§6Hoc loco si quisquam illorum cautus et uigilans iam etiam studiosior quam pertinacior me admoneret non de uitiosis animis. sed de ipsis uitiis esse quaerendum — quae quoniam sensu corporis non cognoscerentur. et tamen cognoscerentur, non nisi intellegibilia posse accipi; quae si sensibilibus omnibus antecellunt, cur lucem deo auctori esse tribuendam inter nos conueniret, uitiorum uero auctorem deum nemo nisi sacrilegus diceret — responderem homini, si aut statim et repente. ut bonis dei cultoribus solet. diuinitus infulsisset huius solutio quaestionis, aut fuisset antea praeparata: quorum si neutrum meruissem atque potuissem, coepta differrem; quodque esset propositum, difficile esse ad dinoscendum atque arduum confiterer.
At this point, if any of them, cautious and watchful, and now even more eager for truth than obstinate, should admonish me that we ought to inquire not about vicious souls but about vices themselves—which, since they are not known by the sense of the body, and yet are known, cannot but be accepted as intelligible; which, if they surpass all sensible things, why should it be agreed between us that light is to be attributed to God as its author, while no one but a sacrilegious person would say that God is the author of vices?—I would answer the man, if either immediately and suddenly, as is wont to happen to good worshipers of God, the solution to this question had flashed upon me from heaven, or had been prepared beforehand: if I had deserved and been able to do neither of these, I would defer what had been begun; and I would confess that what was proposed was difficult to discern and arduous.
recurrerem in me, prosternerer deo, alte ingemerem quaerens, ne me in medio spatio, quo certis rationibus promouissem, haerere pateretur; ne ancipiti quaestione cogerer aut intellegibilia sensibilibus submittere ac subdere. aut ipsum uitiorum dicere auctorem: cum esset utrumuis horum falsitatis inpietatisque plenissimum. nullo modo possem existimare. quod me sic adfectum ille desereret.
I would run back into myself, prostrate myself to God, groan deeply, seeking that He would not suffer me to stick in the middle of the space to which I had advanced by certain reasons; lest by a double question I should be forced either to submit and subject intelligible things to sensible things, or to say that He Himself is the author of vices: since whichever of these was most full of falsehood and impiety, I could in no way think that He would desert me so affected.
admoneret ergo suis illis ineffabilibus modis, ut considerarem etiam atque etiam. utrum animi uitia. de quibus aestuarem, inter intellegibilia numeranda essent.
He would therefore admonish me in those ineffable ways of His, that I should consider again and again whether the vices of the soul, about which I was in turmoil, were to be numbered among intelligible things.
quod ut reperirem propter inbecillitatem interioris oculi mei, quae mihi peccatis meis iure accidisset, aliquem mihi ad inuisibilia contuenda in ipsis uisibilibus machinarer gradum: quorum esset nobis nullo modo certior cognitio, sed consuetudo fidentior.
In order that I might find this out, on account of the weakness of my inner eye, which had rightly happened to me because of my sins, I would devise some step for myself in those visible things themselves for contemplating invisible things: of which we would have in no way a more certain knowledge, but a more confident familiarity.
itaque statim quaererem, quid ad sensum proprie pertineret oculorum.
Therefore, I would immediately ask what belonged properly to the sense of the eyes.
inuenirem colores, quorum principatum lux ista obtineret.
I would find colors, of which this light held the primacy.
haec enim sunt. quae nullus alius sensus adtingit: nam motus corporum et magnitudines et interualla et figuras. quamuis et oculis. non tamen proprie. sed tactu etiam posse sentiri.
For these are the things which no other sense touches: for the motions of bodies, and magnitudes, and intervals, and figures, although they are perceived also by the eyes, are yet not properly so, but can be felt also by touch.
unde colligerem tanto ceteris corporeis et sensibilibus praestare lucem, quanto aliis sensibus aspectus esset inlustrior.
Whence I would gather that light so far excels other bodily and sensible things, as sight is more illustrious than the other senses.
eiecta igitur ex omnibus, quae corpore sentiuntur, ista luce. qua niterer et in qua gradum illum inquisitionis meae necessario conlocarem, pergerem adtendere, quid ageretur hoc modo. mecumque ista sermocinarer: si sol iste tanta claritate conspicuus et diei luce sufficiens usque ad lunae similitudinem in conspectu nostro paulatim deficeret, num aliud quicquam oculis sentiremus quam lucem utcumque fulgentem, lucem tamen quaerentes.
Having therefore cast out from all things that are felt by the body this light, upon which I would rely and in which I would of necessity place that step of my inquiry, I would proceed to attend to what would be done in this way, and would commune thus with myself: if this sun, conspicuous with such great brightness and sufficient for the light of day, should gradually fail in our sight even to the likeness of the moon, would we feel anything else with our eyes than light shining in whatever way, yet seeking light by not seeing what had been, and drawing in by seeing what was present?
quod fuerat, non uidendo et haurientes uidendo quod aderat? non ergo illum defectum uideremus, sed lucem. quae defectui remaneret.
We would not therefore see that defect, but the light which remained to the defect.
cum autem non uideremus, non sentiremus: quicquid enim sentimus aspectu. non potest non uideri.
But when we did not see, we would not feel: for whatever we feel by sight cannot but be seen.
quare si defectus ille neque uisu neque alio sensu sentiretur, non posset inter sensibilia numerari.
Wherefore, if that defect were felt neither by sight nor by any other sense, it could not be numbered among sensible things.
nihil enim sensibile est. quod sentiri non potest.
For nothing is sensible which cannot be felt.
referamus nunc considerationem ad uirtutem, cuius intellegibili luce splendere animum conuenientissime dicimus.
Let us now refer our consideration to virtue, in whose intelligible light we most fittingly say that the soul shines.
porro ab hac luce uirtutis defectus quidam non perimens animam. sed obscurans uitium uocatur.
Furthermore, from this light of virtue a certain defect, not destroying the soul but obscuring it, is called a vice.
potest igitur recte uitium quoque animi nequaquam inter intellegibilia numerari. ut lucis ille defectus recte de sensibilium numero eximitur: illud tamen quod remanet animae, id est hoc ipsum. quod uiuit atque anima est, tam est intellegibile quam sensibile illud, quod in hoc uisibili lumine post defectum quantumcumque fulgeret: et ideo animam in quantum anima esset et uitae participaret, sine qua nullo pacto esse anima potest. rectissime omnibus sensibilibus anteferri.
Therefore, the vice of the soul also can rightly in no way be numbered among intelligible things, just as that defect of light is rightly exempted from the number of sensible things: yet that which remains to the soul, that is, this very thing which lives and is a soul, is as intelligible as that sensible thing which, in this visible light, shone in whatever way after the defect: and therefore that the soul, insofar as it is a soul and participates in life, without which it can in no way be a soul, is most rightly preferred to all sensible things.
quamobrem maximi erroris esse ullam animam dicere non esse ex deo. ex quo esse solem lunamque glorieris.
Wherefore, it is of the greatest error to say that any soul is not from God, from whom you boast that the sun and the moon are.