§1## ΓΑΛΗΝΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΙΣΤΗΣ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ.
Τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερα ἐπιχείρησιν ἀρίστην εἶναι διδασκαλίαν ὁ Φαβωρῖνος φησίν.
## GALEN ON THE BEST METHOD OF TEACHING Favorinus says that arguing on both sides of a question is the best method of teaching.
ὀνομάζουσι δ’ οὕτως οἱ Ἀκαδημιακοὶ, καθ’ ἣν τὴν ἀντικειμένην προσαγορεύουσι.
And the Academics use this name for the procedure by which they address the opposing argument.
οἱ μὲν οὖν παλαιότεροι τελευτᾷν αὐτὴν εἰς ἐποχὴν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, ἐποχὴν καλοῦντες τὴν, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τὶς, ἀοριστίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ περὶ μηδενὸς πράγματος ὁρίσασθαι, μηδὲ ἀποφήνασθαι βεβαίως.
Now the older Academics suppose that this terminates in suspension of judgment, calling "suspension of judgment" what one might call "indeterminacy," which is to decide about no matter, nor to declare anything with certainty.
οἱ νεώτεροι δὲ, οὐ γὰρ μόνος ὁ Φαβωρῖνος, ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰς τοσοῦτον προάγουσι τὴν ἐποχὴν, ὡς μηδὲ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι καταληπτόν· ἐνίοτε δὲ εἰς τοσοῦτον τὴν γνῶσιν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτὴν, ἄνευ τοῦ διδαχθῆναι πρότερον ἐπιστημονικὸν κριτήριον.
But the more recent Academics—for Favorinus is not alone—sometimes carry suspension of judgment to such an extent that they do not even admit that the sun is apprehensible; and sometimes they carry knowledge to such an extent that they entrust it even to their disciples, without their having first been taught a scientific criterion.
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν, ὃ Φαβωρῖνος εἴρηκεν ἐν τῷ περὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημιακῆς διαθέσεως, ὃ Πλούταρχος ἐπιγέγραπται.
For indeed, what Favorinus said in his treatise *On the Academic Disposition*, which is inscribed *Plutarch*, is nothing else.
λέγει δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ἐπίκτητον, ἐν ᾧ δήπουθεν ἐστὶν Ὀνήσιμος ὁ Πλουτάρχου δοῦλος Ἐπικτήτῳ διαλεγόμενος.
And he says this very thing in his *Against Epictetus*, in which, of course, Onesimus, the slave of Plutarch, is represented as disputing with Epictetus.
καὶ μέντοι κᾀν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα γραφέντι βιβλίῳ Ἀλκιβιάδη καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς Ἀκαδημιακοὺς ἐπαινεῖ, προσαγορεύοντας μὲν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις λόγων, ἐπιτρέποντας δὲ τοῖς μαθηταῖς αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀληθεστέρους·
Furthermore, in the book written after these, *Alcibiades*, he praises the other Academics, since they address both of the arguments that oppose each other, while permitting their disciples to choose the truer ones.
ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτῳ μὲν εἴρηκε, πιθανὸν ἑαυτῷ φαίνεσθαι, μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτόν.
But in this work he has said that it seems plausible to him that nothing is apprehensible.
ἐν δὲ τῷ Πλουτάρχῳ συγχωρεῖν ἔοικεν, εἶναί τι βεβαίως γνωστόν.
Yet in the *Plutarch* he seems to concede that something is known with certainty.
ἄμεινον γὰρ οὕτως ὀνομάζειν τὸ καταληπτὸν, ἀποχωροῦντας ὀνόματι Στωϊκῷ.
For it is better to name the "apprehensible" in this way, departing from the Stoic term.
καὶ ἔγωγε ἐθαύμαζον νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς, ὅπως ὁ Φαβωρῖνος εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀττικῶν φωνὴν εἰωθὼς μεταλαμβάνειν ἕκαστα τῶν ὀνομάτων, οὐ παύεται λέγων, οὔτε τὸ καταληπτὸν, οὔτε τὴν κατάληψιν, οὔτε τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, οὔτε τὰ τούτοις ἀντικείμενα οἷον στερητικῶς λεγόμενα, ἀκατάληπτον φαντασίαν, ἢ τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν αὐτήν.
And I, by the gods, used to wonder how Favorinus, though accustomed to translate each of the terms into the Attic dialect, does not stop using "the apprehensible," "apprehension," "apprehensive impression," or their opposites expressed negatively, like "non- apprehensive impression" or "non-apprehensibility" itself.
ὡς δὲ καὶ τρία βιβλία γράψας, ἓν μὲν πρὸς Ἀδριανὸν, ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς Δρύσωνα, καὶ τρίτον πρὸς Ἀρίσταρχον, ἅπαντα περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐπέγραψε.
Indeed, he even wrote three books, one addressed to Hadrian, another to Dryson, and a third to Aristarchus, all of which he inscribed *On the Apprehensive Impression*.
καὶ καθ’ ὅλα γε αὐτὰ γενναίως ἀγωνίζεται, πειρώμενος ἐπιδεικνύναι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀνύπαρκτον.
And throughout all of them he fights vigorously, attempting to show that the apprehensive impression does not exist.