§3κοινῶς δʼ ἅπαντες οὗτοι τὴν ἀρετὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσίν τινα καὶ δύναμιν γεγενημένην ὑπὸ λόγου, μᾶλλον δὲ λόγον οὖσαν αὐτὴν ὁμολογούμενον καὶ βέβαιον καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑποτίθενται· καὶ νομίζουσιν οὐκ εἶναι τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον διαφορᾷ τινι καὶ φύσει ψυχῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ διακεκριμένον, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος, ὃ δὴ καλοῦσι διάνοιαν καὶ ἡγεμονικόν, διʼ ὅλου τρεπόμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς καθʼ ἕξιν ἢ διάθεσιν μεταβολαῖς κακίαν τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετήν, καὶ μηδὲν ἔχειν ἄλογον ἐν ἑαυτῷ·
In general, all these thinkers assume that virtue is a certain disposition and power of the governing part of the soul, brought about by reason, or rather that it is itself a consistent, firm, and unwavering reason; and they believe that the passionate and irrational part is not distinguished from the rational by any difference and nature of the soul, but that the same part of the soul—which indeed they call intellect and the governing part—by turning and changing as a whole both in passions and in changes of habit or disposition, becomes both vice and virtue, and has nothing irrational in itself.
λέγεσθαι δʼ ἄλογον, ὅταν τῷ πλεονάζοντι τῆς ὁρμῆς ἰσχυρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ κρατήσαντι πρός τι τῶν ἀτόπων παρὰ τὸν αἱροῦντα λόγον ἐκφέρηται· καὶ γὰρ τὸ πάθος εἶναι λόγον πονηρὸν καὶ ἀκόλαστον ἐκ φαύλης καὶ διημαρτημένης κρίσεως σφοδρότητα καὶ ῥώμην προσλαβούσης.
And they say it is called irrational when, by the excess of impulse becoming strong and prevailing, it is carried away toward something improper against the choosing reason; for indeed, passion is a wicked and licentious reason, having acquired vehemence and strength from a bad and erroneous judgment.
ἔοικε δὲ λαθεῖν τούτους ἅπαντας, ᾗ διττὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἕκαστός ἐστι καὶ σύνθετος· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν διπλόην οὐ κατεῖδον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος μῖξιν ἐμφανεστέραν οὖσαν·
But all these seem to have been unaware of the way in which each of us is truly double and composite; for they did not perceive the other duplicity, but only the mixture of soul and body, which is more obvious.
ὅτι δʼ αὐτῆς ἔστι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ σύνθετόν τι καὶ διφυὲς καὶ ἀνόμοιον, ὥσπερ ἑτέρου σώματος τοῦ ἀλόγου πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ καὶ φύσει συμμιγέντος καὶ συναρμοσθέντος, εἰκὸς μέν ἐστι μηδὲ Πυθαγόραν ἀγνοῆσαι, τεκμαιρομένοις τῇ περὶ μουσικὴν σπουδῇ τοῦ ἀνδρός, ἣν ἐπηγάγετο τῇ ψυχῇ κηλὴσεως ἕνεκα καὶ παραμυθίας, ὡς οὐ πᾶν ἐχούσῃ διδασκαλίας καὶ μαθήματος ὑπήκοον οὐδὲ λόγῳ μεταβλητὸν ἐκ κακίας, ἀλλά τινος ἑτέρας πειθοῦς συνεργοῦ καὶ πλάσεως καὶ τιθασεύσεως δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ παντάπασι μέλλοι φιλοσοφίᾳ δυσμεταχείριστον εἶναι καὶ ἀπειθές.
But that there is within the soul itself, in itself, something composite, dual-natured, and dissimilar—as if another, irrational body were mixed and fitted together with reason by some necessity and nature—is likely that even Pythagoras was not ignorant of, as we may infer from the man's dedication to music, which he introduced to the soul for the sake of soothing and consolation, since not all of it is obedient to instruction and learning, nor is it changeable from vice by reason alone, but requires some other cooperative persuasion, shaping, and taming, if it is not to be altogether difficult to handle and disobedient to philosophy.
