Humanitext Reader

Augustine · Against Fortunatus §20

Debate on Free Will versus External Compulsion to Evil

Passage 7 of 13 · Latin

Summary

Augustine argues that evil originates not from God but from the free will of the soul, without which divine judgment and moral responsibility would be impossible. Fortunatus counters that granting free will would make God the author of sin, maintaining that humans are forced to sin by an external hostile substance.

§20AuG. dixit: Et nostra fides haec est, quod malorum genitor non sit deus neque ullam naturam fecerit malam.
Aug. said: "And our faith is this, that God is not the generator of evils, nor did He make any nature evil.
sed cum uterque nostrum consentiat incorruptibilem deum et incoinquinabilem, prudentium est aestimare et fidelium, quae sit fides purior et maiestate dei dignior: illa. ubi adseritur uel uirtus dei uel pars aliqua dei uel sermo dei posse commutari. uiolari, corrumpi, ligari, an ea, ubi dicitur et omnipotentem deum et omnem ipsius naturam et substantiam nulla parte umquam posse corrumpi, sed mala esse uoluntario peccato animae, cui dedit deus liberum arbitrium.
But since both of us agree that God is incorruptible and undefilable, it is for the prudent and the faithful to judge which is the purer faith and more worthy of the majesty of God: that one, where it is asserted that either the power of God, or some part of God, or the Word of God can be changed, violated, corrupted, bound; or this one, where it is said that both almighty God and all His nature and substance can never be corrupted in any part, but that evils exist by the voluntary sin of the soul, to which God gave free will.
quod liberum arbitrium si non dedisset deus, iudicium puniendi nullum iustum esse posset nec meritum recte faciendi nec praeceptum diuinum, ut ageretur paenitentia de peccatis, nec ipsa indulgentia peccatorum, quam nobis deus per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum donauit, quia qui non uoluntate peccat, non peccat.
Which free will if God had not given, no judgment of punishing could be just, nor any merit of doing rightly, nor divine precept that repentance should be done for sins, nor the very forgiveness of sins which God gave us through our Lord Jesus Christ, because he who does not sin by his will does not sin.
hoc arbitror omnibus apertum esse atque perspicuum.
I think this is open and clear to everyone.
quapropter non nos mouere debent, si aliqua in his, quae deus fecit, molesta patimur pro meritis nostris.
Therefore, we ought not to be disturbed if we suffer some troublesome things among those which God made, in accordance with our merits.
sicut enim ille bonus est, ut constitueret omnia, sic iustus est, ut peccatis non parcat.
For just as He is good, so as to establish all things, so He is just, so as not to spare sins.
quae peccata, ut dixi, nisi libera uoluntas esset in nobis, peccata non essent.
Which sins, as I said, unless there were free will in us, would not be sins.
si quis enim uerbi causa ligaretur ab aliquo ceteris membris et de manu eius falsum scriberetur sine eius propria uoluntate, quaero, si hoc iudici patefieret, possit hunc hominem falsitatis crimine condemnare? quare si manifestum est peccatum non esse, ubi non est liberum uoluntatis arbitrium, uolo audire animam, quam dicitis aut partem aut uirtutem aut sermonem aut quodlibet aliud dei, quid mali fecerit, ut a deo puniatur aut paenitentiam agat peccati, ut ueniam mereatur, cum nihil ipsa peccauerit. FORT. dixit: De substantiis proposui, quod bonorum tantummodo deus creator, ultor uero malorum habeatur, eo quod mala ex ipso non sint.
For if, for example, someone were bound by another in his other limbs, and something false were written by his hand without his own will, I ask, if this were made clear to the judge, could he condemn this man on a charge of falsehood? Therefore, if it is manifest that there is no sin where there is no free choice of the will, I want to hear what evil the soul—which you say is either a part, or a power, or the Word, or any other thing of God—has done, so that it should be punished by God or do penance for sin to deserve pardon, when it has itself sinned in nothing." Fort. said: "I proposed concerning substances that God is held to be the creator only of good things, but the avenger of evils, because evils are not from Him.
merito ergo hoc sentio et ulcisci deum mala, quia ex ipso non sunt.
Deservedly therefore I hold this, and that God avenges evils because they are not from Him.
ceterum si ex ipso essent aut daret licentiam peccandi, quod dicis liberum arbitrium dedisse deum, consensor iam inueniebatur delicti mei, eo quod delicti mei auctor esset, aut ignorans quod futurus essem delinquere, quem ipse non se dignum institueret.
But if they were from Him, or if He gave permission to sin—which is what you say when you say God gave free will—He would already be found an accomplice to my crime, because He would be the author of my crime, or He would be ignorant that I was going to transgress, whom He Himself established as not worthy of Himself.
hoc ergo propositum est a me, et quod interrogo nunc, utrum deus mala instituerit necne, et utrum ipse finem malorum instituerit.
This therefore was proposed by me, and what I ask now is whether God established evils or not, and whether He Himself established an end to evils.
etenim quae ab ipso diximus facta esse ut opifice deo, uti ab ipso creata et genita incorruptibilia haberi, his rebus et paret et fides euangelica docet.
For those things which we said were made by Him as the creator God, so as to be held incorruptible, created and begotten by Him, both agree with these facts and the evangelical faith teaches so.
haec ego et proposui, quae sunt credulitatis nostrae et quae a te possunt in ista professione nostra firmari, ita tamen, ut non desit auctoritas fidei christianae.
These things I have both proposed, which belong to our belief and which can be confirmed by you in this profession of ours, in such a way, however, that the authority of the Christian faith is not lacking.
et quia nullo genere recte me credere ostendere possum, nisi eandem fidem scripturarum auctoritate firmauerim, id ergo est, quod insinuaui, quod dixi.
And because I can in no way show that I believe rightly, unless I confirm the same faith by the authority of the Scriptures, that is therefore what I suggested, what I said.
aut si mala auctore deo in mundum peruenerunt, hoc ipse dicere dignare; aut si recte creditur mala ex deo non esse, hoc etiam praesentium contemplatio prosequi debet et suscipere.
Or if evils have come into the world with God as their author, deign to say this yourself; or if it is rightly believed that evils are not from God, the consideration of those present ought also to follow and accept this.
de substantiis dixi, non de peccato, quod in nobis uersatur.
I spoke of substances, not of the sin which dwells in us.
si enim originem non haberet, quod cogitamus delicta facere, non cogeremur ad peccatum uenire uel ad delictum.
For if that by which we think to commit sins had no origin, we would not be forced to come to sin or to transgression.
nam quia inuiti peccamus et cogimur a contraria et inimica nobis substantia, idcirco sequimur scientiam rerum.
For because we sin unwillingly and are forced by a substance contrary and hostile to us, for that reason we follow the knowledge of things.
qua scientia admonita anima et memoriae pristinae reddita recognoscet, ex quo originem trahat, in quo malo uersetur, quibus bonis iterum emendans, quod nolens peccauit, possit per emendationem delictorum suorum bonorum operum gratia meritum sibi reconciliationis apud deum collocare auctore deo saluatore nostro. qui nos docet et bona exercere et mala fugere.
Admonished by which knowledge and restored to its pristine memory, the soul will recognize from what it draws its origin, in what evil it is turned, and by what good things, correcting again what it sinned unwillingly, it can, through the correction of its transgressions, by the grace of good works, establish for itself the merit of reconciliation with God, under the authorship of God our Savior, who teaches us both to practice good things and to flee from evils.
propositum est enim nobis, quod non aliqua contraria natura. sed sua sponte homo aut iustitiae seruiat aut peccatis se obnoxium faciat.
For it is proposed to us, that not by any contrary nature, but of his own accord a man either serves justice or makes himself subject to sins.
cum nulla contraria gente, si sola uersatur anima in corpore constituta. cui deus, ut dicis, liberum arbitrium dedit. sine peccato esset nec peccatis se obnoxium faceret.
Whereas, if there were no contrary nation, if the soul alone were turned, being established in the body—to which God, as you say, gave free will—it would be without sin, nor would it make itself subject to sins."

