§8οὐ μόνον τοίνυν ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκολουθίας κατίδοι τις ἂν τὴν παθητικὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς λογικῆς οὖσαν ἑτέραν.
Therefore, not only from the battle but no less from the compliance, one may see that the passionate principle is different from the rational.
ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔστι μὲν ἐρᾶν εὐφυοῦς πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ γενναίου παιδὸς ἔστι δὲ φαύλου καὶ ἀκολάστου, συμβαίνει δὲ θυμῷ χρῆσθαι μὲν ἀλόγως πρὸς παῖδας αὑτοῦ καὶ γονεῖς χρῆσθαι δʼ ὑπὲρ γονέων καὶ παίδων δικαίως πρὸς πολεμίους καὶ τυράννους· ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς τοῦ πάθους πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν αἴσθησις ἔστιν, οὕτως ἐνταῦθα πειθοῦς καὶ ἀκολουθίας, οἷον ἐπιρρέποντος καὶ συνεπιδιδόντος.
For, since it is possible to love a noble and naturally well-disposed boy for virtue, and also to love a base and licentious one, and since it happens that one uses anger irrationally toward his own children and parents, but uses it justly on behalf of parents and children against enemies and tyrants; just as in the former case there is a perception of battle and difference of the passion against reasoning, so in the latter case there is a perception of persuasion and compliance, as if it were inclining toward it and yielding with it.
ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ γυναῖκα γήμας κατὰ νόμους ἀνὴρ ἐπιεικὴς διανοεῖται περιέπειν καὶ συνεῖναι δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως, χρόνῳ δὲ τῆς συνηθείας ἐντεκούσης πάθος αἰσθάνεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτεινόμενον ὥσπερ αὖ καὶ νέοι διδασκάλοις ἐπιτυχόντες ἀστείοις ὑπὸ χρείας τὸ πρῶτον ἕπονται καὶ ζηλοῦσιν, ὕστερον δὲ καὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀντὶ γνωρίμων καὶ μαθητῶν ἐρασταὶ καλούμενοι καὶ ὄντες.
Moreover, a decent man having married a wife according to the laws intends to treat her and live with her justly and temperately, but when in time familiarity produces passion, he perceives that loving and cherishing are intensified for his reasoning, just as again young men meeting with agreeable teachers follow them at first out of necessity and admire them, but later love them as well, being called and being lovers instead of acquaintances and pupils.
τὸ δʼ αὐτὸ συμβαίνει καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἐν πόλεσι χρηστοὺς καὶ γείτονας καὶ κηδεστάς· ἀρξάμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ χρείας τινὸς καθηκόντως ἀλλήλοις ὁμιλεῖν, ἔπειτα λανθάνουσιν εἰς τὸ φιλεῖν ὑποφερόμενοι, συνεπισπασαμένου τοῦ λογισμοῦ καὶ συναναπείσαντος τὸ παθητικόν.
And the same happens also toward good rulers in cities, neighbors, and kinsmen; for, having begun out of some necessity to associate with one another in a fitting manner, they then slide imperceptibly into loving, as reasoning drags them along and persuades the passionate part together.
ὁ δʼ εἰπών
"
αἰδώς τε· δισσαὶ δʼ εἰσίν, ἡ μὲν οὐ κακὴ
ἡ δʼ ἄχθος οἴκων· "
ἆρʼ οὐ δῆλός ἐστι συνῃσθημένος;
And did not he who said, "And shame; and they are two, the one not bad, but the other a weight on houses," clearly perceive this?
ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος πολλάκις μὲν ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ συγκατακοσμούμενον, πολλάκις δὲ παρὰ τὸν λόγον ὄκνοις καὶ μελλήσεσι καιροὺς καὶ πράγματα λυμαινόμενον;
For in himself this passion is often compliant with reason and adorned together with it, but often contrary to reason, ruining opportunities and affairs with hesitation and delay.
§9οἷς καὶ αὐτοὶ τρόπον τινὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ὑπείκοντες, αἰδεῖσθαι τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι καλοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἣδεσθαι χαίρειν καὶ τοὺς φόβους εὐλαβείας· ταύτην μὲν οὐδενὸς; ἂν αἰτιασαμένου τὴν εὐφημίαν, εἰ ταὐτὰ πάθη προστιθέμενα μὲν τῷ λογισμῷ τούτοις καλοῦσι τοῖς ὀνόμασι, μαχόμενα δὲ καὶ βιαζόμενα τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκείνοις.
