§2[Παρὰ τὸ διττὸν πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα γίνεσθαι. ] Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖξαι πρόκειται τοσαυταχῶς γίνεσθαι τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα, ὁσαχῶς Ἀριστοτέλης ἔφη, τὰ παρὰ τὸ διττὸν, δῆλον ὡς δύο δεικτέον ἡμῖν, ἓν μὲν ὅτι πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν παρὰ τὸ διττόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δ᾿ ὅτι παρὰ τὸ διττὸν τοσαῦτα.
[That all fallacies of diction arise from multiplicity.] Since it is proposed to show that fallacies of diction arise in as many ways as Aristotle said—namely, those due to multiplicity—it is clear that we must show two things: first, that all fallacies of diction are due to multiplicity; second, that those due to multiplicity are so many.
δῆλον δ᾿ ἐκεῖνό γε πᾶσιν, ὅτι πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα παρὰ κακίαν αὐτῆς ἀνάγκη συμβαίνειν· ταύτης γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀρχῆς ἐχόμενοι ἐξαπατῶσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ τοὺς ἀπειροτέρους ἐν τούτοις καὶ μὴ συνορῶντας τὸ κίβδηλον.
But this is clear to everyone, that all fallacies of diction must happen due to a defect of diction itself; for the sophists, holding onto this as a starting point, deceive those who are less experienced in these matters and do not perceive the falsehood.
εἰ δὴ ὅσα βουλοίμεθα καλῶς λαβεῖν πόσα παρὰ τὴν λέξιν συμβαίνει σοφίσματα, ληπτέον πόσαι πότ᾿ εἰσὶν αἱ κακίαι ἐν αὐτῇ· ὃ ἂν συνοφθείης τῆς ἀρετῆς ληφθείσης, εἴπερ ἐστὶ μία εἴ τε πλείους ἁπασῶν· ἁμαρτία γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔοικεν εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὀρθῶς ληφθείσης εὐθὺς κᾀκείνην γνωρίζεσθαι.
If, therefore, we wish to grasp properly how many fallacies of diction occur, we must grasp how many defects there are in it; and this would be perceived once its virtue is grasped, whether it is one or more than one of all of them; for a defect seems to be a deviation from virtue, and when virtue is correctly grasped, the defect also is immediately recognized.
ἐπεὶ δὲ, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις ἀποδέδεικται λόγοις, τὸ εὖ τε καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ἐν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς ὃ πέφυκεν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀνθρώπου μὲν τὸ ζῇν, μαχαίρας δὲ τὸ τέμνειν, ληπτέον ἂν εἴη τὸ πρός τι πέφυκεν ἢ γέγονεν ἡ λέξις.
Since, as has been demonstrated in other treatises, well-being and virtue reside in that toward which a thing is naturally directed or for which it has come to be—as for a man it is to live, and for a knife to cut—we must grasp what it is toward which diction is naturally directed or for which it has come to be.
φαίνεται δὲ πρὸς ἓν τὸ σημαίνειν·
And it appears to be directed toward one thing: to signify.
δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ εὖ καὶ κακῶς ἐν τούτῳ·
It is clear, therefore, that both the well and the badly reside in this.
δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν αὕτη καθ᾿ αὑτὴν τῆς λέξεως, αἱ δ᾿ ἄλλαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ ἔξωθεν καὶ οὐ τοῦ πράγματος, οἶον εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐγραμματία.
It is also clear that this is the only virtue of diction in itself, while the others are accidental, external, and not part of the matter itself, such as harmoniousness and grammatical correctness.
τοῦτο γὰρ εἰ καὶ φαίνεταί τισιν εὖ, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἀλλ᾿ ὥσπερ εἰ ξίφος ἐλεφαντόκωπον εἴη, ἢ ὀφθαλμὸς ὑπογεγραμμένος·
For even if these appear good to some, they are not so according to the matter itself; but just as if a sword had an ivory hilt, or an eye were painted with make-up.
καὶ γὰρ τούτοις ταῦτα ἔξωθεν, τὰ δὲ καθ᾿ αὑτὰ, ἐν τῷ τέμνειν τε καὶ ὁρᾷν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἑκάστου τυγχάνειν, εἶθ᾿ ὡς λέγεται καθ᾿ ἣν ἕδραν ἔχειν, πρὸς ὅ πέφυκεν, ἢ γέγονεν·
For in these cases too, these features are external, whereas their essential features consist in cutting and seeing, and the virtue of each lies in achieving this, and then, as it is said, to have its proper seat in accordance with that toward which it is naturally directed or for which it has come to be.
δῆλον ὡς καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις γνοίη ὁπόσος ἐστίν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς πολλὰ, πλείους, εἰ δὲ πρὸς ἓν, μία.
It is clear that one would also know from this how many virtues there are in number: for if they are directed toward many things, they are more; but if toward one thing, they are one.
φαίνεταί γε μὴν ἡ λέξις πρὸς ἓν τὸ σημαίνειν·
And indeed, diction appears to be directed toward one thing: to signify.
εἴπερ τὸ καλῶς πρὸς τοῦτο μὴ σημαίνειν ἢ μὴ εὖ σημαίνειν κακία ἔσται· καίτοι ἴσως δεῖται σκέψεως, εἰ θετέον εἶναι λέξιν ἔτι, τὴν μὴ σημαίνουσαν.
If indeed, in relation to this, not signifying or not signifying well will be a defect; and yet perhaps it requires investigation whether we should still posit that to be diction which does not signify.
οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐλητὴς ὁ μὴ πεφυκὼς αὐλεῖν ὅλως· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ κακὸς αὐλητής·
For neither is he an oboe-player who is not naturally capable of playing the oboe at all; therefore, neither is he a bad oboe-player.
οὐδὲ λέξεως ἄρα κακία τὸ μὴ σημαίνειν·
Consequently, not signifying is not a defect of diction either.
τοῦτο δὲ εὐθὺς καὶ σημεῖον τοῦ μόνην τὴν ὑφ᾿ ἡμῶν δὲ λεγομένην ἀρετὴν εἶναι τῆς λέξεως καθ᾿ αὑτήν·
And this is immediately a proof that the virtue we are speaking of is the only virtue of diction in itself.
ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἑκάστου τὸ εἶναι, ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή· ἡ δὲ λέξις ἐν τῷ σημαίνειν·
For in that which the being of each thing resides, in that also is its virtue; and diction consists in signifying.
τούτου γέ τοι διαφθαρέντος, οὐδὲ λέξις, οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, διὸ καὶ μόνη συναποβάλλεται·
If indeed this is destroyed, it is no longer even diction; therefore, its virtue is also in this, which is why it is the only one that is lost along with it.
αἱ δ᾿ ἄλλαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ κατ᾿ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα εἶναι, οὐδὲν κωλύονται καὶ περὶ τὴν μὴ σημαίνουσαν ὑπάρχειν, οἶον ἡ εὐαρμοστία καὶ ἡ εὐγραμματία.
But the others, because they are not according to the matter itself, are in no way prevented from belonging even to that which does not signify, such as harmoniousness and grammatical correctness.
κρείττω γοῦν διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν διαλέκτων ἑτέραν ἑτέρας φαμὲν, οἶον τὴν Περσίδα τῆς Αἰθιοπικῆς, καίτοι μὴ σημαίνουσαν ἡμῖν· τὸ δ᾿ αἴτιον, ὅτι φωνὴ μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ἢ λέξις.
For this reason, at any rate, we say that one of the foreign languages is better than another, as the Persian than the Ethiopian, although they signify nothing to us; and the reason is that it is voice rather than diction.
ἀλλ᾿ εἴ τῳ καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο κακία τὸ μὴ σημαίνειν καὶ πλανᾶταί τις διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ καλεῖσθαι. ἀλλ᾿ ἐκεῖνο δὲ δῆλον, ὡς οὐδ᾿ ἂν διὰ ταύτην κακίαν σόφισμα συμβαίνοι.
But even if to someone not signifying appears to be a defect, and one is deceived due to the similarity of being called so, yet this is clear, that no fallacy would happen because of this defect.
τίς γὰρ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν, ἢ συνθείη τίς πρὸς ἄσημον καὶ ἀσαφῆ λέξιν.
For who would agree to, or who would compose with, a meaningless and unclear word?
λείπεται δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ εὖ σημαίνειν· τοῦτο δὲ, ὅτι διττόν.
It remains, then, that it is due to not signifying well; and this is multiplicity.
ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μόνῃ τῇ λέξει, σημαίνειν μέν τι, μὴ εὖ δὲ σημαίνειν.
For in this alone does it belong to diction to signify something, but not to signify it well.
τὸ γὰρ κύων ὄνομα σημαίνει μέν τι, οὔπω δὲ τόδε τι, οὐδὲ ἀφωρισμένον ὅπερ ἦν τὸ εὔληπτον·
For the noun "dog" signifies something, but not yet this particular thing, nor anything delimited, which indeed was what is easy to grasp.
κᾀκεῖνο δὲ λέγεται καλῶς ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος, ὅτι πάντα ὅσα φθαρτὰ τῇ σφετέρᾳ κακίᾳ, φθείρει δὲ καὶ τούτων τὴν λέξιν.
And that also is beautifully said by Plato, that all things that are perishable perish by their own defect, and this defect also destroys their diction.
ἄγει γὰρ πρότερόν τινα εἰς ἀσάφειαν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχὶ ἁπλῶς ὥσπερ τὰ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα· ἡ δ᾿ ἀσάφεια καὶ πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο διαφθορά τις εἶναι παντελὴς τῆς λέξεως· ὥσπερ πᾶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, μόνη κακία τὸ διττὸν, χωρὶς εἰ μή τις οἴεται κᾀκεῖνα κακίας, οἶον ἔνδειαν, ἢ μακρολογίαν, ἢ πριττολογίαν· λανθάνειν τοῦτον νομίζω, ἀπατώμενον καὶ μὴ συνιέντα τούτων οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς κακὸν τῆς λέξεως, εἰ μὴ τὴν ἀσάφειαν, ἢ τὸ διττὸν ἐργάζοιτο· εἰ δὲ μόνη κακία λέξεως αὕτη καὶ καλῶς τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται.
For it leads one first into lack of clarity, but not simply in the way of things that signify nothing; and lack of clarity was also said before to be a sort of complete destruction of diction; just like everything, and for this reason, multiplicity is the only defect, unless indeed someone thinks those things also to be defects, such as deficiency, verbosity, or redundancy; I think such a person is mistaken, being deceived and not understanding that none of these is simply an evil of diction unless it produces lack of clarity or multiplicity; and if this is the only defect of diction, then what was said before is also correct.
πάντα δὲ τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα παρὰ τὴν κακίαν ταύτην γίγνεται· πάντα τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ἔσται παρὰ τὸ διττόν.
And since all fallacies of diction arise due to this defect, all those of diction will be due to multiplicity.