§1## ΓΑΛΗΝΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΛΕΞΙΝ ΣΟΦΙΣΜΑΤΩΝ.
[Παρὰ τρόπους ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν γίνεσθαι τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα, τῇ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἀξιοπιστίᾳ. ] Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ φιλόσοφος διδάσκων ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων συγγράμματι παρ᾿ ὅσους τρόπους γίνεται τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφίσματα, τρόπους μὲν ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναί φησι, ἐκτίθεται δὲ. αὐτοὺς οὕτως. παρ᾿ ὁμωνυμίαν, ἀμφιβολίαν, προσῳδίαν, σύνθεσιν, διαίρεσιν, σχῆμα λέξεως.
## GALEN'S ON FALLACIES OF DICTION. [That fallacies of diction arise in six ways in number, by the authority of Aristotle.] Aristotle the philosopher, teaching us in his treatise *On Sophistical Refutations* in how many ways fallacies of diction arise, says that they are six in number, and sets them out as follows: homonymy, ambiguity, accent, composition, division, and figure of speech.
καλεῖ δὲ παρ᾿ ὁμωνυμίαν μὲν ὅταν διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τῷ λόγῳ πλείω σημαίνηται, καθάπερ ἐν τῷ κύνα τεθήρακα· πλείω γὰρ οὗτος ὁ λόγος σημαίνει διὰ τοὔνομα τὸν κύνα.
He calls it homonymy when several things are signified by a noun in a statement, as in "I have hunted a dog"; for this statement signifies several things because of the noun "dog".
παρ᾿ ἀμφιβολίαν δὲ, ὅταν παρ᾿ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ διττὸν ᾖ.
He calls it ambiguity when the multiplicity is in the statement itself.
καθάπερ ἔχει τὸ, γένοιτο καταλαβεῖν τόνδ᾿ ἐμὲ, ἐνταῦθα τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν διττὸν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ σημαίνει τὸ, ἑλεῖν τε καὶ ἀναιρεθῆναι.
As in the case of "may it happen that I capture this man"; here none of the nouns is double in meaning, but the statement itself on its own signifies both capturing and being captured.
παρὰ δὲ τὴν προσῳδίαν, ὅταν διττὸν γίγνηται. καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Ορος ἕστηκε.
It is by accent when a double meaning arises, as in "A mountain stands".
τὸ γὰρ διπλοῦν, παρὰ τὴν διττὴν προσῳδίαν τιθεμένην κατ᾿ ἀρχὰς, ἢ περιαιρουμένην·
For the double meaning arises from the double accent placed at the beginning or removed.
παρὰ δὲ τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ διαίρεσιν, ὅταν αὐτὴ ποιῇ τοῦ σημαινομένου τὴν διαφορὰν, ὥσπερ
Πεντήκοντ᾿ ἀνδρῶν ἑκατὸν λίπε δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς. ἡ γὰρ διαφορὰ τοῦ ἀνδρῶν, τοῦ ἢ συντιθεμένου, ἢ διαιρουμένου ἀπὸ τῶν ν΄ ἐστί.
It is by composition and division when this itself makes the difference in meaning, as in: "Noble Achilles left fifty of a hundred men." For the difference of "men" depends on whether it is combined with or divided from "fifty".
παρὰ δὲ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, ὁπόταν ἕτερον τῷ ὄντι σημαίνῃ, ἕτερον δὲ διὰ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ σχῆμα.
And it is by figure of speech when it signifies one thing in reality, but appears to signify another because of its appearance and shape.
δοκεῖ δὲ οἶον τὸ ἀκούω.
Such is, for example, "I hear".
ἔστι μὲν τοῦ πάσχειν δόξῃς ἂν τοῦ ποιεῖν, διὰ τὴν προφορὰν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ σχῆμα παραπλήσιον κρατεῖσθαι τοῖς τοῦ ποιεῖν, τοῦ τρέχω καὶ νοῶ.
It belongs to the category of being affected, but you might think it belongs to that of acting because of its pronunciation, which is its shape, being similar to the verbs of acting "I run" and "I think".
ἑλκύσει γὰρ ἂν ὁ σοφιστικὸς πρὸς ἑκάτερον. πρὸς μὲν τὸ πάσχειν ὅτι ἐστί. πρὸς δὲ τὸ ποιεῖν ὅτι φαίνεται.
