have also been said by the Stoics who have examined the rights of the part, to see if any other mode falls outside the things that have been said.
εἴη γὰρ ἐπαγωγή τις αὕτη πίστις καὶ δίκαιον ἄλλως, μηδεμίαν δόξαν ἀνδρῶν εὐδοκίμων πάρεργον τίθεσθαι·
For such a proof would be a kind of inductive persuasion, and it is otherwise right to set aside no opinion of reputable men as of secondary importance.
τὸν μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀμφιβολίας ὅρον, εἰ καὶ πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων μάχεσθαι δοκεῖ, τό γε νῦν ἐατέον, ἑτέρας γὰρ καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων σκοπεῖν πραγματείας ἐστὶ, τὰς δὲ διαφορὰς τῶν λεγομένων ἀμφιβολιῶν αὐτὰς ληπτέον·
Therefore, the definition of ambiguity, even if it seems to fight against many of our opinions, must be left aside for the present; for to consider these things belongs to another study.
εἰσί γε πρὸς τῶν χαριεστέρων λεγομένων τὸν ἀριθμὸν η΄.
But the differences of the so-called ambiguities themselves must be taken up; they are, as said by the more refined people, eight in number.
μία μὲν, ἣν κοινὴν ὀνομάζουσι τοῦ τε εἰρημένου καὶ τοῦ διαιρετοῦ, οἵα ἐστὶν ἡ αὐλητρὶς παῖς οὖσα· κοινὴ γὰρ αὕτη τοῦ τε αὐλητρὶς ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦ εἰρημένου.
The first indeed, which they call common to the spoken and the divided, is such as "the flute-player is a child"; for this is common to the name "flute-player" and to the spoken expression.
δευτέρα δὲ, παρὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς, οἷον ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ γὰρ χιτὼν, ἢ ἄνθρωπος.
The second, due to that in simple words, as "manly"; for it could be either a cloak or a human being.
τρίτη δὲ, παρὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς συνθέτοις ὁμωνυμίαν, οἷον ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ἀμφίβολος γὰρ ὁ λόγος, εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν εἴτε τὴν πτῶσιν εἶναι σημαίνει.
The third, due to the homonymy in composite expressions, as "it is a man"; for the expression is ambiguous, whether it signifies the essence or that the case exists.
τετάρτη δέ ἐστι παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, ὡς ὅ ἐστί σου· καὶ γὰρ ἐλλείπει τὸ διὰ μέσον, οἷον δεσπότου, ἢ πατρός. πέμπτη δὲ παρὰ τὸν πλεονασμὸν, ὥσπερ ἡ τοιαύτη, ἀπηγόρευσεν αὐτῷ μὴ πλεῖν· τὸ γὰρ μή προσκείμενον ἀμφίδοξον ποιεῖ τὸ πᾶν εἴτε τὸ πλεῖν ἀπηγόρευσεν εἴτε τὸ μὴ πλεῖν.
The fourth is due to omission, as "that which is yours"; for that which is in the middle is missing, such as "master" or "father." The fifth is due to redundancy, like such as "he forbade him not to sail"; for the added "not" makes the whole ambiguous, whether he forbade sailing or not sailing.
ἕκτην φασὶν εἶναι τὴν μηδὲν σαφοῦσαν τί μετὰ τίνος ἄσημον μόριον τέτακται, ὡς ἐν τῷ, καὶ νῦν καὶ μὴ παρήλασε. τὸ γὰρ στοιχεῖον ἂν μὴ γένοιτο διαζευκτικόν.
The sixth they say is that which makes nothing clear as to what meaningless part is arranged with what, as in "and now and not he passed by"; for the element, if it should not become disjunctive, is ambiguous.
ἑβδόμη δέ ἐστιν ἡ μὴ δηλοῦσα τί μετὰ τίνος τέτακται σημαντικὸν μόριον, ὡς ἐν τῷ
Πεντήκοντ᾿ ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. ὀγδόη ἡ μὴ δηλοῦσα τί ἐπὶ τί ἀναφέρεται, ὡς ἐν τῷ, Δίων Θέων ἐστίν· ἄδηλον γάρ ἐστιν εἴτε ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων ὕπαρξιν ἀναφέρεται, εἴτε ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον, οἷον ὁ Δίων Θένω ἐστὶν, ἢ πάλιν·
The seventh is that which does not show what meaningful part is arranged with what, as in "Of fifty men a hundred left noble Achilles." The eighth is that which does not show what is referred to what, as in "Dion is Theon"; for it is unclear whether it refers to the existence of both, or to something such as "Dion is Theon's," or vice versa.
