§6τούτων δʼ οὕτως ἐχόντων, ἑξῆς ῥητέον, ὡς τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ ἡ τύχη τό τε δυνατὸν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ ταχθέντα ἐν τοῖς προηγουμένοις αὐτά τε σῴζοιτʼ ἂν καὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην σῴζοι.
These things being so, next it must be said that what is in our power, fortune, the possible, the contingent, and their kindred, being ordered among the antecedents, would both themselves be preserved and preserve fate.
ἡ μὲν γὰρ εἱμαρμένη πάντα περιέχει καθάπερ καὶ δοκεῖ· τὰ δʼ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γενήσεται, ἀλλʼ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν οἷον καὶ πέφυκεν εἶναι.
For fate encompasses all things, just as indeed it seems; but things will not happen by necessity, but each of them according to what it is naturally suited to be.
πέφυκε δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν ὡς γένος προϋφεστάναι τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου· τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ὕλη τῶν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋποκεῖσθαι· τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν ὡς κύριον χρῆσθαι τῷ ἐνδεχομένῳ· ἡ δὲ τύχη παρεμπίπτει τῷ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν ἐφʼ ἑκάτερα ῥοπὴν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου.
And the possible is naturally prior to the contingent, existing beforehand as a genus; and the contingent is presupposed as the matter of what is in our power beforehand; and what is in our power, as ruler, uses the contingent; and fortune falls in alongside what is in our power, because of the inclination of the contingent toward either side.
μάθοις δʼ ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον σαφῶς ἐννοήσας, ὡς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἅπαν καὶ ἡ γένεσις αὐτὴ οὐ δίχα δυνάμεως, ἡ δὲ δύναμις οὐκ ἄνευ οὐσίας, οἷον ἀνθρώπου εἴτε γένεσις εἴτε γενητὸν οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως, αὕτη δὲ περὶ ἄνθρωπον, οὐσία δʼ ὁ ἄνθρωπος.
And you would learn what is said clearly if you conceive that everything that comes to be and generation itself are not apart from power, and power is not without substance; for instance, either the generation of a human being or that which is generated is not without the power, and this power is concerning the human being, and the human being is the substance.
ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς δυνάμεως μεταξὺ οὔσης, ἡ μὲν οὐσία δυνάμενον, ἡ δὲ γένεσις καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον ἄμφω δυνατά.
And from the power, which is in the middle, the substance is the possessing-power, and both the generation and that which comes to be are possible.
τριῶν τοίνυν τούτων, δυνάμεως καὶ δυναμένου καὶ δυνατοῦ, δυνάμεως μὲν ὡς τὸ εἶναι προϋπόκειται τὸ δυνάμενον, δυνατοῦ δʼ ἡ δύναμις προϋφίσταται.
Therefore, of these three—power, the possessing-power, and the possible—for power, the possessing-power is presupposed as to its being; and for the possible, the power exists beforehand.
σαφὲς μὲν οὖν καὶ οὕτω τὸ δυνατόν· τύπῳ δʼ ἂν ἀφορισθείη κοινότερον μὲν τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πεφυκὸς γίγνεσθαι, κυριώτερον δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὁπόταν μηδὲν ἔξωθεν ἔχῃ πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ἐμποδών.
So, then, the possible is clear even in this way; but it might be defined in outline: more generally as that which is naturally suited to come to be according to a power; but more strictly as this same thing, whenever it has nothing from without as an impediment to its coming to be.
τῶν δὲ δυνατῶν τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἂν κωλυθείη ποτέ, ὥσπερ τὰ κατʼ οὐρανόν, ἀνατολαὶ καὶ δύσεις καὶ τὰ τούτοις παραπλήσια· τὰ δʼ οἷά τε κωλυθῆναί ἐστιν, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν μεταρσίων.
And of possible things, some would never be hindered, such as those in heaven—risings and settings and things similar to these; others are such as can be hindered, as are many of human affairs and many also of meteorological phenomena.
τὰ μὲν οὖν πρότερʼ ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενʼ ἀναγκαῖα προσαγορεύεται, ἃ δέ πως τοὐναντίον ἐπιδέχεται ἐνδεχόμενα.
