§6#2κατὰ ταὐτὰ δʼ οἴονται καὶ τὴν ἀκρασίαν ἔλαττόν τι κακίας εἶναι παντελῆ δὲ κακίαν τὴν ἀκολασίαν.
In the same way, they believe that incontinence too is something less than vice, but that licentiousness is complete vice.
αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσα καὶ πάθος φαῦλον καὶ λόγον, ὑφʼ οὗ μὲν ἐξάγεται τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, ὑφʼ οὗ δὲ τῷ κακῶς κρίνειν προστιθεμένου ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποβάλλει τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων.
For the latter, having both a base passion and reason, is led astray by the one through desiring what is shameful, and by the other—as it joins the desires by judging badly—it even loses the awareness of its errors.
ἡ δʼ ἀκρασία τῷ μὲν λόγῳ σῴζει τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθὴν οὖσαν, τῷ δὲ πάθει φέρεται παρὰ τὴν κρίσιν ἰσχύοντι τοῦ λόγου μᾶλλον.
But incontinence, on the one hand, keeps its judgment correct by means of reason, but on the other hand, is carried away against its judgment by passion, which is stronger than reason.
ὅθεν διαφέρει τῆς ἀκολασίας· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ἡττᾶται τοῦ πάθους ὁ λογισμὸς ὅπου δʼ οὐδὲ μάχεται, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἀντιλέγων ἕπεται ταῖς· ἐπιθυμίαις ὅπου δʼ ὑφηγεῖται συναγορεύων, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἡδομένῳ κοινωνεῖν ὑπάρχει τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων ὅπου δʼ ἀχθομένῳ, καὶ ὅπου μὲν ἑκὼν φέρεται πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὅπου δὲ προδίδωσιν ἄκων τὸ καλόν·
Hence it differs from licentiousness: for in the one case reason is defeated by passion, but in the other it does not even fight; and in the one case it follows the desires while speaking against them, but in the other it leads the way by advocating for them; and in the one case it belongs to him to share in the errors with pleasure, but in the other with grief; and in the one case he is carried willingly toward what is shameful, but in the other he betrays what is noble against his will.
ὡς τοῖς πραττομένοις ὑπʼ αὐτῶν, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ καὶ τοῖς λεγομένοις ἔνεστιν ἡ διαφορὰ κατάδηλος·
The difference is manifest in what is done by them, and no less also in what is said.
ἀκολάστων μὲν γὰρ αἵδε φωναὶ
"
ʼτίς δὲ χάρις, τί δὲ τερπνὸν ἄτερ χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης;
For these are the voices of the licentious: "What joy, what pleasure is there without golden Aphrodite?
τεθναίην, ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλοι.
May I die when these things no longer concern me.
"
καὶ ἕτερος
"
ʼτὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν,
τὰ δʼ ἄλλα προσθήκας ἅπαντʼ ἐγὼ καλῶ
"
φησίν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὅλης τῆς ψυχῆς συνεπινεύων ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ ὑπερειπόμενος.
"And another says: "Eating, drinking, and obtaining the pleasures of Aphrodite; all other things I call mere additions "as if assenting to and supporting the pleasures with his whole soul.
οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτων ὁ εἰπών
"ἔα μʼ ἀπολέσθαι· τοῦτο γάρ μοι συμφέρει"
τὴν κρίσιν ἔχει τῷ πάθει συννοσοῦσαν.
And no less than these, the one who said: "Let me ruin myself; for this is advantageous to me," has his judgment diseased along with his passion.
αἱ δὲ τῆς ἀκρασίας ἕτεραι καὶ διαφέρουσαι
"γνώμην ἔχοντὰ μʼ ἡ φύσις βιάζεται· "
καί
"
αἰαῖ, τόδʼ ἤδη θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
ὅταν τις εἰδῇ τἀγαθὸν χρῆται δὲ μή· "
καὶ
"
εἴκει γὰρ ἤδη θυμὸς οὐδʼ ἔτʼ ἀντέχει,
θινῶδες ὡς ἄγκιστρον ἀγκύρας σάλῳ
"
θινῶδες ἄγκιστρον οὐ φαύλως λέγων τὸ μὴ κάτοχον τοῦ λογισμοῦ μηδʼ ἀραρός, ἀλλὰ μανότητι τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μαλακίᾳ προϊέμενον τὴν κρίσιν.
