§7περὶ δὲ τῆς; τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ ταῦτα θεωρεῖται, νῦν ἡμῖν λεκτέον.
Concerning fortune and the spontaneous, and if there is anything besides these contemplated, now we must speak.
αἴτιον μὲν δή τι ἡ τύχη.
Fortune is indeed some sort of cause.
τῶν δʼ αἰτίων τὰ μὲν καθʼ αὑτά, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον οἰκίας ἢ νεὼς καθʼ αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικὸν καὶ τὸ ναυπηγικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ γεωμετρικόν, καὶ πᾶν ὅ τι ἂν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ ἢ ναυπηγικῷ εἴδει συμβεβήκῃ, εἴτε κατὰ σῶμα εἴτε κατὰ ψυχὴν εἴτε κατὰ τὰ ἐκτός.
And of causes, some are essential, others accidental; for example, of a house or a ship, the essential cause is the building art and the shipbuilding art, but the accidental cause is the musical or the geometrical, and everything that may be accidental to the building or shipbuilding form, whether concerning the body or the soul or external circumstances.
ὅθεν καὶ δῆλον, ὡς τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὡρισμένον καὶ ἕν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐχ ἕν τε καὶ ἀόριστον πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ ὑπάρχει παντάπασιν ἀλλήλων διαφέροντα.
Whence it is also clear that the essential is defined and one, whereas the accidental is not one and indefinite; for many and infinite things belong to the one, being completely different from one other.
τὸ μέντοι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γίγνηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ προαίρεσις, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης προσαγορεύεται· οἷον τὸ εὑρεῖν χρυσίον σκάπτονθʼ ἵνα φυτεύσῃ, ἢ παθεῖν τι ἢ δρᾶσαι τῶν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος φεύγοντʼ ἢ διώκοντʼ ἢ ἄλλως βαδίζοντʼ ἢ αὐτὸ μόνον ἐπιστραφέντʼ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ὅπερ συνέπεσεν, ἀλλʼ ἑτέρου τινὸς χάριν.
However, when the accidental occurs not only in things that are for the sake of something, but also in those where choice is involved, then indeed it is also called "from fortune"; for example, finding gold while digging in order to plant, or suffering or doing something contrary to custom while fleeing or pursuing or otherwise walking or merely turning around, not for the sake of this which happened, but for the sake of some other thing.
διὸ καὶ ἀπρονόητον αἰτίαν καὶ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ τὴν τύχην ἀπέδοσαν· τῶν παλαιῶν ἔνιοι.
Therefore, some of the ancients attributed fortune to be an unforeseen cause and unclear to human reasoning.
κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔγγιον ἔτι προσιόντας αὐτῇ τῷ λόγῳ, οὕτως ἀφώρισται ἡ τύχη, αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῶν ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἔπειτʼ ἤδη καὶ τὸ ἀπρονόητον καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ προστιθέασι· καίτοι γε κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ τὸ σπάνιον καὶ παράλογον ἐμφαίνεται τῷ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οἷον δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτο, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἄρτι ῥηθέντων, ἀλλʼ ἔκ γε τῶν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι γεγραμμένων, σαφέστατα προσπίπτει.
But according to those from Plato who approach it even closer with definition, fortune is defined as: an accidental cause of things for the sake of something in those that are according to choice; and then indeed they also add the unforeseen and the unclear to human reasoning; and yet, according to these same things, the rare and the unexpected are also manifest in the accidental; and what sort of thing this is, if not from what has just been said, at least from what is written in the *Phaedo*, falls upon us most clearly.
γέγραπται δʼ ὧδε· οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῆς δίκης ἆρα ἐπύθοντο ὃν τρόπον ἐγένετο; ναί· ταῦτα μὲν ἡμῖν ἤγγειλέ τις· καὶ ἐθαυμάζομέν γε, ὅτι πάλαι γενομένης; αὐτῆς ὕστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανών τί ἦν τοῦτο, ὦ Φαίδων; τύχη τις αὐτῷ, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, συνέβη· ἔτυχε γὰρ τῇ προτεραίᾳ τῆς δίκης ἡ πρύμνα ἐστεμμένη τοῦ πλοίου, ὃ εἰς Δῆλον Ἀθηναῖοι πέμπουσιν
ἐν γὰρ τούτοις τὸ
συνέβη
οὐκ ἀντὶ τοῦ
γέγονεν
ἀκουστέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐκ συνδρομῆς τινος αἰτίων ἀπέβη, ἄλλου πρὸς ἄλλο γεγονότος.