Notes

  1. 1105billa, ubi adseritur... an ea, ubi dicitur — The comparative structure `illa... an ea...` clearly contrasts the two opposing beliefs: the Manichaean doctrine (`illa`, that the power or Word of God can be bound and corrupted) and the orthodox Christian doctrine (`ea`, that God is immutable and evil arises from free will).
  2. 1105bquod liberum arbitrium si non dedisset deus — The relative pronoun `quod` is used adjectivally to modify `liberum arbitrium` at the beginning of the sentence to connect with the preceding context (connecting relative). It is situated inside the conditional clause `si non dedisset`, meaning "if God had not given this free will."
  3. 1105bconsensor iam inueniebatur... aut ignorans — In the apodosis of a contrary-to-fact conditional sentence, the indicative imperfect `inueniebatur` is used instead of the subjunctive imperfect. This usage emphasizes the certainty or inevitability of the logical consequence if the condition had been fulfilled (i.e., if evil had originated from God).
  4. 1105bcum nulla contraria gente, si sola uersatur anima — `cum` governs the imperfect subjunctives `esset` and `faceret`, introducing a contrary-to-fact scenario ("whereas, if there were no contrary nation and only the soul existed..."). `nulla contraria gente` can be understood as an ablative absolute with an omitted participle such as `existente`.

Cite this passage

Augustine, Against Fortunatus §20. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:latinLit:stoa0040.stoa024b.humanitext-lat1:20

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