§7#1ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀκρασία τοιαύτας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τὴν ἀκολασίαν, ἡ δʼ ἐγκράτεια πρὸς τὴν σωφροσύνην αὖθις αὖ τὰς ἀντιστρόφους;
Thus, while incontinence has such differences from licentiousness, does self-control, on the other hand, have corresponding and opposite differences from temperance?
ἀναλόγως.
Analogously so.
τὸ γὰρ δάκνον καὶ τὸ λυποῦν καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτοῦν οὔπω τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀπολέλοιπε· τῆς δὲ σώφρονος ψυχῆς τὸ πανταχόθεν ὁμαλὲς καὶ ἄσφυκτον καὶ ὑγιαῖνον ᾧ συνήρμοσται καὶ συγκέκραται τὸ ἄλογον πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν εὐπειθείᾳ καὶ πραότητι θαυμαστῇ κεκοσμημένον, εἴποις ἂν ἐπιβλέψας
"
δὴ τότʼ ἔπειτʼ ἄνεμος μὲν ἐπαύσατο, ἡ δὲ γαλήνη
ἔπλετο νηνεμίη, κοίμισσε δὲ κύματα δαίμων· "
τὰ σφοδρὰ καὶ περιμανῆ καὶ οἰστρώδη κινήματα τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν τοῦ λόγου κατασβέσαντος, ὧν δʼ ἡ φύσις ἀναγκαίως δεῖται, ταῦθʼ ὁμοιοπαθῆ καὶ ὑπήκοα καὶ φίλα καὶ συνεργὰ πεποιημένου ταῖς πρακτικαῖς προαιρέσεσιν ὥστε μὴ προεκθεῖν τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδʼ ὑπενδιδόναι μηδʼ ἀτακτεῖν μηδʼ ἀπειθεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ὁρμὴν εὐάγωγον οὖσαν
"ἄθηλον ἵππῳ πῶλον ὣς ἅμα τρέχειν"
ἐπιβεβαιοῦσαν τὸν Ξενοκράτους λόγον, ὃν ἐκεῖνος εἶπε περὶ τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων, ὅτι μόνοι ποιοῦσιν ἑκουσίως ἃ ποιοῦσιν ἄκοντες οἱ λοιποὶ διὰ τὸν νόμον, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πληγῆς κύνες ἢ γαλαῖ ψόφῳ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀποτρεπόμενοι καὶ πρὸς τὸ δεινὸν ἀποβλέποντες.
For that which bites, grieves, and vexes has not yet departed from self-control; whereas, regarding the temperance of the soul, its utter smoothness, stillness, and healthiness—with which the irrational part has been harmonized and blended toward reason, adorned with obedience and wonderful gentleness—you might say, looking upon it: "Truly then the wind ceased, and a windless calm came to be, and a god lulled the waves to sleep; "since reason has quenched the violent, frantic, and maddened movements of the desires, and has made those things which nature necessarily requires like-minded, obedient, friendly, and cooperative with our practical choices, so that they do not run ahead of reason, nor yield, nor be disorderly, nor disobedient, but every impulse, being easily led, "runs alongside like a suckling colt beside its mother-mare," confirming the saying of Xenocrates, which he spoke concerning those who truly philosophize, that they alone do voluntarily what the rest do involuntarily because of the law, just like dogs at a blow or weasels at a noise, being turned away from pleasures and looking toward what is dreadful.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν γίγνεταί τις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιαύτης ἑτερότητος αἴσθησις καὶ διαφορᾶς περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ὥς τινος μαχομένου καὶ τἀναντία λέγοντος αὐταῖς, οὐκ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν.
That there is, then, in the soul some perception of such difference and distinction regarding the desires, as of something fighting and speaking against them, is not unclear.