ἐμφανῶς μέντοι καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀναμφιδόξως Πλάτων συνεῖδεν, ὅτι τούτου γε τοῦ κόσμου τὸ ἔμψυχον οὐχ ἁπλοῦν οὐδʼ ἀσύνθετον οὐδὲ μονοειδές ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ἐκ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἑτέρου μεμιγμένον δυνάμεως πῆ μὲν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ κοσμεῖται καὶ περιπολεῖ μιᾷ τάξει κράτος ἐχούσῃ χρώμενον, πῆ δʼ εἴς τε κινήσεις καὶ κύκλους σχιζόμενον ὑπεναντίους καὶ πλανητοὺς ἀρχὴν διαφορᾶς καὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ ἀνομοιότητος ἐνδίδωσι ταῖς περὶ γῆν φθοραῖς καὶ γενέσεσιν ἥ τʼ ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ μέρος ἤ τι μίμημα τῆς τοῦ παντὸς οὖσα καὶ συνηρμοσμένη κατὰ λόγους καὶ ἀριθμοὺς ἐοικότας ἐκείνοις οὐχ ἁπλῆ τίς ἐστιν οὐδʼ ὁμοιοπαθής, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον μὲν ἔχει τὸ νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, ᾧ κρατεῖν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ φύσιν καὶ ἄρχειν προσῆκόν ἐστιν· ἕτερον δὲ τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ πολυπλανὲς καὶ ἄτακτον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ δεόμενον.
However, clearly, firmly, and unambiguously Plato perceived that the animate part of this universe is not simple, nor uncomposite, nor of a single form, but mixed from the power of the Same and that of the Other; on the one hand, it is always ordered and revolves in the same way, employing a single order that holds sway, and on the other hand, being split into contrary and wandering movements and circles, it provides the beginning of difference, change, and unlikeness to the destructions and generations around the earth. And the soul of man, being a part or some imitation of the soul of the whole, and fitted together according to ratios and numbers resembling those, is not simple nor single in its passions, but has on the one hand the intellectual and rational part, to which it is fitting by nature to rule and govern man; and on the other hand the passionate, irrational, wandering, and disordered part, which of itself requires guidance.
οὗ πάλιν διχῆ μεριζομένου, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ σώματι βουλόμενον συνεῖναι καὶ σῶμα θεραπεύειν πεφυκὸς ἐπιθυμητικὸν κέκληται, τὸ δʼ ἔστι μὲν τούτῳ προστιθέμενον, ἔστι δʼ ᾗ τῷ λογισμῷ παρέχον ἰσχὺν ἐπὶ τοῦτο καὶ δύναμιν, θυμοειδές.
Of this, again divided into two, that which always wishes to be with the body and is by nature suited to care for the body is called the appetitive part, while that which is sometimes allied with this, and sometimes provides strength and power to reason against it, is the spirited part.
ἀποδείκνυσι δὲ τὴν διαφορὰν μάλιστα τῇ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος ἀντιβάσει πρὸς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ θυμούμενον, ὡς τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι πολλάκις ἀπειθοῦν τε καὶ δυσμαχοῦν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον.
And he proves the difference especially by the resistance of the reasoning and thinking part against the appetitive and spirited parts, in that the latter is often disobedient and struggles against the best.
ταύταις ἐχρήσατο ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐπὶ πλέον Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν ἔγραψεν ὕστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδὲς τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένειμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμὸν ὄντα καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως.
These principles Aristotle used to a greater extent, as is clear from what he wrote; though later he assigned the spirited part to the appetitive, on the ground that anger is a certain appetite and desire for retaliation.
τῷ μέντοι παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ μέχρι παντὸς ὡς διαφέροντι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ χρώμενος διετέλεσεν, οὐχ ὅτι παντελῶς ἄλογόν ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτικὸν καὶ φυτικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὅλως ἀνήκοα λόγου καὶ κωφὰ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐκβεβλάστηκε καὶ περὶ τὸ σῶμα παντελῶς καταπέφυκε· τὸ δὲ παθητικὸν οἰκείου λόγου στέρεται καὶ ἄμοιρόν ἐστιν, ἄλλως δὲ τοῦ λογιζομένου καὶ φρονοῦντος εἰσακούειν καὶ τρέπεσθαι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὑπείκειν καὶ κατασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν, ἐὰν μὴ τέλεον ᾗ διεφθαρμένον ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς ἀμαθοῦς καὶ ἀκολάστου διαίτης.
However, he continued to treat the passionate and irrational part as differing from the rational until the end, not because it is completely irrational like the sensory or the nutritive and vegetative part of the soul; for these, being altogether disobedient to reason and deaf in a way, have grown out of the flesh and are completely rooted in the body; whereas the passionate part is destitute of and has no share in its own reason, but is by nature suited to listen to the reasoning and thinking part, and to turn toward it, yield to it, and be shaped by it, unless it is completely corrupted by the pleasure of an ignorant and licentious way of life.