Humanitext Reader

Plutarch · On Moral Virtue §4

Subjection of the Irrational to Reason and Habituation

Passage 3 of 12 · Greek

Summary

The author draws on bodily functions, poetic descriptions of emotion, musical instruments, and animal training to demonstrate how the irrational part of the soul is co-shaped by reason through habit, thereby explaining the etymology of character (ethos) and defining the three elements of the soul: power, passion, and disposition.

§4οἱ δὲ θαυμάζοντες ὅπως ἄλογον μέν ἐστι λόγῳ δʼ ὑπήκοον, οὔ μοι δοκοῦσι τοῦ λόγου περινοεῖν τὴν δύναμιν "ὅση πέφυκε κἀφʼ ὅσον διέρχεται" τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ ἄγειν οὐ σκληραῖς οὐδʼ ἀντιτύποις ἀγωγαῖς ἀλλὰ τυπικαῖς καὶ τὸ ἐνδόσιμον καὶ πειθήνιον ἁπάσης ἀνάγκης καὶ βίας ἐχούσαις ἀνυσιμώτερον.
Those who wonder how the irrational is obedient to reason do not seem to me to understand the power of reason, "how great it is by nature, and how far it extends," ruling and leading not by harsh or resistant compulsions, but by flexible ones, which yield and obtain compliance more effectively than any force or violence.
ἐπεὶ καὶ πνεῦμα δήπου καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὀστᾶ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἄλογʼ ἐστίν, ἀλλʼ ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντος ὥσπερ ἡνίας τοῦ λογισμοῦ, πάντα τέταται καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει·
For indeed, breath, nerves, bones, and the other parts of the body are surely irrational; yet whenever an impulse arises, when the reasoning part shakes them like reins, all are stretched and contracted and obey.
καὶ πόδες τε θεῖν διανοηθέντος εὔτονοι καὶ χεῖρες εἰς ἔργον καθίστανται βαλεῖν ἢ λαβεῖν ὁρμήσαντος ἄριστα δʼ ὁ ποιητὴς τὸ συμπαθοῦν καὶ συγκατασχηματιζόμενον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ ἀλόγου παρίστησι διὰ τούτων " ὣς τῆς τήκετο καλὰ παρήια δάκρυ χεούσης, κλαιούσης ἑὸν ἄνδρα παρήμενον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς θυμῷ μὲν γοόωσαν ἑὴν ἐλέαιρε γυναῖκα, ὀφθαλμοὶ δʼ ὡς εἰ κέρα ἕστασαν ἠὲ σίδηρος ἀτρέμας ἐν βλεφάροισι, δόλῳ δʼ ὅ γε δάκρυα ἔκευθεν.
When one thinks of running, the feet are eager, and when one rushes to throw or catch, the hands set to work. The poet best presents this sympathy and co-shaping of the irrational with reason in these lines: "Thus her fair cheeks were melting as she wept, weeping for her own husband who sat beside her; but Odysseus in his heart pitied his weeping wife, yet his eyes stood as if they were horn or iron, unmoving in his eyelids, and by guile he hid his tears.
" οὕτως κατήκοον εἶχε τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ δάκρυον.
"So obedient to his judgment did he keep his breath, his blood, and his tears.
δηλοῦσι δὲ καὶ παρὰ καλαῖς καὶ καλοῖς, ὧν οὐκ ἐᾷ λόγος οὐδὲ νόμος θιγεῖν, αἰδοίων φυγαὶ καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις ἡσυχίαν ἀγόντων καὶ ἀτρεμούντων.
And this is also shown in the case of beautiful boys and girls, whom reason and law do not allow to touch; the retreats and withdrawals of the sexual organs when they remain quiet and still.
ὃ μάλιστα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἐρῶσιν, εἶτʼ ἀκούσασιν ὡς ἀδελφῆς ἐρῶντες ἢ θυγατρὸς ἠγνοήκασιν ἅμα γὰρ ἔπτηξε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἁψαμένου τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὰ μέρη συνευσχημονοῦντα τῇ κρίσει παρέσχε.
This especially happens to lovers when they afterwards hear that they have been loving a sister or daughter, whom they did not know; for immediately, as reason touches it, the desiring part cowers, and the body renders its parts orderly in conformity with the judgment.
σιτίοις γε μὴν πολλάκις καὶ ὄψοις μάλʼ ἡδέως προσενεχθέντες ἂν αἴσθωνται καὶ μάθωσιν αὑτοὺς τῶν μὴ καθαρῶν τι μηδὲ νομίμων ἐδηδοκότας, οὐ τῇ κρίσει μόνον ἐπιτίθεται τὸ λυποῦν καὶ δάκνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ δόξῃ συνδιατρεπόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ἔμετοι καὶ ἀνατροπαὶ ναυτιώδεις ἴσχουσι.
Nay, even with respect to food and dishes, people have often partaken of them with great pleasure, but when they perceive and learn that they have eaten something unclean or unlawful, not only does pain and biting attack their judgment, but the body itself, turning and being filled in sympathy with the opinion, suffers vomitings and nauseous upheavals.
δέδοικα δὲ μὴ δόξαιμι παντάπασιν ἐπαγωγὰ καὶ νεαρὰ τῷ λόγῳ περαίνειν, ψαλτήρια διεξιὼν καὶ λύρας καὶ πηκτίδας καὶ αὐλοὺς, καὶ ὅσα μουσικῆς προσῳδὰ καὶ προσήγορα μηχανησαμένης ἀνθρωπίνοις πάθεσιν ἄψυχα συνήδεται καὶ συνεπιθρηνεῖ καὶ συνᾴδει καὶ συνακολασταίνει, τὰς κρίσεις ἀναφέροντα καὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔθη τῶν χρωμένων.
