§5ἐπεὶ δʼ οὐ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν μεσότητα ποιοῦσιν οὐδʼ ἠθικὴν καλοῦσι, λεκτέον ἂν εἴη περὶ τῆς διαφορᾶς ἀρξαμένοις ἄνωθεν.
Since they do not make every virtue a mean, nor call every virtue moral, we must speak about the difference, starting from the beginning.
ἔστι τοίνυν τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα τὰ δὲ πῶς ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς·
Now, of things, some exist absolutely, while others exist in some relation to us.
ἁπλῶς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντα, γῆ οὐρανὸς ἄστρα θάλασσα· πῶς δʼ ἔχοντα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀγαθὸν κακόν, αἱρετὸν φευκτόν, ἡδὺ ἀλγεινόν·
Those that exist absolutely are earth, heaven, stars, and sea; those that exist in relation to us are good and evil, the desirable and the avoidable, the pleasant and the painful.
ἀμφοῖν δὲ τοῦ λόγου θεωρητικοῦ ὄντος, τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ ἁπλῶς ἔχοντα μόνον ἐπιστημονικὸν καὶ θεωρητικόν ἐστι· τὸ δʼ ἐν τοῖς πῶς ἔχουσι πρὸς ἡμᾶς βουλευτικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν·
Since reason is contemplative of both, that which is concerned with things existing absolutely is solely scientific and contemplative; that which is concerned with things in relation to us is deliberative and practical.
ἀρετὴ δὲ τούτου μὲν ἡ φρόνησις ἐκείνου δʼ ἡ σοφία.
The virtue of the latter is wisdom, and that of the former is theoretical wisdom.
διαφέρει δὲ σοφίας φρόνησις, ᾗ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ πρὸς τὸ πρακτικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν ὑποστροφῆς καὶ σχέσεώς τινος γενομένης ὑφίσταται κατὰ· λόγον ἡ φρόνησις.
Wisdom differs from theoretical wisdom in that wisdom arises in accordance with reason when a certain turning back and relation of the contemplative part to the practical and passionate part takes place.
διὸ φρόνησις μὲν τύχης δεῖται, σοφία δʼ οὐ δεῖται πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον τέλος οὐδὲ βουλῆς· ἔστι γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα.
Therefore, wisdom requires fortune, but theoretical wisdom does not require fortune for its proper end, nor does it require deliberation; for it is concerned with things that are always in the same state and manner.
καὶ καθάπερ ὁ γεωμέτρης οὐ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ τριγώνου, εἰ δυεῖν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς ἐντὸς γωνίας ἀλλʼ οἶδεν ʽ αἱ γὰρ βουλαὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως ἐχόντων οὐ περὶ τῶν βεβαίων καὶ ἀμεταπτώτων’ οὕτως ὁ θεωρητικὸς νοῦς περὶ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ μόνιμα καὶ μίαν ἀεὶ φύσιν ἔχοντα μὴ δεχομένην μεταβολὰς ἐνεργῶν ἀπήλλακται τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι·
And just as the geometer does not deliberate about the triangle, whether it has its internal angles equal to two right angles, but knows it (for 'deliberations are concerned with things that are at different times in different ways, not with things that are firm and unchangeable'), so the contemplative intellect, active concerning first, permanent things that always possess one nature not admitting changes, is free from deliberation.
τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν εἰς πράγματα πλάνης μεστὰ καὶ ταραχῆς καθιεῖσαν ἐπιμίγνυσθαι τοῖς τυχηροῖς πολλάκις ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι καὶ τῷ βουλευτικῷ χρῆσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀδηλοτέρων, τῷ δὲ πρακτικῷ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ἐκδεχομένην ἐνεργεῖν ἤδη καὶ τοῦ ἀλόγου συμπαρόντος καὶ συνεφελκομένου ταῖς κρίσεσιν.
But it is necessary for wisdom, which descends into things full of wandering and confusion, often to mix with things of fortune and to use deliberation about more obscure matters, and in its practical capacity, receiving the result of deliberation, to act already while the irrational part is present and drawn along with its judgments.
ὁρμῆς γὰρ δέονται· τὴν δʼ ὁρμὴν τῷ πάθει ποιεῖ τὸ ἦθος, λόγου δεομένην ὁρίζοντος, ὅπως μετρία παρῇ καὶ μήθʼ ὑπερβάλλῃ μήτʼ ἐγκαταλείπῃ τὸν καιρόν.
