Humanitext Reader

Plutarch · On Compliancy §18-19

Vulnerability to Praise and Blame and Overcoming It

Passage 7 of 7 · Greek

Summary

The weakness of compliancy is compared to a bodily constitution sensitive to both heat and cold, being easily swayed by praise and blame. The author argues that it is better to face the hatred of the unreasonable than to be justly blamed for serving them, citing ancient exemplars who resisted flattery, and advises overcoming this weakness by keeping the painful memory of past regret.

§18ἀλλʼ ἔοικεν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτονία σώματος κράσει καὶ πρὸς ἀλέαν κακῶς πεφυκυίᾳ καὶ πρὸς κρύος· ἐπαινούμενοί τε γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν δυσωπούντων παντάπασι θρύπτονται καὶ χαλῶνται, πρός τε τὰς μέμψεις καὶ ὑφοράσεις τῶν ἀποτυγχανόντων ψοφοδεῶς καὶ δειλῶς ἔχουσι.
But the weakness of the soul seems to be like a bodily constitution naturally ill-adapted to both heat and cold; for when they are praised by those who make them compliant, they are utterly softened and relaxed, and they are fearfully and timidly disposed towards the censures and suspicions of those who fail to obtain their requests.
δεῖ δʼ ἀντισχυρίζεσθαι πρὸς· ἀμφότερα, μήτε τοῖς δεδιττομένοις μήτε τοῖς κολακεύουσιν ἐνδιδόντας.
But one must resist strongly against both, yielding neither to those who terrify nor to those who flatter.
ὁ μὲν οὖν Θουκυδίδης, ὡς ἀναγκαίως ἑπομένου τῷ δύνασθαι τοῦ φθονεῖσθαι, καλῶς φησὶ βουλεύεσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ· μεγίστοις λαμβάνοντα τὸ ἐπίφθονον· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν μὲν φθόνον διαφεύγειν οὐ χαλεπὸν ἡγούμενοι, τὸ· δὲ μέμψει μὴ περιπεσεῖν μηδὲ λυπηρόν τινι γενέσθαι τῶν χρωμένων ἀδύνατον παντάπασιν ὁρῶντες, ὀρθῶς βουλευσόμεθα τὰς τῶν ἀγνωμόνων ἀπεχθείας ἐκδεχόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς τῶν δικαίως ἐγκαλούντων, ἐὰν ἐκείνοις μὴ δικαίως ὑπουργῶμεν.
Now Thucydides, since envy necessarily follows power, says that he who takes up envy for the greatest things is deciding well; but we, considering that it is not difficult to escape envy, but seeing that it is altogether impossible not to fall into censure or not to be painful to some of our associates, shall decide rightly by accepting rather the hatreds of the unreasonable than those of people who justly accuse us, if we should serve those former unjustly.
καὶ μὴν ἔπαινόν γε τὸν παρὰ τῶν δυσωπούντων κίβδηλον ὄντα παντάπασι δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι, καὶ μὴ πάθος πάσχειν ὑῶδες, ὑπὸ κνησμοῦ καὶ γαργαλισμοῦ παρέχοντα χρῆσθαι ῥᾷστα τῷ δεομένῳ καὶ καταβάλλειν ἑαυτὸν ὑποκατακλινόμενον.
And indeed, one must altogether guard against the praise from those who make us compliant, since it is counterfeit, and not suffer the passion of swine, presenting oneself most easily to be used by the petitioner because of scratching and tickling, and casting oneself down and lying under.
οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρουσι τῶν τὰ σκέλη τοῖς ὑποσπῶσι παρεχόντων οἱ τὰ ὦτα τοῖς κολακεύουσι παραδιδόντες, ἀλλʼ αἴσχιον ἀνατρέπονται καὶ πίπτουσιν, οἱ μὲν ἔχθρας καὶ κολάσεις ἀνιέντες ἀνθρώποις πονηροῖς, ἵνʼ ἐλεήμονες καὶ φιλάνθρωποι καὶ συμπαθεῖς κληθῶσιν οἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀπεχθείας καὶ κατηγορίας οὐκ ἀναγκαίας οὐδʼ ἀκινδύνους ἀναδέξασθαι πεισθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαινούντων ὡς μόνους ἄνδρας καὶ μόνους ἀκολακεύτους καὶ νὴ Δία στόματα καὶ φωνὰς προσαγορευόντων.
For they differ nothing from those who yield their legs to those who trip them up, who surrender their ears to those who flatter them; but they are overturned and fall more shamefully, some of them relaxing their enmities and punishments towards wicked men, so that they may be called merciful, humane, and sympathetic, while others, on the contrary, are persuaded to take up enmities and accusations, neither necessary nor without danger, by those who praise them, addressing them as the only real men, the only unflattering, and, by Zeus, as mouths and voices.
διὸ καὶ Βίων ἀπείκαζε τοὺς τοιούτους ἀμφορεῦσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν ὤτων ῥᾳδίως μεταφερομένοις.
Therefore Bion also compared such persons to amphorae, being easily carried about by their ears.
ὥσπερ Ἀλεξῖνον ἱστοροῦσι τὸν σοφιστὴν πολλὰ φαῦλα λέγειν ἐν τῷ περιπάτῳ περὶ Στίλπωνος τοῦ Μεγαρέως· εἰπόντος δέ τινος τῶν παρόντων ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐκεῖνός σε πρῴην ἐπῄνει, νὴ Δία φάναι· βέλτιστος γὰρ ἀνδρῶν ἐστι καὶ γενναιότατος. ἀλλὰ Μενέδημος τοὐναντίον, ἀκούσας ὡς Ἀλεξῖνος αὐτὸν ἐπαινεῖ πολλάκις ἐγὼ δʼ εἶπεν ἀεὶ ψέγω Ἀλεξῖνον· ὥστε κακός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἢ κακὸν ἐπαινῶν, ἢ ὑπὸ χρηστοῦ ψεγόμενος. οὕτως ἄτρεπτος ἦν καὶ ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ κρατῶν ἐκείνης τῆς παραινέσεως, ἣν ὁ Ἀντισθένειος Ἡρακλῆς παρῄνει, τοῖς παισὶ διακελευόμενος μηδενὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦντι αὐτούς· τοῦτο δʼ ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι μηδʼ ἀντικολακεύειν τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας.
Just as they relate that Alexinus the sophist spoke many ill things in the stroll about Stilpo of Megara; and when one of those present said, "But indeed, that man was praising you the other day," "By Zeus," he said, "for he is the best of men and most noble." But Menedemus, on the contrary, having heard that Alexinus praised him often, said: "But I always censure Alexinus; so he is a bad man, either praising a bad man, or being censured by a good one." Thus he was unswerving and invulnerable to such things, and held fast to that exhortation which the Antisthenian Heracles advised, commanding his children to show gratitude to no one who praised them; and this was nothing else than not to be made compliant nor to flatter in return those who praise.
ἀρκεῖ γὰρ οἶμαι τὸ τοῦ Πινδάρου, πρὸς τὸν λέγοντα πανταχοῦ καὶ πρὸς πάντας ἐπαινεῖν αὐτὸν εἰπόντος κἀγώ σοι χάριν ἀποδίδωμι· ποιῶ γάρ σʼ ἀληθεύειν. §19ὃ τοίνυν πρὸς πάντα τὰ πάθη χρήσιμόν ἐστι, τούτου δεῖ μάλιστα τοῖς εὐδυσωπήτοις, ὅταν ἐκβιασθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ, πάθους παρὰ γνώμην ἁμάρτωσι καὶ διατραπῶσιν, ἰσχυρῶς μνημονεύειν, καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τοῦ δηγμοῦ καὶ τῆς μεταμελείας θεμένους ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀναλαμβάνειν καὶ φυλάττειν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον, ὡς γὰρ οἱ λίθῳ προσπταίσαντες ὁδοιπόροι ἢ περὶ ἄκραν ἀνατραπέντες κυβερνῆται, ἂν μνημονεύωσιν, οὐκ ἐκεῖνα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ προσόμοια φρίττοντες καὶ φυλαττόμενοι διατελοῦσιν οὕτως οἱ τὰ τῆς δυσωπίας αἰσχρὰ καὶ βλαβερὰ συνεχῶς τῷ μετανοοῦντι καὶ δακνομένῳ προβάλλοντες ἀντιλήψονται πάλιν ἑαυτῶν ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ οὐ προήσονται ῥᾳδίως ὑποφερομένους.
For I think the saying of Pindar is sufficient, who, to the one who said that he praised him everywhere and to all, said: "And I return you thanks; for I make you speak the truth." That, therefore, which is useful against all passions, those who are easily made compliant must especially remember strongly, when, forced by the passion, they err contrary to their judgment and are subverted; and placing the marks of the bite and of repentance in themselves, they must take them up and keep them for the longest time. For as travelers who have stumbled against a stone, or pilots who have been capsized near a promontory, if they remember, continue to shudder at and guard against not only those places but also similar ones; so those who continuously place the shameful and harmful effects of compliancy before themselves when they repent and are bitten, will lay hold of themselves again in similar situations, and will not easily abandon themselves to be carried away.