οἱ μὲν δὴ τρόποι πρὸς τῶν χαριεστέρων οὗτοι κατηρίθμηνται.
These modes, then, have been numbered by the more refined.
δῆλόν δέ γε, ὅστις μὴ παρέργως τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἤκουσεν, ὅτι πάντες πίπτουσιν εἰς τοὺς κατειλεγμένους ὑφ᾿ ἡμῶν τρόπους, τὸ δ᾿ ἀμέθοδόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον πρόδηλον·
But it is clear to anyone who has not listened to the preceding things carelessly that they all fall into the modes listed by us, and their lack of method and lack of art is obvious.
οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀπόδειξίν τις λάβοι τοῦ κατ᾿ οὐδένα τρόπον ἕτερον ἀμφίβολόν τι δύνασθαι συστῆναι, τό τε κᾂν τοῖς πεπλεγμένοις ὁμωνυμίαν φάσκειν συμβαίνειν, παντελῶς οὐδ᾿ ἀκουόντων ἐστὶν ὀνομάτων·
For neither from what has been said could one obtain a proof that an ambiguous thing can be constituted in no other mode, and to say that homonymy occurs even in composite things belongs to those who do not listen to names at all.
πῶς δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῖς γενικαῖς διαφοραῖς εἰδικὰς καταριθμεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιουσῶν ἀσήμαντον μόριον σημαῖνον διαιρούμεναι.
And how is it not possible to number specific differences under generic differences, just as those who make the division divide into a meaningless part and a meaningful part?
λάβοι γὰρ ἂν οὕτως πλείους τὰς εἰδικὰς διαφοράς·
For in this way, one would obtain more specific differences.
ἔτι δ᾿ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰς καὶ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας τις ποιήσειε πλείους εἰδικὰς λεγομένας διαφορὰς, ὅτι αὐτὸς παρὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, αἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν, ἢ ὁμοιότητα, ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον συνίστανται·
And further, in this way, one would make more specific differences of homonymy, because it itself exists by chance, while others exist by analogy, or likeness, or some other mode.
καὶ μὴν καὶ τῆς ἐν λόγῳ ὁμωνυμίας ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν λεγομένης πλείους οἱ τρόποι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῇ παραθέσει τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων γίγνονται, ὡς ἐν τῷ, εἴη μέλλει τὸν Σωκράτην νικῆσαι· οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι τρόποι·
Moreover, there are more modes of what is called by them homonymy in an expression; for some occur by the juxtaposition of similar cases, as in "he is likely to defeat Socrates"; and the other modes are similar.
ταῦτα μὲν ἐλάττω, ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ ἄξιον ἀπορίας, πῶς τὰ περὶ τὰς φαντασίας διττὰ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι, πῶς τὰ τῆς προσῳδίας·
These indeed are minor defects, but that other thing is worthy of doubt: how double things concerning appearances, and much more still, how those concerning accent, exist.
οἱ γὰρ τιθέμενοι διττοὺς τοὺς παρὰ τὴν θέσιν, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν;
For those who posit double things due to position, how do they not also posit them due to accent?
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκείνη τῇ διαλήψει τοῦ ὅλου καὶ τῇ μὲν σιωπῇ δύναται πρὸς τὸ διττὸν ἕλκεσθαι, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τῇ προσῳδίᾳ·
For just as the former can be drawn to multiplicity by the interval of the whole and by silence, so indeed can the name by accent.
καθάπερ ἔξωθεν ὂν ὁ κενὸς χρόνος τοῦ λόγου καὶ οὐ μόριον αὐτοῦ, διττὸν ποιεῖν αὐτὸν πέφυκεν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ προσῳδία·
Just as the empty time of the expression, being outside and not a part of it, is of a nature to make it double, so indeed is accent.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ οἱ σοφισταὶ καθάπερ ἐκείνῳ χρῶνται πρὸς τὰς ἔριδας καὶ τούτῳ·
And further, the sophists use this for contentions just as they use the former.
καὶ μὴν αὐτὸ ἄν τις ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ σκοπούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν ἢ διαίρεσιν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν·
And indeed, if one considers it by itself, just as they dispute due to composition or division, so indeed they would dispute due to accent.
δῆλον δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων λόγων, οἷς μὴ πρόσκειται τὰ διακρίνοντα σημεῖα, δεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκείνων εἰς τὴν διάκρισιν, οὕτω καὶ τῆς προσῳδίας, οὐκ ἀεί γε μὴν καὶ δι᾿ αὐτὴν γένοιτο διττὸς ὁ λόγος.
And this is clear in written expressions, to which the distinguishing marks are not added; for it needs accent just as it needs the former for distinction, though the expression would not always indeed become double because of it.