§6#1ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλαχῶς τὸ μέσον ʽ καὶ γὰρ τὸ κεκραμένον τῶν ἀκράτων μέσον, ὡς λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος τὸ φαιόν· καὶ τὸ περιέχον καὶ περιεχόμενον τοῦ περιεχομένου καὶ περιέχοντος, ὡς τῶν δώδεκα καὶ τεττάρων τὰ ὀκτώ· καὶ τὸ μηδετέρου τῶν ἄκρων μετέχον, ὡς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ τὸ ἀδιάφορον̓, τούτων μὲν οὐδενὶ τῶν τρόπων ἡ ἀρετὴ προσρητέα μεσότης.
Since "the mean" is spoken of in many ways—for indeed, the mixture of unmixed things is a mean, as grey is of white and black; and that which both contains and is contained is a mean of the contained and the container, as eight is of twelve and four; and that which participates in neither of the extremes is a mean, as the indifferent is of good and evil—virtue must not be called a mean in any of these ways.
οὔτε γὰρ μῖγμα τῶν κακιῶν ἐστιν οὔτʼ ἐμπεριέχουσα τοὔλαττον ἐμπεριέχεται τῷ πλεονάζοντι τοῦ προσήκοντος· οὔτʼ ἀπήλλακται παντάπασι τῶν παθητικῶν ὁρμῶν, ἐν αἷς τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐστι.
For it is neither a mixture of vices, nor does it, while containing the lesser, find itself contained by that which exceeds the proper limit; nor is it completely free from those passionate impulses in which there is the more and the less.
γίγνεται δὲ μεσότης καὶ λέγεται μάλιστα τῇ περὶ φθόγγους καὶ ἁρμονίας ὁμοίως·
Rather, a mean arises and is spoken of most similarly in the case of musical tones and scales.
ἐκείνη τε γὰρ ἐμμελὴς οὖσα φωνὴ καθάπερ ἡ νήτη καὶ ὑπάτη, τῆς μὲν τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς δὲ τὴν βαρύτητα τὴν ἄγαν διαπέφευγεν·
For the former, being a tuned voice like the highest and lowest note, escapes the excessive sharpness of the one and the excessive flatness of the other.
αὕτη τε κίνησις οὖσα καὶ δύναμις περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, τὰς ἐκλύσεις καὶ τὰς ἐπιτάσεις καὶ ὅλως τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον ἐξαιρεῖ τῆς ὁρμῆς, εἰς τὸ μέτριον καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καθιστᾶσα τῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον.
And the latter (virtue), being a movement and a power concerning the irrational part, eliminates the slacking and the tightening, and generally the more and the less of the impulse, settling each of the passions into a moderate and unerring state.
αὐτίκα τὴν μὲν ἀνδρείαν μεσότητά φασιν εἶναι δειλίας καὶ θρασύτητος, ὧν ἡ μὲν ἔλλειψις ἡ δʼ ὑπερβολὴ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ἐστι· τὴν δʼ ἐλευθεριότητα μικρολογίας καὶ ἀσωτίας, πραότητα δʼ ἀναλγησίας καὶ ὠμότητος·
For instance, they say that courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness, of which the former is a deficiency and the latter an excess of the spirited part; and liberality between parsimony and prodigality, and gentleness between insensibility and cruelty.
αὐτήν τε σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, τὴν μὲν περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια μήτε πλέον νέμουσαν αὑτῇ τοῦ προσήκοντος μήτʼ ἔλαττον, τὴν δʼ εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀπαθείας καὶ ἀναισθησίας καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀεὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καθιστᾶσαν.
And temperance and justice themselves are likewise: the latter (justice) assigning to itself in contracts neither more nor less than what is proper, and the former (temperance) always settling the desires into the mean between apathy or insensibility and licentiousness.
ἐν ᾧ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκεῖ τὸ ἄλογον τῆς πρὸς τὸ λογικὸν διαφορᾶς αὑτοῦ παρέχειν κατανόησιν, καὶ δεικνύειν τὸ πάθος ὡς ἕτερόν τι κομιδῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐστίν.
