§2Ἐγὼ δ’ οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι καταληπτὸν ἡγοῦμαι σημαίνειν παρὰ τὸ γνωστὸν, οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τὸ καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ βεβαίως γιγνώσκειν, ἀνάλογον δ’ αὐτοῖς λέγεσθαι τήν τε κατάληψιν καὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν.
I do not think that the "apprehensible" means anything other than the "known," nor that "being ap prehended" means anything other than "knowing with certainty," and I think that, analogously to these, "apprehension" and "apprehensive impression" are also spoken of.
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔνια μὲν οἰόμεθα ἢ βλέπειν, ἢ ἀκούειν, ἢ ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι, καθάπερ ἐν ὀνείροις καὶ μανίαις, ἔνια δὲ οὐκ οἰόμεθα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὁρῶμεν, ἢ ὅλως αἰσθανόμεθα, ταυτὶ μὲν τὰ δεύτερα πάντες ἄνθρωποι πλὴν Ἀκαδημιακῶν τε καὶ Πυῤῥωνείων εἰς βεβαίαν γνῶσιν ἥκειν νομίζουσιν, ἃ δ’ ὄναρ ἢ παραπαιόντων ἡ ψυχὴ φαντάζεται, ψευδῆ ταῦθ’ ὑπάρχειν.
For since we think we either see or hear or generally perceive some things, as in dreams and madness, but of other things we do not merely think so, but in truth we see or generally perceive them, all men except the Academics and Pyrrhonists believe that these latter things arrive at certain knowledge, while those things which the soul imagines in dreams or when raving exist as false.
εἰ μὲν δὴ συγχωροῦσιν αὐτὸ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχειν, ἐξαλειψάτωσαν, ἐν οἷς γράφουσι, μήτε τοῦ μαινομένου τὸν σωφρονοῦντα, μήτε τοῦ νοσοῦντος τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, μήτε τοῦ κοιμωμένου τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πιστότερον ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γνῶσιν.
If indeed they concede that this very thing is so, let them erase from what they write that neither the sane man is more trustworthy than the madman, nor the healthy than the sick, nor the waking than the sleeping, for the knowledge of things.
εἰ δ’ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῖς ἐναντίως διακειμένοις γνωστὸν, συγκέχυται μὲν δήπου τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήρια, οὔτ’ αὐτὸς ὁ διδάσκαλος ὁ Ἀκαδημιακὸς, οὔτ’ ὁ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ δυνήσεται κρῖναι τοὺς εἰς ἑκάτερα τῶν ἀντικειμένων εἰρημένους λόγους.
But if nothing more is known to them than to those in the opposite state, the criteria of truth have surely been confounded, and neither the Academic teacher himself nor his disciple will be able to judge the arguments spoken on both sides of the contradiction.
ἔτι δὲ οὐ δεησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν τοιούτων διδασκάλων, δυνάμενοί γε καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων ἀντιδιῃρημένων ἀναγινώσκειν, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον τῶν Ἀκαδημιακῶν εἰδέναι, κᾂν ἀσαφὲς αὐτῶν τὶ ᾖ, τὸ μὲν παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς διδασκάλοις ἀσφαλέστερον ὀνομάζειν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει τοῖς περιπατητικοῖς.
Moreover, we shall not need such teachers at all, being able ourselves to read the writings of those from the opposing sects, and to know them no less than the Academics; and if any of them is unclear, one can call it more securely under Chrysippus for the Stoic teachers, and another under Theophrastus and Aristotle for the Peripatetics.
οὕτω δὲ κᾀπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ’ οὐδὲν ἄν τι λείποιτο πρὸς διδασκαλίαν τοῖς Ἀκαδημιακοῖς, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ Φαβωρίνου λόγῳ τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πρεσβυτέροις αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο ἦν δίδαγμα, τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ἀνθρώπῳ δεδομένον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως, ᾧ παραβάλλων ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀκριβῶς διαγνώσεται.
And so too for the others, so that nothing would be left for the Academics to teach, as far as Favorinus' argument is concerned. For to the older Academics, this very thing was their teaching: that no criterion was given to man by nature, by comparison with which he will accurately distinguish each of existing things.
διὸ μήδ’ ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ μηδενὸς ἠξίουν, ἀλλὰ περὶ πάντων ἐπέχειν ἀεί.
For this reason, they did not even think it right to declare anything about any matter, but always to suspend judgment about all things.