But I fear I may seem to pursue altogether seductive and novel arguments if I go through harps, lyres, pectides, and flutes, and all the inanimate instruments of music that, designed for human passions, rejoice, mourn, sing, and share in licentiousness together with them, reflecting the judgments, passions, and habits of those who use them.
καίτοι καὶ Ζήνωνά φασιν εἰς θέατρον ἀνιόντα κιθαρῳδοῦντος Ἀμοιβέως πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς ἴωμεν εἰπεῖν ὅπως καταμάθωμεν οἵαν ἔντερα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὀστᾶ λόγου καὶ ἀριθμοῦ μετασχόντα καὶ τάξεως ἐμμέλειαν καὶ φωνὴν ἀφίησιν ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἐάσας, ἡδέως ἂν αὐτῶν πυθοίμην, εἰ κύνας καὶ ἵππους καὶ ὄρνιθας οἰκουροὺς ὁρῶντες ἔθει καὶ τροφῇ καὶ διδασκαλίᾳ φωνὰς τε συνετὰς καὶ πρὸς λόγον ὑπηκόους κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις ἀποδιδόντας καὶ πράξεις τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν ἐχούσας, Ὁμήρου τʼ ἀκούοντες τὸν Ἀχιλλέα λέγοντος ὀτρύνειν ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην, ἔτι θαυμάζουσι καὶ διαποροῦσιν εἰ τὸ θυμούμενον ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ λυπούμενον καὶ ἡδόμενον ὑπακούειν τε τῷ φρονοῦντι καὶ πάσχειν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ καὶ συνδιατίθεσθαι πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἀποικοῦν οὐδʼ, ἀπεσχοινισμένον οὐδὲ πλασσόμενον ἔξωθεν οὐδὲ τυπούμενον ἀνάγκαις τισὶν ἢ πληγαῖς, ἀλλὰ φύσει μὲν ἐξηρτημένον ἀεὶ δʼ ὁμιλοῦν καὶ συντρεφόμενον καὶ ἀναπιμπλάμενον ὑπὸ συνηθείας διὸ καὶ καλῶς ὠνόμασται τὸ ἦθος·
And yet they say that even Zeno, when going up to the theater where Amoebeus was singing to the cithara, said to his disciples: "Let us go, that we may learn what harmony and voice intestines, nerves, wood, and bones emit when they participate in reason, number, and order." But leaving these things aside, I would gladly ask them: when they see dogs, horses, and domestic birds, by habit, food, and instruction, rendering intelligible voices and movements and postures obedient to reason, and performing actions that are moderate and useful to us; and when they hear Homer saying that Achilles "urged both horses and men" to the battle—do they still wonder and doubt whether the spirited, desiring, grieving, and rejoicing parts in us are by nature suited to obey the thinking part, to be affected by it, and to be disposed in conformity with it? They do not dwell far away, nor are they fenced off, nor are they shaped from without, nor are they stamped by any necessities or blows; but they are by nature attached to it, always associating with it, growing up with it, and being filled with it through familiarity.
ἔστι μὲν γάρ, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν; ποιότης τοῦ ἀλόγου τὸ ἦθος·
Therefore, "character" (ethos) is beautifully named; for character is, to speak in outline, a quality of the irrational part.
ὠνόμασται δʼ ὅτι τὴν ποιότητα ταύτην καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον, οὐ βουλομένου τὸ πάθος ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν ʽ οὔτε γὰρ δυνατὸν οὔτʼ ἄμεινον̓, ἀλλʼ ὅρον τινὰ καὶ τάξιν ἐπιτιθέντος αὐτῷ καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς, ἀρετάς, οὐκ ἀπαθείας οὔσας ἀλλὰ συμμετρίας παθῶν καὶ μεσότητας, ἐμποιοῦντος·
It is named because the irrational part receives this quality and difference from habit (ethos), being shaped by reason, which does not wish to eliminate the passion altogether (for that is neither possible nor better), but imposes a certain limit and order on it, and produces the moral virtues, which are not apathy but symmetries and medians of passions.
ἐμποιεῖ δὲ τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ δύναμιν εἰς ἕξιν ἀστείαν καθιστάς.
And it produces them by wisdom, establishing the power of the passionate part into an excellent disposition.
τρία γὰρ δὴ ταῦτά φασι περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπάρχειν, δύναμιν πάθος ἕξιν.
For they say that these three things exist in the soul: power, passion, and disposition.
ἡ μὲν οὖν δύναμις ἀρχὴ καὶ ὕλη τοῦ πάθους, οἷον ὀργιλότης αἰσχυντηλία θαρραλεότης· τὸ δὲ πάθος κίνησίς τις ἤδη τῆς δυνάμεως, οἷον ὀργὴ αἰδὼς θάρσος ἡ δʼ ἕξις ἰσχὺς καὶ κατασκευὴ τῆς περὶ τὸ ἄλογον δυνάμεως ἐξ ἔθους ἐγγιγνομένη, κακία μὲν ἂν φαύλως δʼ ἂν καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παιδαγωγηθῇ τὸ πάθος.
Power is the beginning and material of passion, such as irascibility, bashfulness, boldness; passion is a certain movement of the power already, such as anger, shame, confidence; and disposition is the strength and structure of the power of the irrational part arising from habit, which becomes vice if the passion is guided poorly by reason, and virtue if it is guided well.