For the sophistical reasoner will drag it toward both sides: on the one hand, that it is passive in reality; on the other hand, that it appears active.
τούτους δ᾿ ἐξηριθμημένους τοὺς τρόπους ἐφεξῆς δείκνυσιν, ὅτι μηδείς ἐστιν ὃν παραλέλοιπε, μηδὲ οἷόν τέ ἐστι τῶν παρὰ μὲν τὴν λέξιν τι σοφισμάτων, ἔξω πεσεῖν τῶν εἰρημένων.
Having enumerated these ways, he next shows that there is none he has left out, nor is it possible for any of the fallacies of diction to fall outside the ones mentioned.
ὁ δὲ λόγος δι᾿ οὗ ταῦτα δείκνυσίν ἐστιν οὗτος. τούτου δὲ πίστις ἥ τε διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς καὶ συλλογισμὸς, ἄν τε ληφθῇ τις ἕτερος καὶ ὅτι τοσαυταχῶς ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις, μὴ ταὐτὸν μέντοι δηλώσαιμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμον.
The argument by which he shows this is as follows: "The proof of this is both through induction and through syllogism, whether any other is assumed, and that we would not signify the same thing in so many ways with the same nouns and statements." Now, the part concerning induction is well-known.
εἰ γὰρ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον εἰπόντι καὶ λαβόντι τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων φαίνοιτο μηδὲν πίπτειν ἔξω τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, δῆλον ἤδη ταύτῃ γε, ὅτι μηδεὶς παραλέλειπται τρόπος·
For if, as we speak of and take each of the fallacies of diction, none appears to fall outside the mentioned ways, it is already clear from this that no way has been left out.
τὸ δ᾿ ἐφεξῆς παντάπασιν ἀσαφές ἐστι, τί ποτε βούλεται λέγειν ἐν τῷ καὶ συλλογισμὸς, ἄν τε ληφθῇ τις ἕτερος καὶ ὅτι τοσαυταχῶς ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις οὐ ταὐτὰ δηλώσαιμεν, οὐδέ γε ὅπως ἂν ἕτερόν τινα λάβοιμεν συλλογισμὸν εἴρηται·
But what follows is altogether unclear, as to what he means by "and a syllogism, whether any other is assumed, and that we would not signify the same thing in so many ways with the same nouns and statements," nor is it explained how we might take any other syllogism.
τὸ δὲ καὶ ὅτι τοσαυταχῶς ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ λόγοις οὐ ταὐτὰ δηλώσαιμεν, συλλογισμοῦ συμπεράσματι μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ συλλογισμῷ.
And the phrase "and that we would not signify the same thing in so many ways with the same nouns and statements" resembles a conclusion of a syllogism rather than a syllogism.
σύνηθες δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο τάχος τῷ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ σημείων ἐκφέρειν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ, πρὸς τοὺς ἀκηκοότας ἤδη γράφεσθαι.
Such brevity is customary for the philosopher, often expressing things as if by symbols, and because he writes for those who have already heard his lectures.
τῶν οὖν ἐξηγησαμένων αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν οὐδ᾿ ἐπεχείρησαν ταῦτ᾿ ἀκριβῶσαι τὸν προσήκοντα τρόπον· οἱ δ᾿ οὐκ ἔτυχον.
Of those who have commented on him, some did not even attempt to clarify these matters in the proper way, while others did not succeed.
ἡμεῖς δὲ πειραθῶμεν οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλους ἕνεκεν, οὐδ᾿ ὡς τῷ λόγῳ βοήθειάν τινα πορίζοντες, ἀλλ᾿ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.
Let us, then, make the attempt, not for the sake of Aristotle, nor as providing some defense for his argument, but for our own sake.
φιλοσόφου γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰς προτάσεις λαβόντα συλλογίσασθαι, καθάπερ τοῖς πλείστοις εἴωθεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ συμπεράσματος κειμένου τὰς προτάσεις κατασκευάσαι.
For it belongs to a philosopher not only to syllogize having taken the premises, as is customary for most, but also, when the conclusion is laid down, to construct the premises.