For they need impulse; and character produces impulse in passion, which needs reason to define it, so that it may be moderate and neither exceed nor fall short of the proper opportunity.
τὸ γὰρ δὴ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον κινήσεσι χρῆται ταῖς μὲν ἄγαν σφοδραῖς καὶ ὀξείαις ταῖς δὲ μαλακωτέραις ἢ προσήκει καὶ ἀργοτέραις.
For the passionate and irrational part indeed employs movements that are sometimes too violent and sharp, and sometimes softer or more sluggish than is proper.
ὅθεν ἕκαστον ὧν πράττομεν ἀεὶ μοναχῶς μὲν κατορθοῦται πλεοναχῶς δʼ ἁμαρτάνεται· τὸ γὰρ βαλεῖν τὸν σκοπὸν ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἁπλοῦν, ἀστοχοῦσι δʼ ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως, ὑπερβάλλοντες τὸ μέτριον ἢ προαπολείποντες.
Whence each of the things we do is always successful in only one way, but is failed in many ways; for hitting the mark is one and simple, but they miss at different times in different ways, exceeding the mean or falling short beforehand.
τοῦτʼ οὖν τοῦ πρακτικοῦ λόγου κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον ἐστί, τὸ ἐξαιρεῖν τὰς ἀμετρίας τῶν παθῶν καὶ πλημμελείας.
This, then, is the natural work of practical reason: to eliminate the excesses and deficiencies of the passions.
ὅπου μὲν γὰρ ὑπʼ ἀρρωστίας καὶ μαλακίας ἢ δέους καὶ ὄκνου προενδίδωσιν ἡ ὁρμὴ καὶ προαπολείπει τὸ καλόν, ἐνταῦθα πάρεστιν ἐξεγείρων καὶ ἀναρριπίζων, ὅπου δὲ πάλιν ἐκφέρεται ῥυεῖσα πολλὴ καὶ ἄτακτος, ἐκεῖ τὸ σφοδρὸν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ ἵστησιν.
For where, through weakness and softness or fear and hesitation, the impulse gives in beforehand and falls short of the beautiful, there reason is present, awakening and fanning it; but where, on the other hand, it is carried away, flowing abundant and disorderly, there reason removes the violence and stops it.
οὕτως δʼ ὁρίζων τὴν παθητικὴν κίνησιν ἐμποιεῖ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον, ἐλλείψεως καὶ ὑπερβολῆς μεσότητας οὔσας.
And thus defining the passionate movement, reason produces the moral virtues in the irrational part, which are means between deficiency and excess.
οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ἀρετὴν μεσότητι γίνεσθαι ῥητέον· ἀλλʼ ἡ μὲν ἀπροσδεὴς τοῦ ἀλόγου καὶ περὶ τὸν εἰλικρινῆ καὶ ἀπαθῆ νοῦν συνισταμένη σοφία καὶ φρόνησις αὐτοτελής τίς ἐστιν ἀκρότης τοῦ λόγου καὶ δύναμις, ᾗ τὸ θειότατον ἐγγίνεται τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ μακαριώτατον, ἡ δʼ ἀναγκαία διὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ δεομένη νὴ Δία τῆς παθητικῆς ὥσπερ ὀργανικῆς ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τὸ πρακτικόν, οὐκ οὖσα φθορὰ τοῦ ἀλόγου τῆς ψυχῆς οὐδʼ ἀναίρεσις ἀλλὰ τάξις καὶ διακόσμησις, ἀκρότης μέν ἐστι τῇ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ ποιότητι, τῷ ποσῷ δὲ μεσότης γίνεται τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐξαιροῦσα καὶ τὸ ἐλλεῖπον.
For it must not be said that every virtue arises through a mean; but on the one hand, theoretical wisdom and a certain self-sufficient wisdom that is free from the irrational part and established around the pure and passionless intellect is a certain height and power of reason, by which the most divine and most blessed part of knowledge arises; on the other hand, the virtue which is necessary because of the body and indeed requires the passionate service, as if instrumental, for action—not being a destruction or elimination of the irrational part of the soul, but its order and decoration—is a height in power and quality, but in quantity it becomes a mean, eliminating the excessive and the deficient.