Notes

  1. 535fὀρθῶς βουλευσόμεθα τὰς τῶν ἀγνωμόνων ἀπεχθείας ἐκδεχόμενοι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς τῶν δικαίως ἐγκαλούντων, ἐὰν ἐκείνοις μὴ δικαίως ὑπουργῶμεν. — A complex conditional structure with a comparison, where `ἐκείνοις` refers to those who make one compliant (i.e., unreasonable petitioners, `δυσωπούντων`). If we "unjustly serve" (`μὴ δικαίως ὑπουργῶμεν`) their requests, we will incur the resentment of "those who justly accuse us" (`τὰς τῶν δικαίως ἐγκαλούντων`). Therefore, choosing to accept the hatred of the unreasonable (`τὰς τῶν ἀγνωμόνων ἀπεχθείας ἐκδεχόμενοι`) by refusing them is defined as "deciding rightly" (`ὀρθῶς βουλευσόμεθα`).
  2. 536aοἱ μὲν ἔχθρας καὶ κολάσεις ἀνιέντες ἀνθρώποις πονηροῖς ... οἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον ... — This classifies the preceding group `οἱ τὰ ὦτα τοῖς κολακεύουσι παραδิดόντες` (those who surrender their ears to flatterers) into two types using `οἱ μὲν` and `οἱ δὲ`. The former type of people remit enmities and punishments to wicked men to be praised as "merciful", while the latter type, on the contrary, are flattered into taking up dangerous and unnecessary enmities of others.
  3. 536bὥστε κακός ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἢ κακὸν ἐπαινῶν, ἢ ὑπὸ χρηστοῦ ψεγόμενος. — This expresses Menedemus' witty dilemma. Given the premise that Alexinus praises him (`ἐπαινεῖ`) but he always censures Alexinus (`ψέγω`), he concludes "Alexinus is a bad man." The proof relies on two alternatives: either (1) the one Alexinus praises (Menedemus) is bad, making Alexinus a bad man for praising a bad man; or (2) the one censuring Alexinus (Menedemus) is good, making Alexinus a bad man for being censured by a good person.

Cite this passage

Plutarch, On Compliancy §18-19. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg104.humanitext-grc2:18-19

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