ἔνιοι δέ φασιν οὐχ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου τὸ πάθος οὐδὲ δυεῖν διαφορὰν καὶ στάσιν, ἀλλʼ ἑνὸς λόγου τροπὴν ἐπʼ ἀμφότερα, λανθάνουσαν ἡμᾶς ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς, οὐ συνορῶντας ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ πέφυκεν ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν, ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι, φέρεσθαι πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ φερομένης πάλιν αὑτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι·
But some say that passion is not other than reason, nor is there a difference and faction between two, but a turning of a single reason in both directions, which escapes our notice because of the sharpness and speed of the change, since we do not perceive that the very same part of the soul is that which is naturally disposed both to desire and to repent, to be angry and to fear, to be carried toward what is shameful by pleasure and, as it is being carried, to check itself again.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ ὀργὴν καὶ φόβον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα δόξας εἶναι καὶ κρίσεις πονηράς, οὐ περὶ ἓν τι γιγνομένας τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ἀλλʼ ὅλου τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ῥοπὰς καὶ εἴξεις καὶ συγκαταθέσεις καὶ ὁρμάς, καὶ ὅλως ἐνεργείας τινὰς οὔσας ἐν ὀλίγῳ μεταπτωτάς, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν παίδων ἐπιδρομαὶ τὸ ῥαγδαῖον καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἐπισφαλὲς ὑπʼ ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀβέβαιον ἔχουσι.
For they hold that desire, anger, fear, and all such things are corrupt opinions and judgments, not arising in some single part of the soul, but being inclinations, yieldings, assents, and impulses of the whole ruling principle, and in general certain activities that are changeable in a brief moment, just as the sudden dashes of children have a violence and intensity that is unstable and precarious due to weakness.
ταῦτα δὲ πρῶτον μὲν παρὰ· τὴν ἐνάργειάν ἐστι καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος αἰσθάνεται μεταβολὴν εἰς τὸ κρῖνον οὐδὲ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὖ πάλιν εἰς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδὲ παύεται μὲν ἐρῶν ὅτε λογίζεται καθεκτέον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα καὶ διαμαχετέον πρὸς αὐτόν, ἐξίσταται δὲ πάλιν τοῦ λογίζεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν, ὅταν ἐνδιδῷ μαλασσόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.
But these views, in the first place, are contrary to clear evidence and perception; for no one perceives in himself a change of the desiring part into the judging part, nor of the judging part back again into the desiring part, nor does one cease loving when one reasons that love must be held back and fought against, nor on the other hand does one depart from reasoning and judging when one yields, being softened by desire.
ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὸ πάθος ἀντιβαίνων ἐν τῷ πάθει ἐστὶν ἔτι, καὶ πάλιν κρατούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους διορᾷ τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον· καὶ οὔτε τῷ πάθει τὸν λόγον ἀνῄρηκεν οὔτε τῷ λογίζεσθαι τοῦ πάθους ἀπήλλακται, φερόμενος δʼ ἑκατέρωσε μέσος ἀμφοῖν καὶ κοινός ἐστιν.
But even while resisting the passion with reason, one is still in the passion, and again, while being mastered by the passion, one clearly sees the error with reason; and neither by passion has one destroyed reason, nor by reasoning has one been rid of passion, but being carried toward either side, one is in the middle and shared between both.
οἱ δὲ νῦν. μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, νῦν δὲ τὸν ἀντιταττόμενον τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ λογισμὸν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν ἀπέχουσι τῶν μὴ δύο τὸν κυνηγὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ θηρίον ὑπολαμβανόντων, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ σῶμα χρώμενον μεταβολῇ νῦν μὲν εἶναι θηρίον νῦν δὲ γίγνεσθαι κυνηγόν.
Those, however, who suppose that the ruling principle becomes at one time desire, and at another time the reason that is arrayed against desire, are no different from those who suppose that the hunter and the beast are not two, but that the same body, undergoing a change, is at one time a beast and at another becomes a hunter.
ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ ἐμφανές τι παρορῶσιν οὗτοί τε πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀντιμαρτυροῦσιν, οὐχ ἑνός τινος μεταβολῆς ἀλλὰ δυεῖν ἅμα μάχης καὶ διαφορᾶς ἐν ἑαυτοῖς αἰσθανόμενοι.
For both the former overlook something obvious, and the latter bear witness contrary to perception, since they feel in themselves not the change of some single thing, but the simultaneous battle and difference between two.