§10ἴσα τοίνυν τὰ ἁμαρτήματα πάντα καὶ πάσας τιθέμενοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας, εἰ μὲν ἄλλῃ πη παρορῶσι τἀληθές, οὐκ ἔστι καιρὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι διελέγχειν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάθεσι φαίνονται κομιδῇ παρὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν ἐνιστάμενοι τῷ λόγῳ.
Therefore, laying down that all transgressions are equal and all sins are equal, if indeed in some other way they overlook the truth, it is not the time to refute them at present; but in the case of passions, they appear to oppose facts completely and resist reasoning.
πᾶν μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἁμαρτία κατʼ αὐτούς ἐστι, καὶ πᾶς ὁ λυπούμενος ἢ φοβούμενος ἢ ἐπιθυμῶν ἁμαρτάνει.
For according to them, every passion is a transgression, and everyone who grieves or fears or desires transgresses.
μεγάλαι δὲ τῶν παθῶν διαφοραὶ κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ὁρῶνται·
But great differences in the passions are seen in terms of the more and the less.
τίς γὰρ ἂν φαίη τὸν Δόλωνος φόβον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ Αἴαντος
ἐντροπαλιζομένου
καὶ βάδην ἀπιόντος ἐκ τῶν πολεμίων
ὀλίγον γόνυ γουνὸς ἀμείβοντος;
For who would say that the fear of Dolon is equal to that of Ajax, who turned back and retreated step by step from the enemy, "changing knee for knee only a little"?
ἢ τῇ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Σωκράτει τελευτήσαντι λύπῃ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου διὰ Κλεῖτον, αὑτὸν ἀνελεῖν ὁρμήσαντος;
Or the grief of Plato for Socrates when he died, to that of Alexander because of Cleitus, who rushed to destroy himself?
ἐπιτείνονται γὰρ οὐ μετρίως καὶ τῷ παρὰ λόγον αἱ λῦπαι, καὶ τὸ παρʼ ἐλπίδα σύμπτωμα τοῦ κατὰ λόγον ὀδυνηρότερον εἰ προσδοκῶν εὐημεροῦντα καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ὄψεσθαι πύθοιτο κατεστρεβλωμένον, ὡς Φιλώταν Παρμενίων.
For griefs are also intensified not moderately by what is contrary to expectation, and an unexpected misfortune is more painful than one according to expectation, if one, expecting to see someone prosperous and admired, should learn that he has been tortured, as Parmenion did of Philotas.
θυμῷ δὲ τίς ἂν εἴποι πρὸς Ἀνάξαρχον ἴσῳ κεχρῆσθαι Νικοκρέοντα καὶ πρὸς Φιλήμονα Μάγαν, ἀμφοτέρους λοιδορηθέντας ὑπʼ αὐτῶν;
And as for anger, who would say that Nicocreon used an equal amount toward Anaxarchus as Magas did toward Philemon, both having been insulted by them?
ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέροις σιδηροῖς κατέπτισσε καὶ κατέκοπτεν ἐκεῖνον ὁ δὲ τῷ Φιλήμονι τὸν δήμιον ἐκέλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸν τράχηλον ἐπιθεῖναι γυμνὴν τὴν μάχαιραν εἶτʼ ἀφεῖναι.
For the former brayed and crushed that man with iron pestles, while the latter ordered the executioner to place the naked sword upon Philemon's neck and then let him go.
διὸ καὶ νεῦρα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν θυμὸν ὁ Πλάτων προσεῖπεν ὡς ἐπιτεινόμενόν τε πικρίᾳ καὶ πραότητι χαλώμενον.
Therefore, Plato also called anger the "sinews of the soul," as being tightened by bitterness and relaxed by gentleness.
ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα διακρουόμενοι τὰς ἐπιτάσεις τῶν παθῶν καὶ τὰς σφοδρότητας οὔ φασι γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἐν ᾗ τὸ ἁμαρτητικόν, ἀλλὰ τὰς δήξεις καὶ τὰς συστολὰς καὶ τὰς διαχύσεις εἶναι τὰς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον τῷ ἀλόγῳ δεχομένας.
These, then, and such things they evade, and say that the intensifications and violent degrees of passions do not occur according to the judgment in which the capacity for error lies, but that the "pangs," "contractions," and "diffusions" are those which receive the more and the less in the irrational part.
καίτοι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις φαίνονται γιγνόμεναι διαφοραί·
And yet, differences are seen to occur also concerning judgments themselves.
τήν τε γὰρ πενίαν οἱ μὲν οὐ κακὸν οἱ δὲ καὶ μέγα κρίνουσι κακόν, οἱ δέ γε καὶ μέγιστον, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τῶν πετρῶν καὶ κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ὠθεῖν ἑαυτούς·
For as to poverty, some judge it to be no evil, others a great evil, and some indeed the greatest, so as even to throw themselves down rocks and into the sea.
