§7Quod si iam placeret omnia sensibilia nominare, non modo ea, quae sentiremus, sed etiam ea, quae non sentiendo, tamen per corpus iudicaremus, sicut per oculos tenebras et per aures silentium — et illas enim non uidendo et hoc non audiendo cognoscimus — rursusque intellegibilia, non ea tantum, quae inlustrata mente conspicimus, sicuti est ipsa sapientia, sed etiam illa, quae ipsius inlustrationis priuatione auersamur, ut est insipientia, quam tenebras animi congrue dixerimus: nullam de uerbo facerem controuersiam, sed totam quaestionem facili diuisione dissoluerem statimque adprobarem bene adtendentibus substantias intellegibiles sensibilibus substantiis diuina et incorrupta ueritatis lege praeponi, non earum - substantiarum defectus, quamuis hos intellegibiles, illes sensibiles appellare uellemus.
But if now it were pleasing to name all things "sensible," not only those which we perceive, but also those which, although not perceiving them, we nevertheless judge through the body, such as darkness through the eyes and silence through the ears—for indeed we know the former by not seeing and the latter by not hearing—and on the other hand to name "intelligible" not only those things which we behold with an illuminated mind, such as wisdom itself, but also those things from which we turn away by the privation of that very illumination, such as foolishness, which we might fitly call the darkness of the mind: I would make no controversy about the word, but would dissolve the whole question by an easy division, and would immediately prove to those paying good attention that intelligible substances are preferred to sensible substances by the divine and incorruptible law of truth, not the defects of those substances, even though we should wish to call the former intelligible and the latter sensible.
quapropter qui et haec lumina uisibilia et illas intellegibiles animas substantias esse faterentur, omni modo eos cogi sublimiores partes animis tribuere atque concedere, defectus uero utriusque generis non posse alteros alteris anteponi; priuant enim tantum et non esse indicant, quod usquequaque eandem uim habent, sicut ipsae negationes.
Wherefore, those who should confess both that these visible lights and those intelligible souls are substances, are in every way compelled to attribute and grant more sublime parts to souls, but that the defects of either kind cannot be preferred one to the other; for they only deprive and indicate non-existence, in which respect they have everywhere the same force, just like negations themselves.
nam cum dicimus: non est aurum, et: non est uirtus, quamuis inter aurum et uirtutes plurimum, nihil tamen inter negationes, quas eis adiunximus, distat.
For when we say, "there is no gold," and "there is no virtue," although there is a very great difference between gold and virtue, yet there is no difference between the negations which we have joined to them.
uerum enimuero peius est non esse uirtutem quam non esse aurum, nemo sanus hinc ambigit, quod non propter ipsas negationes, sed propter res, quibus adiunguntur, accidere quis non intellegat? auro enim uirtus quanto praestat, tanto est uirtute quam auro carere miserius.
But indeed, that it is worse for there to be no virtue than for there to be no gold, no sane person doubts; and who would not understand that this happens not on account of the negations themselves, but on account of the things to which they are joined? For by how much virtue excels gold, by so much is it more wretched to lack virtue than gold.
quamobrem cum res intellegibiles sensibilibus rebus antecellunt, defectum in intellegibilibus quam in sensibilibus merito aegrius toleramus, non eos defectus, sed ea, quae deficiunt, carius uel uilius aestimantes.
Wherefore, since intelligible things excel sensible things, we deservedly bear a defect in intelligible things with more difficulty than in sensible things, evaluating not those defects, but those things which are deficient, as more precious or less precious.
ex quo iam illud adparet defectum uitae, quae intellegibilis est, multo miserabiliorem esse quam huius sensibilis lucis, quod scilicet multo est carior intellecta uita quam lux ista conspecta.
From which it now appears that the defect of life, which is intelligible, is much more wretched than that of this sensible light, for the obvious reason that life understood is much more precious than this light beheld.
§8Quae cum ita sint, audebitne quisquam, cum solem ac lunam et quicquid in sideribus, quicquid denique in hoc igni nostro atque terreno luce uisibili effulget, deo tribuat, animas quaslibet, quae profecto nisi uiuendo animae non sunt, cum tanto hoc lumen uita praecedat. ex deo esse nolle concedere? et cum ille uerum dicat.
Since these things are so, will anyone dare, while he attributes to God the sun and the moon and whatever in the stars, and finally whatever in this fire of ours and of the earth shines with visible light, to refuse to grant that any souls whatsoever, which indeed are not souls except by living, since life so greatly precedes this light, are from God?
qui dicit: in quantum nitet. ex deo est, egone tandem. deus magne. mentiar, si dicam: in quantum uiuit.
And since he speaks truth who says, "Insofar as it shines, it is from God," shall I at last, O great God, tell a lie if I say, "Insofar as it lives, it is from God"?
ex deo est? non usque adeo. quaeso, caecitas mentis subpliciaque augeantur animorum. ut haec homines non intellegant.
May the blindness of mind and the punishments of souls not be increased to such an extent, I pray, that men do not understand these things.
sed quoquo modo illorum error aut pertinacia sese haberet, his ego fretus armatusque rationibus credo, cum ad eos rem ita consideratam perspectamque detulissem et cum his placide contulissem. uererer. ne mihi quisquam eorum alicuius momenti esse uideretur, si aut intellectum aut ea, quae intellectu, non per defectum perciperentur, sensui conaretur praeferre aut saltem conparare corporeo uel his rebus, quae ad eundem sensum cognoscendum similiter pertinerent.
But in whatever way their error or obstinacy might stand, relying and armed with these reasons, I believe that, when I had brought this matter so considered and examined to them, and had calmly conferred with them, I would fear lest any of them should seem to me to be of any consequence, if he should attempt to prefer either the intellect or those things which are perceived by the intellect (not through defect) to bodily sense, or at least to compare them to the bodily sense or to those things which similarly pertain to knowing the same sense.
quo constituto quando ille mihi uel quisquam negare auderet animas, quantum uellet malas, tamen, quoniam animae essent, intellegibilium rerum numero contineri neque illas per defectum intellegi? siquidem animae non alio essent, nisi quo uiuerent licet enim per defectum intellegerentur uitiosae, quia uirtutis egestate uitiosae, non tamen per defectum animae, quia ui. uendo animae.
This being established, when would he or anyone dare to deny to me that souls, however evil they might be, yet, since they are souls, are contained in the number of intelligible things and that they are not understood through defect? Since indeed souls would not exist by any other thing than by that by which they live; for although they might be understood as vicious through defect, because they are vicious through lack of virtue, yet they are not souls through defect, because they are souls by living.
nec fieri potest, ut uitae praesentia sit causa deficiendi, cum tanto quidque deficiat, quanto deseritur uita.
Nor can it happen that the presence of life is the cause of failing, since everything fails by so much as it is deserted by life.