§3Ἡδέως δ’ ἂν ἠρόμην, εἴπερ ἦν ὁ Φαβωρῖνος, ἆρά κελεύει με πείθεσθαι αὐτοῖς ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις, ἢ σκοπεῖσθαι, πότερον ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν, ἢ ψευδεῖς.
I would gladly have asked, if Favorinus were alive, whether he commands me to believe all these arguments, or to consider whether they are true or false.
ἓν δὴ γὰρ σκοπεῖσθαι συνεχώρησεν.
For he indeed conceded that one must consider them.
ἠρόμην δ’ ἂν ἐπὶ τῷδε πάντως, εἰ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει διακρίνειν ἀληθεῖς λόγους ψευδῶν, ἢ μέθοδός ἐστε τῆς ἑκατέρων γνώσεως.
In any case, I would certainly have asked on this point, whether it belongs to all men by nature to distinguish true arguments from false ones, or whether there is a method for the knowledge of each.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει, πῶς οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν ἀλλήλοις ἅπαντες, οὐδ’ ὡσαύτως ἀποφαινόμεθα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν;
For if by nature, how is it that we do not all agree with one another, nor declare ourselves in the same way about the same things?
εἰ δὲ μέθοδός τίς ἐστιν, αὐτὴν πρώτην μαθεῖν ἐδεήθην. ἑξῆς δὲ ἐπιστατοῦντας αὐτοὺς γυμνάσασθαι πολυειδῶς ἐπὶ παραδειγμάτων πλειόνων, ὥσπερ οἱ παλαίειν μανθάνοντες, ἢ σκυτοτομεῖν, ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν, ἢ ναυπηγεῖν, ἢ ῥητορεύειν, ἢ ἀναγιγνώσκειν, ἢ γράφειν, ἢ ὅλως ὁτιοῦν ἐνεργεῖν κατὰ τέχνην.
But if there is some method, I needed to learn this first; and next, to be trained in many ways on more examples under their supervision, just like those who learn to wrestle, or to make shoes, or to build houses, or to build ships, or to speak in public, or to read, or to write, or in general to perform any activity according to art.
εἰ μὲν οὖν ἔγραψέ τις τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν, οἶον μέν τι χρῆμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οἷον δὲ σόφισμα, καὶ ὡς χρὴ διαγιγνώσκειν αὐτὰ, καὶ ὡς χρὴ γυμνάζεσθαι κατὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὁ Φαβωρῖνος ἐπιτρέπει τὴν κρίσιν, ὡς εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχειρουμένων τῶν μαθητῶν, πλὴν ὅτι περιττός ἐστιν, ἐδίδασκεν ὁ Ἀκαδημιακὸς ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων, ἔχομέν. τε ἡμεῖς τοὺς ἰδίων τῶν δογμάτων διδασκάλους.
If indeed, therefore, any of the Academics had written what kind of thing demonstration is, and what kind sophism is, and how one must distinguish them, and how one must train according to these, just as Favorinus entrusts the judgment, and just as when the disciples attempt both sides—except that he is superfluous—the Academic had taught each of the things mentioned, and we had our own teachers of our own doctrines, [we would have been content].
εἰ δ’ οὔτ’ ἔγραψέ τις ὑπὲρ τῆς διαφορᾶς αὐτῶν, οὔτ’ ἐγύμνασεν, ὅμοιόν τι ποιεῖ τέκτονι κελεύοντι τῷ μαθητῇ μετρῆσαί τε καὶ στῆσαι καὶ ἀποτεῖναι, καὶ κύκλον γράψαι, χωρὶς τοῦ πῆχυν δοῦναι, καὶ ξυστὸν, καὶ κανόνα, καὶ κιρκίνον.
But if no one wrote about their difference, nor trained us, he does something similar to a carpenter who commands his disciple to measure and to set up and to stretch out, and to draw a circle, without giving him a cubit-measure, a scraper, a rule, and a compass.
ἀλλ’ ἴσως φησὶ μηδὲν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ δόγμασι.
But perhaps he says that there is no such thing in philosophy and doctrines.
μὴ τοίνυν ἔτι προςποιοῦ γιγνώσκειν τι, μηδ’ ἀποφάναι, μηδ’ ἀποδίδρασκε τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων Ἀκαδημιακῶν εἰσαγομένην ἐποχὴν, μηδὲ σεμνύνου γραμματικοῦ ποιῶν ἔργον, ἃ μὲν εἰρήκασιν οἱ πρόσθεν ἐκμεμελετηκώς.
Do not, then, pretend any longer to know anything, nor declare anything, nor run away from the suspension of judgment introduced by the older Academics, nor puff yourself up by doing the work of a grammarian, having studied thoroughly what those before have said.
ὅτι δὲ αὐτῶν ὑγιές ἐστιν οὐδὲν, εὔδηλον ἐννόῳ.
But that there is nothing healthy in them is clear to anyone of sense.
οὐδὲ γὰρ διδασκάλου τόγε τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ ἀδολεσχία τις ἢ λῆρος.
For such a thing is not even the part of a teacher, but some idle chatter or nonsense.
πόθεν οὖν ἐλπὶς ὑπολείπεται τῆς τῶν ἀληθῶν εὑρέσεως;
Whence, then, is any hope left for the discovery of the truth?
ᾧ γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει κριτήριον ἀληθῶν καὶ ψευδῶν, ἀνέλπιστος ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ.
For to him for whom there is no criterion of true and false, his knowledge is hopeless.
ἐγχείρησον δὲ διδάξαι μόνον σοφιστὰς, μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν κριτήριον σύμφυτον, ὥστε γε μετὰ τοῦτο τολμηρῶς.
Try to teach only sophists that we have no innate criterion, so that after this, boldly [you may do something].
ἡμῖν μέντοι ἴσως φησὶν, αἴσθησίν τε καὶ νόησιν ἐναργῆ κριτήρια τοῦ ἀληθοῦς εἶναι, συγχωρήσειεν ἄν τις ἐν λογικαῖς κυλινδεῖσθαι βουλόμενος ἐλπίσι ματαίαις.
But to us, indeed, he perhaps says that sensation and intellect are manifest criteria of the truth, which someone might concede if he wished to roll about in logical and vain hopes.
ὅσοι δ’ ἀνῃρήκασιν ὅλην τὴν ἐλπίδα, καθάπερ ἐκεῖνος, μάτην φλυαροῦσι.
But as many as have taken away all hope, like him, talk nonsense in vain.
εὔδηλος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ Φαβωρῖνος, αἰδοῖ μὲν ἀνατρέπων πάντα, καὶ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπάρχειν ὁμολογῶν, ὅθεν ὑπάρχειν οἱ πρόσθεν ἔλεγον Ἀκαδημιακοί τε καὶ Πυῤῥώνειοι· προσποιούμενος δ’ ἐπιτρέπειν τὴν κρίσιν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, ἣν οὐδὲ ἑαυτοῖς ἐπέτρεψαν οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.
It is clear, therefore, that Favorinus, on the one hand, out of shame overturns everything and confesses that he is ignorant, refusing to allow that knowing is possible from the source whence the older Academics and Pyrrhonists said it was possible; and on the other hand, pretends to entrust the judgment to his disciples, which those before him did not even permit to themselves.