It is written thus: "Did they not then learn about the trial, in what manner it took place?" "Yes, someone reported these things to us; and we were indeed wondering that, although it took place long ago, he appears to have died later." "What was this, Phaedo?" "Some fortune, Echecrates, happened to him; for it happened on the day before the trial that the stern of the ship was crowned, which the Athenians send to Delos." For in these words, "it happened" is not to be understood instead of "it became", but much rather that it resulted from some concurrence of causes, one thing having happened in relation to another.
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἱερεὺς ἔστεφε τὸ πλοῖον ἄλλου χάριν ἀλλʼ οὐ Σωκράτους· οἱ δὲ διʼ ἕτερον κατεψηφίσαντʼ αὐτοῦ· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ἀποβὰν παράλογον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἀπέβη, οἷον κἂν ἐκ προνοίας ἐγεγόνει ἤτοι ἀνθρωπίνου τινὸς ἢ τῶν ἔτι κρειττόνων.
For the priest crowned the ship for the sake of something else and not for Socrates; and they condemned him because of another thing; but the result itself turned out unexpected and of such a kind as if it had come about from foresight, either of some human or of those even better.
καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς τύχης; ταῦθʼ ἱκανὰ ὡς συνυφίστασθαι ἀνάγκη, τὸ μὲν ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ παρωνύμως; καὶ τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν προϋποκεῖσθαι ἐλέχθη.
And concerning fortune, these things are sufficient; how it is necessary that they co-exist, that which is named after it and that "what is in our power" is presupposed, was said.
τὸ δʼ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῆς τύχης· εἰ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴν περιλαβὸν ἔχει καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως συμπίπτειν πεφυκότων.
But the spontaneous is of wider extent than fortune; for it also encompasses fortune itself and many of the things that naturally happen at different times in different ways.
ἔστι δὲ κατʼ ὄνομα, ὅπερ αὐτόματον λέγεται τὸ πεφυκὸς ἄλλου ἕνεκα, ὅταν μὴ ἐκεῖνο παρʼ ἐπεφύκει· οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ ὑπὸ κύνα ψῦχος.
And according to its name, that which is called spontaneous is that which is naturally suited to be for the sake of something else, when that does not turn out for which it was naturally suited; for example, cold under the Dog Star seems to be so.
ποτὲ γὰρ ψῦχος οὐ μάτην, οὐδὲ τὸ δʼ ὅλον, ὡς τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν μέρος τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου, οὕτως ἡ τύχη τοῦ αὐτομάτου.
For sometimes cold is not in vain, nor... and on the whole, as what is in our power is a part of the contingent, so is fortune of the spontaneous.
ἔστι δʼ ἑκατέρου ἑκατέρου σύμπτωμα, τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου· ἡ δὲ τύχη τοῦ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, καὶ τούτου οὐχ ἅπαντος, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ ἂν καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν ᾖ, ὡς προείρηται.
And each is a symptom of each, the spontaneous of the contingent, and fortune of what is in our power, and of this not all, but that which is also according to choice, as has been said before.
διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον κοινὸν ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ἀψύχων· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἤδη πράττειν δυναμένου.
Therefore, the spontaneous is common to both animate and inanimate things, whereas fortune is peculiar to a human being who is already capable of acting.
τεκμήριον δέ, ὅτι τὸ εὐτυχεῖν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ταὐτὰ εἶναι δοξάζεται· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία τις ἡ δʼ εὐπραξία περὶ μόνον καὶ τέλειον ἄνθρωπον.
And the proof is that faring well and being happy are thought to be the same; and happiness is a kind of well-doing, and well-doing is concerned only with the complete human being.
§8καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς εἱμαρμένης; τοιαῦτα, τὸ τʼ ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ δυνατόν, ἥ τε προαίρεσις καὶ τὸ ἐφʼ ἡμῖν, ἥ τε τύχη καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον, τά τε παρακείμενʼ αὐτοῖς ὧν καὶ τὸ τάχα καὶ τὸ ἴσως· ἃ δὴ πάντα περιέχει μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐδὲν δʼ αὐτῶν ἐστι καθʼ εἱμαρμένην.
And the things within fate are of this kind: the contingent and the possible, choice and what is in our power, fortune and the spontaneous, and the things adjacent to them, among which are "perhaps" and "probably"; all of which indeed fate encompasses, but none of them is according to fate.
λοιπὸν δʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ περὶ προνοίας εἰπεῖν, ὡς αὐτή γε περιείληφε τὴν εἱμαρμένην.
And it would remain to speak also of providence, how it encompasses fate.