§7#2τί οὖν; φασίν,
οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πολλάκις διχοφορεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας ἀνθέλκεται δόξας περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλλʼ ἕν ἐστι; πάνυ μὲν οὖν
φήσομεν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ συμβαῖνον οὐχ ὅμοιον· οὐ γὰρ μάχεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φρονοῦν, ἀλλὰ μιᾷ χρώμενον δυνάμει διαφόρων ἐφάπτεται λογισμῶν·
"What then?" they say, "does not also that part of man which deliberates often disagree with itself and is pulled in opposite directions regarding opinions about what is advantageous, and yet is one?" "Certainly indeed," we shall say, "but what happens is not similar." For the thinking part of the soul does not fight against itself, but, employing a single power, it lays hold of different reasonings; or rather, it is a single reasoning that comes to be in different matters as though in different materials.
μᾶλλον δʼ εἷς λογισμὸς ἔστιν ἐν πράγμασι γιγνόμενος ἑτέροις ὥσπερ ὕλαις διαφερούσαις. ὅθεν οὔτε λύπη τοῖς ἄνευ πάθους λογισμοῖς ἔνεστιν, οὔθʼ ὥσπερ ἐκβιαζόμενοι παρὰ γνώμην αἱροῦνται θάτερον, ἂν μὴ νὴ Δία λανθάνῃ πάθος τι προσηρτημένον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ.
Hence neither does pain belong to reasonings that are free from passion, nor do they choose the one or the other as though forced against their judgment, unless, by Zeus, some passion is secretly attached to it, as if on a scale.
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο συμβαίνει πολλάκις, οὐ λογισμοῦ τινος πρὸς λογισμὸν ἀλλὰ φιλοτιμίας ἢ φιλονεικίας ἢ χάριτος ἢ ζηλοτυπίας ἢ δέους ἀντιβαίνοντος, οἴεσθαι λόγων εἶναι δυεῖν διαφορὰν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις
"αἴδεσθεν μὲν ἀνήνασθαι, δεῖσαν δʼ ὑποδέχθαι· "
καὶ
"
τὸ μὲν σφαγῆναι δεινὸν εὔκλειαν δʼ ἔχει,
τὸ μὴ θανεῖν δὲ δειλὸν ἡδονὴ δʼ ἔνι,ʼ
"
καὶ περὶ τὰς κρίσεις δὲ τῶν συμβολαίων ὑποτρέχοντα τὰ πάθη τὴν πλείστην ἐμποιεῖ διατριβήν καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβούλια τῶν βασιλέων οἱ πρὸς χάριν λέγοντες οὐ δυεῖν κρίσεων τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συναγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ πάθει τινὶ προστίθενται παρὰ τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμόν· διὸ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις οἱ ἄρχοντες οὐκ ἐῶσι παθαίνεσθαι· ῥέπει γὰρ εὐθεῖαν ῥοπὴν ὁ ἀπαθὴς λογισμὸς ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον· ἂν δὲ πάθος ἐγγένηται, μάχην ποιεῖ καὶ διαφορὰν τὸ ἡδόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀλγοῦν πρὸς τὸ κρῖνον καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον.
For this too often happens, not because one reasoning is in opposition to another, but because ambition or rivalry or favor or jealousy or fear resists, so that we think there is a difference between two reasonings, as in these lines: "They were ashamed to refuse, and feared to accept;" and, "To be slain is terrible, yet it brings good repute, whereas not to die is cowardly, yet pleasure is in it; "and also in judgments concerning contracts, the passions creeping in produce the greatest delay; and in the councils of kings, those who speak to curry favor do not advocate for one of two judgments, but associate themselves with some passion contrary to the reasoning of what is advantageous; wherefore, in aristocracies, the rulers do not allow the orators to excite the passions; for passionless reasoning inclines with a straight inclination toward justice; but if passion arises, that which experiences pleasure and pain creates a battle and difference against that which judges and deliberates.
ἐπεὶ διὰ τί τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ σκέμμασιν οὐ πρόσεστι τὸ μετὰ λύπης ὑπὸ τῶν ἑτέρων ἄγεσθαι καὶ μετατίθεσθαι πολλάκις, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸς τʼ Ἀριστοτέλης Δημόκριτός τε καὶ Χρύσιππος ἔνια τῶν πρόσθεν αὐτοῖς ἀρεσκόντων ἀθορύβως καὶ ἀδήκτως καὶ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς ἀφεῖσαν;
Otherwise, why is it that in philosophical inquiries there is no pain attached to being led and often converted by others, but Aristotle himself, Democritus, and Chrysippus abandoned some of the opinions previously pleasing to them without disturbance, without being bitten, and with pleasure?
