§4σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δηλοῖ, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ἡ εἱμαρμένη, πλὴν οὐχ ἥ γε κατὰ μέρος οὐδʼ ἡ καθʼ ἕκαστα.
This, therefore, almost shows also what sort of thing fate is, except not that which is partial or individual.
ποία τις οὖν καὶ ἥδε κατʼ αὖ τόδε τὸ εἶδος τοῦ λόγου;
What sort of thing, then, is this also, according to this form of the argument?
ἔστι τοίνυν, ὡς ἄν τις εἰκάσαι, οἷος ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος ὃς πρῶτον μὲν τὰ πλεῖστα, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντα, ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προστάττει· ἔπειτα μὴν καθόλου τὰ πόλει προσήκοντα εἰς δύναμιν περιλαμβάνει.
It is, then, as one might guess, like the political law, which first of all prescribes most things, if not all, hypothetically; and then indeed, as far as possible, encompasses those things that are appropriate to the city.
πάλιν δὲ τούτων ἑκάτερον ὁποῖὸν τί ἐστι, σκεπτέον.
Again, what sort of thing each of these is must be considered.
ἀκολούθως τοίνυν ὁ πολιτικὸς νόμος περὶ τʼ ἀριστέως καὶ λιποτάκτου διαλέγεται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως· ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ τοῦδʼ ἢ τοῦδʼ νόμιμόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθόλου προηγουμένως, τὰ δʼ ὑποπίπτοντα τούτων ἑπομένως.
Consequently, then, the political law speaks of the brave man and the deserter, and similarly of the others; but it is not a law concerning this or that specific person, but rather prescribes universal things primarily, and those falling under these secondarily.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ τιμῆσαι τόνδε τινὰ ἠριστευκότα καὶ τὸ κολάσαι τόνδε τινὰ λιποτακτήσαντα νόμιμον ἂν φήσαιμεν, ὡς δυνάμει καὶ περὶ τούτων διατεταγμένου τοῦ νόμου· ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἰατρικὸς καὶ ὁ γυμναστικὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν νόμος δυνάμει τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα τοῖς ὅλοις συμπεριλαμβάνει·
For we would say that honoring a certain brave man and punishing a certain deserter is lawful, since the law has also prescribed potentially concerning these; in the same manner that the medical or, so to speak, gymnastic law potentially encompasses individual cases in their wholes.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ τῆς φύσεως νόμος τὰ μὲν καθόλου προηγουμένως, τὰ δὲ καθʼ ἕκαστα ἑπομένως.
And in this way also the law of nature prescribes universal things primarily, and individual things secondarily.
ἔστι θʼ εἱμαρμένα τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ταῦτα, ὄντʼ ἐκείνοις συνειμαρμένα, τάχα δʼ ἄν τις τῶν ἄγαν ἀκριβολογουμένων τὰ τοιαῦτα καί τοὐναντίον φαίη προηγούμενα συντετάχθαι τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα, εἶναί τε τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ καθόλου, προηγεῖσθαι δὲ τῶν ἕνεκά του τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα.
And these are also in a certain way fated, being co-fated with those; though perhaps someone of those who are excessively precise in such matters might say, on the contrary, that the individual things are ordered primarily, and that the universal exists for the sake of these, since that for the sake of which a thing is precedes that which is for its sake.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μέν τούτων ἐν ἄλλοις σκεπτέον.
But concerning these things we must consider in other places.
ὅτι δʼ οὐ πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαρρήδην ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιέχει ἀλλʼ ὅσα καθόλου, τοῦτο δὴ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ῥηθὲν πρός τε τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον καὶ τὸν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν χώραν ἔχει.
But that fate does not contain all things purely or explicitly, but only those that are universal, having been said at present, has its proper place both for the following argument and for the one a little before.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡρισμένον οἰκεῖον τῇ θείᾳ φρονήσει ἐν τῷ καθόλου μᾶλλον θεωρεῖται· τοιοῦτο καὶ ὁ θεῖος νόμος, ὁ μέντοι γε πολιτικός, τὸ δʼ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ καθʼ ἕκαστα μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, οἷον μέν ἐστιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως·
For that which is defined is appropriate to the divine intellect and is contemplated rather in the universal; such also is the divine law, and indeed the political law; but the infinite is in the individual after these, such as is hypothetical.
ὅτι δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οἰέσθω.
And that fate also is of this kind, let it be believed.
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δὴ ἔφαμεν τὸ μὴ καθʼ ἑαυτὸ τιθέμενον, ἀλλά πως ἑτέρῳ τινὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὑποτεθέν, ὁπόσα ἀκολουθίαν σημαίνει. θεσμός τε Ἀδραστείας ὅδε· ἣτις ἂν ψυχὴ συνοπαδὸς γενομένη κατίδῃ τι τῶν ἀληθῶν, μέχρι τῆς ἑτέρας περιόδου εἶναι ἀπήμονα· κἂν ἀεὶ δύνηται τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀεὶ ἀβλαβῆ εἶναι. τοιοῦτον μὲν δὴ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἅμα καὶ καθόλου.