But the voices of incontinence are different and distinct: "Though I have understanding, nature forces me;" and: "Alas, this is indeed a divine evil for humans, when one knows the good but does not practice it; "and: "For now my spirit yields and no longer holds out, like an anchor's fluke in the sand against the tossing of the sea "calling it "an anchor's fluke in the sand" not ineptly, to describe that which is not holding nor firmly fixed in reason, but yields up its judgment through the slackness and softness of the soul.
οὐ πόρρω δὲ τῆς εἰκόνος ταύτης κἀκεῖνα εἴρηται
"
ναῦς ὥς τις ἐκ μὲν γῆς ἀνήρτημαι βρόχοις,
πνεῖ δʼ οὖρος, ἡμῖν δʼ οὐ κρατεῖ τὰ πείσματα
"
πείσματα γὰρ λέγει τὰς ἀντεχούσας κρίσεις πρὸς τὸ αἰσχρόν, εἶθʼ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ πνεύματος πολλοῦ ῥηγνυμένας τοῦ πάθους.
And not far from this image are those lines spoken: "Like some ship I am bound to the land by cables, but a fair wind blows, and the ropes do not hold us fast "For by "ropes" he means the judgments that hold out against what is shameful, which are then broken, as if by a great wind of passion.
τῷ γὰρ ὄντι πλησίστιος μὲν ἐπὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὁ ἀκόλαστος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν φέρεται καὶ δίδωσιν ἑαυτὸν καὶ συγκατευθύνει· πλάγιος δʼ ὁ ἀκρατής, οἷον ἐξαναφέρειν γλιχόμενος καὶ διωθεῖσθαι τὸ πάθος, ὑποσύρεται καὶ περιπίπτει περὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ὡς Ἀνάξαρχον ἐσίλλαινε Τίμων
"
ἐν δὲ τὸ θαρσαλέον τε καὶ ἐμμανὲς ὅππη ὀρούσαι
φαίνετʼ Ἀναξάρχου κύνεον μένος ὃς ῥα καὶ εἰδώς,
ὡς φάσαν, ἄθλιος ἔσκε, φύσις δέ μιν ἔμπαλιν ἦγεν
ἡδονοπλήξ, ἣν πλεῖστοι ὑποτρείουσι σοφιστῶν.
For in truth, the licentious man is carried with full sails toward pleasures by his desires, giving himself up and steering along with them; whereas the incontinent man is drifted broadside, as if eager to pull through and push away the passion, yet he is dragged down and stumbles into what is shameful, just as Timon used to lampoon Anaxarchus: "And there appeared the bold and frantic canine rage of Anaxarchus, wherever it might rush; who, though he knew, as they said, was a wretched man, for his pleasure-stricken nature led him back in the opposite direction—a nature which most of the sophists dread.
"
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ σοφὸς ἐγκρατὴς ἀλλὰ σώφρων, οὔθʼ ὁ ἀμαθὴς ἀκρατὴς ἀλλʼ ἀκόλαστος ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥδεται τοῖς καλοῖς ὁ δʼ οὐκ ἄχθεται τοῖς αἰσχροῖς.
"For neither is the wise man self-controlled but rather temperate, nor is the ignorant man incontinent but rather licentious; for the former delights in what is noble, while the latter is not displeased by what is shameful.
σοφιστικῆς οὖν ψυχῆς ἡ ἀκρασία, λόγον ἐχούσης οἷς ἔγνωκεν ὀρθῶς ἐμμένειν μὴ δυνάμενον.
Thus, incontinence belongs to a sophistical soul, which possesses a reason that is unable to abide by what it has correctly recognized.