In this indeed the irrational part seems most of all to offer a comprehension of its own difference from the rational part, and to show that passion is something entirely different from reason.
οὐ γὰρ ἂν διέφερε σωφροσύνης ἐγκράτεια, καὶ ἀκολασίας ἀκρασία περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, εἰ ταὐτὸν ἦν τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ ἐπιθυμεῖν ᾧ τε κρίνειν πέφυκε.
For self-control would not differ from temperance, nor incontinence from licentiousness, regarding pleasures and desires, if that by which the soul naturally desires and that by which it judges were the same.
νῦν δὲ σωφροσύνη μέν ἐστιν, οὗ τὸ παθητικὸν ὥσπερ εὐήνιον θρέμμα καὶ πρᾶον ὁ λογισμὸς ἡνιοχεῖ καὶ μεταχειρίζεται, περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας χρώμενος ὑπείκοντι καὶ δεχομένῳ τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ εὔσχημον ἑκουσίως· ὁ δʼ ἐγκρατὴς ἄγει μὲν ἐρρωμένῳ τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ κρατοῦντι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, ἄγει δʼ οὐκ ἀλύπως οὐδὲ πειθομένην ἀλλὰ πλαγίαν καὶ ἀντιτείνουσαν, οἷον ὑπὸ πληγῆς καὶ χαλινοῦ καταβιαζόμενος καὶ ἀνακρούων, ἀγῶνος ὢν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ θορύβου μεστός·
But as it is, temperance is that state in which reason, like a gentle and easy-to-rein beast, guides and manages the passionate part, employing it as it willingly yields and accepts the moderate and the decent in respect to desires; whereas the self-controlled man guides indeed by a strong and dominant reason, yet he guides the desire not without pain, nor because it is persuaded, but as it turns aside and resists, dragging it back and subduing it as if by blows and a bridle, being himself full of struggle and confusion within.
οἷον ὁ Πλάτων ἐξεικονίζει περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς; ὑποζύγια, τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ζυγομαχοῦντος ἅμα καὶ τὸν ἡνίοχον διαταράττοντος, ἀντέχειν ὀπίσω καὶ κατατείνειν ὑπὸ σπουδῆς ἀναγκαζόμενον ἀεὶ
"μὴ βάλῃ φοίνικας ἐκ χειρῶν ἱμάντας"
κατὰ Σιμωνίδην.
This is just as Plato portrays concerning the draft-animals of the soul, where the worse fights against the better for the yoke and at the same time disturbs the charioteer, who is forced by effort always to hold back and pull tight, "lest he drop the crimson reins from his hands," according to Simonides.
ὅθεν οὐδʼ ἀρετὴν αὐτοτελῆ ἀξιοῦσι τὴν ἐγκράτειαν ἀλλʼ ἔλαττον ἀρετῆς εἶναι·
Hence they do not even deign to call self-control a complete virtue, but something less than virtue.
μεσότης γὰρ οὐ γέγονεν ἐκ συμφωνίας τοῦ χείρονος πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον οὐδʼ ἀνῄρηται τοῦ πάθους τὸ ὑπερβάλλον, οὐδὲ πειθόμενον οὐδʼ ὁμολογοῦν τῷ φρονοῦντι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἀλλὰ λυποῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ καθειργόμενον ὑπʼ ἀνάγκης ὥσπερ ἐν στάσει δυσμενὲς καὶ πολέμιον συνοικεῖ· "
πόλις δʼ ὁμοῦ μὲν θυμιαμάτων γέμει,
ὁμοῦ δὲ παιάνων τε καὶ στεναγμάτων
"
ἡ τοῦ ἐγκρατοῦς ψυχὴ διὰ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν καὶ τὴν διαφοράν.
For the mean has not arisen from a harmony of the worse with the better, nor has the excess of the passion been eliminated, nor does the desiring part of the soul obey or agree with the intelligent part, but it grieves and is grieved, and being shut up by necessity, it dwells together as hostile and combative, just as in a faction: "The city is filled at once with incense, and at once with both paeans and groans, "which is the soul of the self-controlled man because of its unevenness and difference.