By “hypothetical” we meant that which is not posited by itself, but rather is truly hypothesized to some other thing, signifying a consequence. “And this is a decree of Adrasteia: whatever soul, having become a companion to a god, beholds any of the truths, shall be free from harm until the next period; and if it can always do this, it shall always be unharmed.” Such, then, is that which is at once hypothetical and universal.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἡ εἱμαρμένη τοιοῦτον τυγχάνει ὄν, ἔκ τε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς προσηγορίας δῆλον.
And that fate also happens to be of this kind is clear both from its substance and from its name.
εἱμαρμένη τε γὰρ προσαγορεύεται ὡς ἂν εἰρομένη τις· θεσμὸς δὲ καὶ νόμος ὑπάρχει τῷ τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς γιγνομένοις πολιτικῶς διατετάχθαι.
For it is called fate as if it were a kind of connection; and it is a decree and law because the things that follow are ordered politically for the things that come to be.
§5ἑξῆς δὲ σκεπτέον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ πρός τι, πῶς μὲν πρὸς τὴν πρόνοιαν ἡ εἱμαρμένη· ἔχει, πῶς δὲ πρὸς τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ γʼ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ διωρίσθω, πῆ μὲν ἀληθὲς πῆ δὲ ψεῦδος τὸ
πάντα καθʼ εἱμαρμένην. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ πάντα περιέχεσθαι δηλοῖ, συγχωρητέον εἶναι ἀληθές· εἴθʼ ὅσα περὶ ἀνθρώπους εἴτε περὶ γῆν ἅπαντα εἴτε κατʼ οὐρανὸν γιγνόμενα, βούλεταί τις ἐν τῇ εἱμαρμένῃ τίθεσθαι, καὶ ταῦθʼ ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν συγκεχωρήσθω.
Next, we must also consider the things in relation to something else: how fate is related to providence, and how it is related to fortune, to what is in our power, to the contingent, and to all such things; and in addition to this, let it be defined in what way it is true and in what way false that “all things are according to fate.” If, then, this means that all things are encompassed in fate, it must be granted to be true; whether one wishes to place in fate all things concerning human beings, or those concerning the earth, or those that come to be in heaven, let these also be granted for the present.
εἰ δʼ, ὅπερ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει, τὸ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην οὐχ ἅπαντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ μόνον τὸ ἑπόμενον αὐτῷ σημαίνει, οὐ πάντα ῥητέον καθʼ εἱμαρμένην.
But if, as is more indicated, “according to fate” does not signify all things, but only that which follows upon it, we must not say that all things are according to fate.
οὐδὲ γὰρ νόμιμα οὐδὲ κατὰ νόμον πάνθʼ ὁπόσα περιείληφεν ὁ νόμος· καὶ γὰρ προδοσίαν καὶ λιποταξίαν καὶ μοιχείαν καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα περιλαμβάνει, ὧν οὐδὲν ἄν τις εἴποι νόμιμον· ὁπότʼ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριστεῦσαι ἢ τυραννοκτονῆσαι ἤ τι ἄλλο κατορθῶσαι φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε νόμιμον.
For neither are all things lawful or according to law which the law has encompassed; for it includes treason and desertion and adultery and many other such things, none of which anyone would say is lawful; since I indeed would not even say that acting bravely, or killing a tyrant, or achieving any other success is lawful.
τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ νόμιμον πρόσταγμα νόμου ἐστί· τὸ δʼ εἴπερ ὁ νόμος προστάττει, πῶς οὐκ ἂν ἀπειθοῖεν καὶ παρανομοῖεν οἵ γε μὴ ἀριστεύοντες καὶ τυραννοκτονοῦντες καὶ ὅσοι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ κατορθοῦσιν;
For that which is lawful is a command of the law; and if the law commands these, how would those not be disobedient and lawbreakers who do not act bravely or kill tyrants, and all who do not achieve such successes?
ἢ πῶς, εἰ παράνομοι οἵδε, οὐ δίκαιον κολάζειν τοὺς τοιούτους;
Or how, if these are lawbreakers, is it not just to punish such people?
εἴ γε μὴν ταῦτα λόγον οὐκ ἔχει, μόνα ῥητέον νόμιμὰ τε καὶ κατὰ νόμον τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ὁρισθέντʼ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν πραττομένοις· μόνα δʼ εἱμαρμένα καὶ καθʼ εἱμαρμένην τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς ἐν τῇ θείᾳ διατάξει προηγησαμένοις.
But if these things are not rational, we must say that only those things are lawful and according to law which are defined by the law upon actions performed in whatever manner; and only those things are fated and according to fate which follow upon the things that preceded in the divine ordering.
ὥστε πάντα μὲν τὰ γιγνόμενʼ ἡ εἱμαρμένη περιλαμβάνει, πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ σχεδὸν ὅσα προηγεῖται οὐκ ὀρθὸν λέγειν καθʼ εἱμαρμένην.
So that while fate encompasses all things that come to be, it is not correct to say that many of the things in it, and almost all that precede, are according to fate.