§4Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη διδασκαλία τῶν μανθανόντων ὁτιοῦν, οἵαν ἐννοεῖται Φαβωρῖνος, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρίστη τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ διδασκαλία τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐναργῶς οἶμαι δεδιδάχθαι.
Therefore, that this kind of teaching of those who learn anything, such as Favorinus conceptualizes, is not only not the best of others, but not even teaching to begin with, I think has been clearly demonstrated.
ἂν δ’ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες, διδασκαλίαι μέν εἰσιν, εἰ δ’ ἄρισται, σκοπῶμεν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν αὖθις ἀρξάμενοι.
But as for all the remaining ones, they are indeed teachings; but whether they are the best, let us examine, starting again from the same beginning.
φαίνεται γὰρ ἡμῖν ἐναργῶς τοῦτο, κᾂν ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτοῖς ἄπιστον ἐργάσασθαι σπουδάζουσιν οἱ σοφισταὶ, μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον φυσικόν.
For this is clearly apparent to us, even if the sophists strive as much as possible to make it untrustworthy, that it is not the case that there is no natural criterion.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ κιρκίνος γράφει τὸν κύκλον, ὁ δὲ πῆχυς διακρίνει τὰ μήκη, καθάπερ ὁ ζυγὸς τὰ βάρη.
For the compass draws the circle, and the cubit-rule distinguishes lengths, just as the balance does weights.
ταῦτα δὲ αὐτὸς κατεσκεύασεν ἄνθρωπος, ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν ὀργάνων τε καὶ κριτηρίων ὁρμώμενος, ὧν ἀπωτέρω κριτήριον, σὔτε πρεσβύτερον, οὔτε σεμνότερον ἔχομεν.
And these things man himself constructed, starting from natural organs and criteria, than which we have no criterion further away, nor older, nor more venerable.
εἰ τοίνυν ἐντεῦθεν ἄρχεσθαι δεῖ, λέγει γὰρ πάλιν ὁ νοῦς, ὅτι πιστεῦσαι μὲν ἢ ἀπιστῆσαι ὡς τῷ φυσικῷ κριτηρίῳ δυνατὸν ἡμῖν ἐστι, κρῖναι δ’ οὐ δυνατὸν αὐτὸ δι’ ἑτέρου τινός. ᾧ γὰρ κρίνεται τἄλλα πάντα, πῶς ἂν τοῦτο πρὸς ἄλλου κριθείη;
If, then, we must begin from here (for the intellect says again that while it is possible for us to believe or disbelieve the natural criterion, it is not possible to judge it by means of something else), for how could that by which all other things are judged be judged by another?
πιστεύειν βούλει τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἐναργῶς ὁρῶσι, καὶ τῇ γλώσσῃ γευομένῃ, τουτὶ μὲν μῆλον εἶναι, τουτὶ δὲ σῦκον, ἢ μὴ πιστεύειν;
Do you wish to believe your eyes when they see clearly, and your tongue when it tastes, that this is an apple and that is a fig, or not to believe?
ὑπείσομαι ὃ βούλει ποιεῖν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, εἰ μέντοι σπεύδεις διαλέγεσθαί μοι.
I will yield to whatever you wish to do, as being in our power, provided however that you are eager to converse with me.
μὴ πιστεύοντος δὲ, ὡς παρὰ φύσιν ἔχοντος ἀφίσταμαι.
But if you do not believe, I step aside from you as from one who is in an unnatural state.
κείσθω πρότερον ἀπιστεῖν σε, μηδὲν ἐλπίζειν μαθήσεσθαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ.
First, let it be assumed that you disbelieve, and expect to learn nothing from me.
τοῦτο γὰρ ἄρτι πέπαυμαι λέγων.
For I have just ceased saying this.
ὑποκείσθω δέ σε πιστεύειν, ἐλπίζεσθαι μαθήσεσθαι παρ’ ἐμοῦ κρίνειν.
But let it be assumed that you believe, and that it is expected that you will learn from me how to judge.
ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τοῖς ἐναργῶς αἰσθήσει φαινομένοις, τὰ δὲ νοητὰ τοῖς ἐναργῶς νοουμένοις.