ἀλλ’ εἰ δὴ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κριτηρίοις αἴσθησιν ἱκανῶς συγχωρήσουσιν ἡμῖν, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεησόμεθα τῆς εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχειρήσεως, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρου τινὸς ἀπαιτήσεως, μᾶλλον μὲν τοὺς τεχνίτας παρέχοντας τοῖς μαθηταῖς εὐθέως, ἀλλ’ ἕτερον τὸ λογίζεσθαι, τὸ καλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ψηφίζειν.
But if indeed they will sufficiently concede sensation to us among the natural criteria, we shall no longer need the argument on both sides, but another kind of demand, rather providing the students immediately with craftsmen, but another thing is reasoning, which is called "calculating" by the many.
τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι τὸ ἐπισταθῆναι τῷ γυμναζομένῳ, καὶ τούτῳ προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, ἐν οἷς σφάλλεται, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπανορθούμενον μόνα.
And this is to stand over the person being trained and to direct one's mind to this, namely the points in which he errs, correcting these alone.
παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ὁ παιδοτρίβης ἐπανορθοῦται τὰ τῶν παλαιόντων ἁμαρτήματα.
Similarly, the physical trainer corrects the mistakes of those who wrestle.
καὶ ὁ γραμματικὸς, καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ, καὶ γεωμέτρης, καὶ μουσικὸς, οὕτω διδάσκουσιν οὐ διασείοντες, οὐδὲ σαλεύοντες τῶν μαθητῶν ἣν ἔχουσι πίστιν ἐπὶ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κριτηρίοις, ἀλλ’ ἐφεστῶτες αὐτοῖς γυμναζομένοις, ἄχρι περ ἂν ἀναμαρτήτους ἀποδείξωσι, τὰς κατὰ μέρος ἐνεργείας, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν εἰσάγοντες.
And the grammarian, the rhetorician, the geometer, and the musician teach in this way, not shaking or unsettling the trust that their students have in natural criteria, but standing over them as they train, until they show them to be error-free, introducing individual activities, but not suspension of judgment.
οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις σὺν αἰσθήσεσιν ἀπιστεῖν ἀνατιθέντες, ἢ τοῖς ὑπό του βεβαίως γιγνωσκομένοις καταφρονεῖν.
For these are the ones who enjoin us to distrust even activities with sensations, or to look down on things that are known with certainty by someone.
ὁ γοῦν Καρνεάδης οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ πάντων ἐναργέστατον συγχωρεῖ πιστεύειν, ὅτι τὰ τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα μεγέθη καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα γίγνεται.
At any rate, Carneades does not even permit us to believe this most manifest thing of all: that magnitudes equal to the same thing are also equal to one another.
τοὺς μὲν οὖν λόγους, οἷς ἐπιχειρεῖ λύειν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα πάμπολλα τῶν ἐναργῶς τὶ εἶναί σοι φαινομένων τε καὶ πιστευομένων, ἔτι καὶ εἰς τόδε σωζομένους ἔχομεν.
Thus, the arguments with which he attempts to solve both these and very many other things that appear and are believed by you to be clearly something, we still have preserved to this day.
ἀπόκεινται γὰρ ἐν γράμμασιν ὑπὸ τῶν μαθητῶν αὐτοῦ συναθροισθέντες.
For they are stored in writing, having been collected by his disciples.
αἱ λύσεις δ’ οὔθ’ ὑπ’ ἐκείνων, οὔθ’ ὑπ’ ἄλλου τινὸς εἴρηνται τῶν μετ’ αὐτὸν Ἀκαδημιακῶν.
But the solutions have been stated neither by them nor by any other of the Academics after him.
ἆρ’ οὖν εἰ καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο, τοῦτο γοῦν ἐδήλωσε μόνον, ὅτι σοφίσματά εἰσιν οἱ λόγοι πάντες οὗτοι, καὶ ζητητέον τὴν λύσιν αὐτῶν ὑμῖν, ὦ μαθηταί.
Did he then, if nothing else, at least show this alone, that all these arguments are sophisms, and that you must seek their solution, O disciples?
μοχθηρὸν μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, σμικρότερον δ’ ὅμως οὐ πεποιήκασιν οἱ γράψαντες μὲν αὐτοὺς, μὴ δηλώσαντες δ’ ὑμῖν, ὁποῖοί τινές εἰσι.
For this is a wretched thing, but nevertheless those who wrote them down without showing you what kind they are have not made it any smaller.