ὅτι τῷ θεωρητικῷ καὶ μαθηματικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθος οὐδὲν ἀνθέστηκεν ἀλλʼ ἀτρεμεῖ καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονεῖ τὸ ἄλογον ἐν τούτοις.
Because against the theoretical and mathematical part of the soul no passion is arrayed, but the irrational part remains still and does not meddle in these matters.
διὸ πρὸς τἀληθὲς ὁ λογισμός, ὅταν φανῇ, προέμενος τὸ ψεῦδος ἀσμένως ἀπέκλινεν ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν ἑτέρῳ τὸ πειθόμενον καὶ μεταπειθόμενον.
Therefore, reasoning, when the truth appears, gladly inclines toward it, having dismissed the falsehood; for that which is persuaded and changed in opinion is in itself, and not in another.
αἱ δὲ πραγματικαὶ βουλαὶ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ δίαιται τῶν πολλῶν ἐμπαθεῖς οὖσαι δυσοδίαν τῷ λόγῳ παρέχουσι καὶ δυσκολίαν, ἐνισχομένῳ καὶ ταραττομένῳ περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἀνταῖρον αὐτῷ μεθʼ ἡδονῆς τινος ἢ δέους ἢ λύπης ἢ ἐπιθυμίας.
But the practical deliberations, decisions, and ways of life of the many, being full of passion, present to reason a difficult path and trouble, as it is held fast and disturbed around the irrational part, which rises up against it with some pleasure, fear, pain, or desire.
καὶ τούτων κριτήριον ἡ αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαπτομένη· καὶ γὰρ ἂν περιγένηται θάτερον, οὐκ ἀνῄρηκε θάτερον, ἀλλʼ ἐφέλκεται καταβιαζόμενον καὶ ἀντιτεῖνον.
And of these things perception is the judge, laying hold of both; for even if the one gets the upper hand, it does not destroy the other, but drags it along, which is overpowered yet still resisting.
ὁ γὰρ νουθετῶν αὑτὸν ἐρῶντα χρῆται τῷ λογισμῷ πρὸς τὸ πάθος, ὡς ἀμφοτέρων ἐνόντων ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ, καθάπερ χειρὶ φλεγμαῖνον ἕτερον μέρος πιέζων καὶ δυεῖν ὄντων καὶ διαφερόντων ἐπαισθανόμενος.
For he who admonishes himself when in love employs reasoning against passion, as both being present together in the soul, just as one presses with the hand another part that is inflamed, and perceiving that they are two and different.
ἐν μέντοι ταῖς ἀπαθέσι βουλαῖς καὶ σκέψεσιν οἵας ἔχει μάλιστα τὸ θεωρητικόν, ἂν μὲν ἴσαι μένωσιν, οὐ γέγονε κρίσις ἀλλʼ ἀπορία, στάσις οὖσα καὶ μονὴ διανοίας ὑπʼ ἐναντίων λόγων· ἂν δὲ ῥοπὴ γένηται πρὸς θάτερον ἡ κρατήσασα τὴν ἑτέραν λέλυκεν, ὥστε μὴ λυπεῖν μηδʼ ὑπεναντιοῦσθαι πρὸς τὴν δόξαν.
In passionless deliberations and inquiries, however, such as the theoretical part especially has, if they remain equal, no judgment has occurred, but a state of difficulty, which is a standstill and remaining of the intellect because of contrary arguments; but if an inclination occurs toward one of them, the one which has prevailed has dissolved the other, so that it neither pains nor opposes itself to the opinion.
ὅλως δὲ λογισμοῦ μὲν ἀντικεῖσθαι λογισμῷ δοκοῦντος, οὐ γίγνεται δυεῖν καὶ ἑτέρων αἴσθησις ἀλλʼ ἑνός τινος ἐν διαφόροις γιγνομένου φαντασίαις· ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἄλογον μάχηται τῷ λογισμῷ, μήτε κρατεῖν ἀλύπως μήτε κρατεῖσθαι πεφυκὸς εὐθὺς εἰς δύο διίστησι τῇ μάχῃ τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ποιεῖ τὴν διαφορὰν πρόδηλον.
In general, when one reasoning seems to oppose another, there is no perception of two distinct things, but of a single thing coming to be in different appearances; but when the irrational part fights with reasoning, being by nature disposed neither to conquer without pain nor to be conquered without pain, it immediately divides the soul into two by the battle, and makes the difference manifest.