However, I judge sensible things by what clearly appears to sensation, and intelligible things by what is clearly understood.
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν φυσικῶν κριτηρίων αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι κατασκευάζουσιν ὄργανά τε καὶ κριτήρια τεχνικὰ, δι’ ὧν τὰ μὲν αὐτοῖς συντιθέασι, τὰ δὲ ὑφ’ ἑτέρων συγκείμενα κρίνουσιν, κᾀγὼ διδάξω ὅλως, ὄργανά τε καὶ κριτήρια, τὰ μὲν οἷς κατασκευάσεις τοὺς ἀληθεῖς λόγους, τὰ δ’ οἷς τοὺς ἐφ’ ἑτέρων κρινεῖς γεγονότας. ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως τὸ πᾶν.
And since all arts, starting from natural criteria, construct technical instruments and criteria, through which they compile some things themselves and judge others compiled by others, I too will teach instruments and criteria in general: some by which you will construct true arguments, and others by which you will judge those produced by others.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τι φαίνοιτο πρὸς αἴσθησιν ἢ νόησιν ἐναργῶς, οὐ χρῄζει τοῦτο ζητήσεως. εἰ δὲ μήτε τι τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχῃ, τῆς ἐξ ἑτέρου προςδεῖται γνώσεως.
For the whole matter stands thus: if something should appear clearly from itself to sensation or intellect, this does not need inquiry; but if no such thing is present, it requires knowledge from something else.
ἐγὼ μὲν ἐπαγγέλλομαί σοι διδάξειν ἔνια μὲν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὀργάνοις ἀνάλογα, ἐξ ὧν εὑρήσεις τὸ ζητούμενον· ἔνια δὲ τοῖς κριτηρίοις, ἐξ ὧν τὸ δοκοῦν εὑρῆσθαι κρινεῖς.
I indeed promise to teach you some things analogous to the instruments in the arts, from which you will find what is sought; and others analogous to the criteria, from which you will judge what seems to have been found.
ἐπειδὰν δὲ μάθοις ταῦτα, ἐπὶ πολλῶν παραδειγμάτων γυμνάσω σε ταχέως τε ἅμα καὶ ἀκριβῶς εὑρίσκειν, καὶ κρίνειν τὸ ζητούμενον, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ βιβλίου δεήσει τινὸς ἔτι ἤδη πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν εὕρεσιν, οὔτε διδασκαλίας ἑτέρας, εὐθύς τε δήπου καὶ τοὺς ἄλλο τι λέγοντας ὧν εὕροις, ἑτοίμως γνωρίσειας.
And when you learn these, I will train you on many examples to find and to judge what is sought both quickly and accurately, so that you will no longer need any book for the discovery of truths, nor another teaching, and you would immediately and readily recognize those who say something other than what you have found.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ τὴν εὐθεῖαν ὁδὸν γιγνώσκων εὐθεῖαν οὖσαν οὐ δεῖται διδασκαλίας ἑτέρας εἰς ἔλεγχον τῶν πεπλανημένων, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τὴν εὐθεῖαν ὁδὸν τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐκμαθὼν, εὐθὺς ἅμα ταύτῃ καὶ τὰς πεπλανημένας γνωρίζει.
For just as one who knows the straight road to be straight does not need another teaching for the refutation of those who have gone astray, so also one who has thoroughly learned the straight road of proof immediately recognizes the stray roads along with it.
§5Φαβωρῖνος δέ μοι δοκεῖ παραπλήσιόν τι ποιεῖν τῷ φάσκοντί σε εἶναι τυφλὸν, δύνασθαι δὲ κρίνειν, πότερος ἡμῶν ἐστι ῥυπαρώτερος ἢ λευκότερος· οὐκ ἐννοῶν, ὅτι τῷ μὲν μέλλοντι τὰ τοιαῦτα κρίνειν ὑπάρχειν χρὴ πρότερον ὄψιν.
But Favorinus seems to me to do something very similar to one who claims that you are blind, yet are able to judge which of us is dirtier or whiter; not reflecting that for one who is going to judge such things, sight must first be present.
οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ διαφέρει πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ μήδ’ ὅλως ἔχειν ὄψιν, ἢ ἔχοντα μὴ πιστεύειν αὐτῇ.
Indeed, neither does it make any difference for the judgment, whether one does not have sight at all, or, having it, does not believe it.
κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ὅτι ᾧ κρίνομεν, ὁποῖόν ἐστί τι, καὶ ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ ἴσα, καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἴσα ὑπάρχει, καθάπερ τοῖς ὄνοις οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπιτρέψειεν, ὅτι μήδ’ ὅλως ἔχουσι νοῦν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, εἰ μηδὲ οὖτοι πιστὸν ἔχουσι τὸν νοῦν.
And in the same way, as to that by which we judge what sort of thing something is, and that things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another: just as no one would entrust this judgment to donkeys, because they do not have intellect at all, so neither would one entrust it to men, if they do not have a trustworthy intellect.
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς τὴν τῶν κρινομένων διδασκαλιῶν ἀπιστίαν, ἢ μήδ’ ὅλως ἔχειν τὶ κριτήριον, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἀπιστεῖν αὐτῷ.
For it makes no difference for the disbelief in the things judged, whether one does not have any criterion at all, or disbelieves it.
γελοῖος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ Φαβωρῖνος ἐπιτρέπων κρίνειν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, ἄνευ τοῦ συγχωρῆσαι τὴν πίστιν τοῖς κριτηρίοις.
Therefore, Favorinus is ridiculous in leaving the judgment to the disciples, without granting belief to the criteria.
εἰ γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐναργὲς τῷ νῷ, ἢ πιστὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, διέφθαρται πάντων ἡ κρίσις.
For if nothing is clear to the intellect, or trustworthy from itself, the judgment of all things is destroyed.
εἰ δ’ ἔστι μὲν, ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς τῷ σώματι, τοιοῦτος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νοῦς, οὐ μὴν ἅπασί γε ὁμοίως ὀξὺς, ἐγχωρεῖ, καθάπερ ὁ βλέπων ὀξύτερον ἐπάγει πρὸς τὸ θέαμα τὸν ἀμβλύτερον ὁρῶντα, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν νοημάτων, ὑπὸ τῶν φθασάντων ἰδεῖν ἐναργῶς τὸ νοητὸν, ἐπάγεσθαι πρὸς τὴν θέασιν αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀμβλύτατον, καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων τε φησὶ, κᾀγὼ πείθομαι.
But if, just as the eye is to the body, such an intellect exists in the soul, though indeed not equally sharp in everyone, it is possible, just as the one who sees more sharply leads the blunter-sighted to the spectacle, in the same way also regarding thoughts, for the bluntest person to be led to the contemplation of the intelligible by those who have already seen it clearly; and this is the teacher, as Plato also says, and I agree.
καὶ γέγραπταί γέ μοι περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν τῇ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πραγματείᾳ, ὅτι τοιαύτη τις οὖσα ἦν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἐναργὴς ἡ διδασκαλία.
And indeed, more has been written by me about these things in the treatise On Demonstration, namely that the teaching which is clear to the intellect was of this kind.
γέγραπται δὲ καὶ, ὅπως ἄν τις ὁρμώμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ στοιχείων τε καὶ ἀρχῶν ἀποδεικνὺς εἴη μάλιστα πᾶν, ὅσον ἀποδειχθῆναι δυνατὸν, οὐχ ὡς ὁ θαυμαστὸς Φαβωρῖνος, ἓν ὅλον γράψας βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ δείκνυσι μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον εἶναι καταληπτὸν, ὡς ἐπιλήσμοσιν ἡμῖν ἑτέρωθι διαλέγεται, συγχωρεῖ τέ τι βεβαίως εἶναι γνωστὸν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐπιτρέπων αἱρεῖσθαι τοῖς μαθηταῖς.
And it has also been written how one, starting from the elements and principles in each subject, would best prove everything, as much as can be proved; not like the admirable Favorinus, who wrote an entire book in which he shows that not even the sun is apprehensible, yet in another place, as if speaking to us as forgetful people, concedes that something is securely knowable and leaves this to be chosen by the disciples.