Notes

  1. ¦442c¦ὅπως ἄλογον μέν ἐστι λόγῳ δʼ ὑπήκοον — The `ὅπως` clause following the verb of wondering `θαυμάζοντες` forms an indirect question, expressing the content of their wonder: "how the irrational is obedient to reason."
  2. ¦442d¦τῷ κρατεῖν καὶ ἄγειν — The dative of the articular infinitive expresses means or manner ("by ruling and leading") and, in coordination with the subsequent `ἀγωγαῖς... ἐχούσαις` (guidance), explains the specific way reason controls the irrational part.
  3. ¦442e¦ὡς εἰ κέρα ἕστασαν — `ὡς εἰ` expresses a hypothetical comparison ("as if"). `κέρα` is the contracted nominative plural of `κέρας` (horn). The verb `ἕστασαν` is the pluperfect of `ἵστημι` with an intransitive meaning, describing a state of being completely fixed and unmoving.
  4. ¦443c¦ἔθει λαμβάνει τὸ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου πλαττόμενον — This passage explains the etymological connection between character (`ἦθος`) and habit (`ἔθος`). `ἔθει` ("by habit") is a dative of means, showing the process by which the irrational part (`•ò ἄλογον`), while being shaped (`πλαττόμενον`) by reason (`ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου`), gradually acquires its quality.

Cite this passage

Plutarch, On Moral Virtue §4. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0007.tlg094.humanitext-grc2:4

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