So the former, as coming to be of necessity, are called necessary; whereas those that in some way admit the contrary are called contingent.
ἀφορίζοιτο δʼ ἂν καὶ ταῦτα· τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον δυνατὸν τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἀδυνάτῳ, τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον δυνατόν, οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον δυνατόν.
And these also might be defined: the necessary is a possible whose opposite is impossible, whereas the contingent is a possible whose opposite is also possible.
τὸ μὲν γάρ καταδῦναι τὸν ἣλιον ἀναγκαῖὸν θʼ ἅμα καὶ δυνατόν, ἀντίκειται δʼ ἀδύνατον τὸ μὴ καταδῦναι· τὸ δὲ καταδύντος ἡλίου ὄμβρον γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἀμφότερα δυνατὰ καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα.
For that the sun should set is at once necessary and possible, and there is opposed to it as impossible its not setting; but that, when the sun has set, rain should come to be or not come to be, both are possible and contingent.
πάλιν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπʼ ἔλαττον, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπίσης καὶ ὁπότερον ἔτυχεν· τοῦτο μὲν φανερὸν ὡς αὐτὸ αὑτῷ ἀντιτέτακται, τὸ δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐπʼ ἔλαττον ἀλλήλοις· καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τὸ πλεῖστον, ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τε τὸ ἐπίσης.
And again, also in the case of the contingent, one is for the most part, another is for the lesser part, and another is equally and whichever happens; and this one indeed is clearly opposed to itself, whereas the for the most part and the for the lesser part are opposed to each other; and these former ones depend for the most part on nature, while the equal depends on us.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ κύνα καῦμʼ ἢ ψῦχος, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐπʼ ἔλαττον, τῇ φύσει ἄμφω ὑποτέτακται· τὸ· δὲ περιπατεῖν καὶ μὴ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὧν ἑκάτερον ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ὁρμῇ ὑποτέτακται, ὃ δὴ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγεται.
For heat or cold under the Dog Star, of which one is for the most part and the other for the lesser part, are both subordinated to nature; whereas walking or not walking, and all such things, of which each is subordinated to human impulse, is indeed what is said to be in our power and according to choice.
γενικώτερον δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν· δύο γὰρ εἶναι εἴδη, τὸ τʼ ἐκ πάθους καὶ θυμοῦ ἢ ἐπιθυμίας, τὸ τʼ ἐξ ἐπιλογισμοῦ ἢ διανοίας, ὅπερ ἤδη κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἄν τις εἴποι.
But what is in our power is rather more generic; for there are two species: that which is from passion, namely anger or desire, and that which is from deliberation or intellect, which indeed one would already call according to choice.
ἔχει δὲ λόγον μὴ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦτο, ὅπερ καθʼ ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν εἴρηται, μὴ ταὐτὸ κατʼ ἄλλο λέγεται.
But it is reasonable that this possible and contingent thing, which is expressed in terms of impulse and what is in our power, is not called the same in another respect.
κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μᾶλλον δυνατόν τε καὶ ἐνδεχόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐφʼ ἡμῖν τε καὶ καθʼ ὁρμήν.
For in respect of its being more (general), it is possible and contingent; but in respect of the present (human context), it is in our power and according to impulse.
ἀφορίζοιτο δʼ ἂν ὧδε· τὸ μὲν ἐνδεχόμενον ὅπερ αὐτό τε καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸ δʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν θάτερον μέρος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ὁρμὴν ἤδη γιγνόμενον.
And it might be defined thus: the contingent is that which is possible both as to itself and its opposite; whereas what is in our power is the one part of the contingent, which is already coming to be according to our impulse.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου πρότερον τῇ φύσει τὸ δʼ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋφίσταται, καὶ οἷον αὐτῶν τυγχάνει ὂν ἕκαστον καὶ πόθεν ὀνομάζεται καὶ τά γε παρακείμενα αὐτοῖς, σχεδὸν εἴρηται.
Therefore, that the possible is prior by nature to the contingent, and the contingent exists beforehand to what is in our power, and what sort of thing each of them happens to be, and from what they are named, and indeed the things adjacent to them, has almost been said.