To which things even they themselves, yielding in some way because of the evidence of facts, call "shamefacedness" "reverence," and "experiencing pleasure" "joy," and "fears" "cautions." No one indeed would find fault with this euphemism, if they called the same passions by these names when they are joined with reasoning, but by those names when they fight and force the reasoning.
ὅταν δὲ δακρύοις ἐλεγχόμενοι καὶ τρόμοις καὶ χρόας μεταβολαῖς, ἀντὶ λύπης καὶ φόβου δηγμούς τινας καὶ συνθροήσεις λέγωσι καὶ προθυμίας τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὑποκορίζωνται, σοφιστικὰς δοκοῦσιν οὐ φιλοσόφους δικαιώσεις καὶ ἀποδράσεις ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων μηχανᾶσθαι διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων.
But when, being refuted by tears and trembling and changes of color, they speak of "pangs" and "agitations" instead of "grief" and "fear," and euphemize "desires" as "eagernesses," they seem to devise sophistical rather than philosophical justifications and escapes from facts by means of names.
καίτοι πάλιν αὐτοὶ τάς τε χαρὰς ἐκείνας καὶ τὰς βουλήσεις καὶ τὰς εὐλαβείας εὐπαθείας καλοῦσιν οὐκ ἀπαθείας, ὀρθῶς ἐνταῦθα χρώμενοι τοῖς ὀνόμασι·
And yet, they themselves in turn call those joys, wills, and cautions "good passions" (eupatheiai), not "apathies" (apatheiai), using names correctly in this.
· γίγνεται γὰρ εὐπάθεια τοῦ λογισμοῦ τὸ πάθος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντος ἀλλὰ κοσμοῦντος καὶ τάττοντος ἐν τοῖς σωφρονοῦσιν.
For a "good passion" comes to be from reasoning, which does not destroy the passion but adorns and orders it in those who are temperate.
οἱ δὲ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀκρατεῖς τί πάσχουσιν, ὅταν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα κρίναντες φιλεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου καὶ τῆς ἐρωμένης μὴ δύνωνται, τὴν δʼ ἑταίραν καὶ τὸν κόλακα κρίναντες, εὐθὺς καὶ φιλῶσιν;
But what do the base and incontinent experience, when, having judged that they ought to love father and mother instead of a male or female lover, they are unable to do so, but having judged that they ought not to love a courtesan or a flatterer, they immediately love them?
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἦν κρίσις, ἔδει τῇ τοῦ φιλεῖν χρῆναι καὶ μισεῖν κρίσει τὸ φιλεῖν ἕπεσθαι καὶ τὸ μισεῖν νυνὶ δὲ συμβαίνει τἀναντία, ταῖς μὲν προστιθεμένου τοῦ πάθους κρίσεσι ταῖς δʼ ἀπειθοῦντος.
For if passion were judgment, loving and hating ought to follow the judgment that one must love and hate; but now the contrary happens, passion being added to some judgments and disobeying others.
καί φασιν αὐτοί, τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκβιαζομένων, οὐ πᾶσαν εἶναι κρίσιν πάθος ἀλλὰ τὴν κινητικὴν ὁρμῆς βιαίου καὶ πλεοναζούσης, ὁμολογοῦντες ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ πάσχον ἐν ἡμῖν ὥσπερ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον.
And they themselves say, when facts force them, that not every judgment is passion, but only that which is motive of a violent and excessive impulse, thereby admitting that that which judges and that which suffers in us are different, just like that which moves and that which is moved.
αὐτός τε Χρύσιππος ἐν πολλοῖς ὁριζόμενος τὴν καρτερίαν καὶ τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἕξεις ἀκολουθητικὰς τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ, δῆλός ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ ᾧ ἀκολουθεῖ πειθόμενον ἢ πάλιν μάχεται μὴ πειθόμενον.
And Chrysippus himself, defining in many places endurance and self-control as dispositions compliant with the choosing reason, is clearly forced by facts to admit that that which complies in us is different from that which it complies with, being persuaded when it complies, or again fighting when it does not comply.