τόν τε θάνατον οἱ μὲν ἀγαθῶν στερήσει μόνον οἱ δὲ καὶ τιμωρίαις αἰωνίοις ὑπὸ γῆν καὶ κολασμοῖς φρικώδεσι κακὸν εἶναι νομίζουσιν ἥ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια τοῖς μὲν ὡς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ χρήσιμον ἀγαπᾶται, τοῖς δὲ τῶν ὄντων δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν·
And as to death, some think it only a deprivation of goods, but others think it an evil accompanied by eternal punishments under the earth and frightful chastisements. And bodily health is loved by some as according to nature and useful, but by others it seems to be the greatest of existing goods.
οὔτε γάρ
"πλούτου χάριν ἢ τεκέων"
οὔτε
"τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς,"
τελευτῶντες δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνωφελῆ καὶ ἀνόνητον ἡγοῦνται, τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος ὥστε φαίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτὰς τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δʼ - ἧττον ἁμαρτάνοντας.
For they think that neither "for the sake of wealth or of children," nor "of the kingly power equal to the gods for men," and in the end they think that even virtue is useless and unprofitable, if health is not present; so that even concerning judgments themselves, some appear to err more and others less.
ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο νῦν διελεγκτέον, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἐκ τούτου ληπτέον, ὅτι συγχωροῦσι καὶ αὐτοὶ τῆς κρίσεως ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ἄλογον, καθʼ ὅ φασι γίγνεσθαι τὸ πάθος σφοδρότερον καὶ μεῖζον, ἐρίζοντες πρὸς τοὔνομα καὶ τὸ ῥῆμα, τὰ δὲ πράγματα διδόντες τοῖς διαφέρειν τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ κρίνοντος ἀποφαινομένοις.
But this is not to be refuted now, but that other point must be taken from this: that they themselves also concede that the irrational is different from judgment, in accordance with which they say that passion becomes more violent and greater, contending against the name and the expression, but giving up the facts to those who declare that the passionate and irrational part differs from that which reasons and judges.
ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Ἀνωμαλίας ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰπών, ὅτι τυφλόν ἐστιν ἡ ὀργὴ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν οὐκ ἐᾷ ὁρᾶν τὰ ἐκφανῆ πολλάκις δὲ τοῖς καταλαμβανομένοις ἐπιπροσθεῖ, μικρὸν προελθών
τὰ γὰρ ἐπιγιγνόμενα
φησὶ
πάθη ἐκκρούει τοὺς λογισμούς, καὶ τὰ ὡς ἑτέρως φαινόμενα βιαίως προωθοῦντα ἐπὶ τὰς ἐναντίας πράξεις· εἶτα χρῆται μάρτυρι τῷ Μενάνδρῳ λέγοντι
"
οἴμοι τάλας ἔγωγε, ποῦ ποτε φρένες
ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνον ἦσαν ἐν τῷ σώματι
τὸν χρόνον, ὅτʼ οὐ ταῦτʼ ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνʼ ᾑρούμεθα
"
καὶ πάλιν ὁ Χρύσιππος προελθὼν τοῦ λογικοῦ φησι ζῴου φύσιν ἔχοντος προσχρῆσθαι εἰς ἕκαστα τῷ λόγῳ καὶ ὑπὸ τούτου κυβερνᾶσθαι, πολλάκις ἀποστρέφεσθαι αὐτὸν ἡμᾶς ἄλλῃ βιαιοτέρᾳ φορᾷ χρωμένους· ὁμολογῶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόγον τοῦ πάθους διαφορᾶς.
And Chrysippus, in his work On Anomalies, having said that anger is blind, and often does not allow one to see obvious things, and often obstructs those that are apprehended, proceeding a little further, says: "For the passions that supervene drive out reasonings, and violently push forward what appears otherwise to contrary actions." Then he uses Menander as a witness, who says: "Ah, wretched me, where indeed in our body was our mind at that time, when we chose those things instead of these?" And again Chrysippus, proceeding, says that though the rational animal has a nature to use reason in each thing and to be governed by it, we often turn away from it, employing another more violent impulse; admitting what happens from the difference of passion in relation to reason.
ἐπεὶ καὶ γελοῖόν ἐστιν, ᾗ φησι Πλάτων, αὐτόν τινα λέγειν αὑτοῦ κρείττονα καὶ πάλιν χείρονα, καὶ τὸν μὲν κρατοῦνθʼ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ κρατοῦντα.
Since it is also ridiculous, as Plato says, for someone to say that a person is stronger than himself, and again weaker, and that one is master of himself, and another not master.